














# THE PERSONALIST

VOLUME I



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## Our Contributors' Page

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## TO THE GENTLE PERSONALIST

WHY WE SHOULD CALL YOU GENTLE we do not know, save that the reader is ever "gentle" reader and we presume that it may be after the same manner with personalists.

¶ Many, very many, who will feel that these words are addressed to them will do so because the set of their minds is fundamentally due to the influence of a great American thinker who named his system of thought—Personalism. If your inspiration to the personalistic view of life is due to that impulse, well and good.

¶ In his last public address Dr. Bowne said something about his work being done. To the students whom he had taught to bend the bow and aim the shaft he left the remaining task.

¶ Since those words were spoken ten years have passed. With the passage of years the significance of his thought has grown upon us as the proportions of a mountain clear themselves with distance. The effect of those teachings, however, can be perpetuated only as they enter into the living thought of today through living channels. On this task many men have been working disconnectedly and fragmentarily. It is now time to furnish a focus for the perpetuation of that wisdom which has meant so much to us. Bowne would have been the last of all of us to wish the slavish perpetuation of his teaching or interpretations for he was no literalist, believing rather in the inspiration which giveth life. Is not the personalistic interpretation of life worth magnifying? Will you do your share by subscription, voice and pen? The line of action is clear.

¶ To other Personalists it may seem worth while to perpetuate the theistic and personalistic type of philosophy. So far as we know this is the first undisguised attempt in this form to provide a nucleus for such thinking. Will you share with us the labors and responsibilities? Doubtless others could have done it better, but someone must needs start.

¶ So this is your invitation to join our company.

THE EDITOR.

# The Personalist

VOLUME I

APRIL 1920

NUMBER 1

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## CAN CIVILIZATION BECOME CHRISTIAN

RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

The crusades marked the break-up of an institutionalized and provincial world, the limit of a culture characteristically Roman. In politics, the crusades, the resort of kings to further the monarchical system, were the beginnings of a movement that ended far off in a high tide of democracy. Intended to increase the power and authority of the church they introduced a liberalizing movement that resulted in the Reformation. Entered upon in a blind and dogmatic devotion they prepared the way for the revival of learning and gave to science its early impetus. In a day when philosophy was scholastic and pedantic were sown the seeds destined to revolutionize philosophical systems. Indeed the perspective of history will show that many of the movements of the latest century had their roots in the results that grew out of the greatest previous world upheaval, the crusades. As one can best compare mountain range with mountain range by ascending the highest peaks so it may be possible to get light on the present situation by considering the developments that came from that far-off time.

Of these various developments commonly known as the Renaissance the deeper movements came to the later flowering. The period of revolution in government and of the enlightenment in philosophy was really the after-flowering of the earlier efforts.

The whole movement from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries is the story of a developing individualism, which sprang from the revival of the Hellenistic spirit. It represents the breaking away from cramping institutionalized forms, the protest of the individual against tyrannical dominance and over-lordship of every kind. It nursed the dream that the largest good to the whole could come only out of the largest development of the individual. Hence it was a movement of vast significance in historical results. Upon its doctrine and achievements have been built some of the most precious accomplishments of society.

Rousseau may be named as the chief spokesman for individualism in its late political evolution. He represented that mighty political revulsion which resulted in the establishment of independence in America and culminated in a new democracy in Europe.

Nor was Rousseau's influence confined to the realm of politics. He gave a tremendous impetus to the romantic movement in literature. A prevailing passion of his age was the passion for self-expression. Stress was laid upon personal meditation, reflection, and experience altogether out of proportion to their real value. The writing of journals became a common literary occupation. Out of this grew an over-valuation of both the cultural and religious worth of these inner experiences. One most profoundly influenced was the poet Goethe. His life story became one of an effort for individual development at any moral cost. The end of emotional attainment was held to justify the means, with the result that morals, religion, and

the sense of honor were sacrificed to individual culture. We note in Goethe the beginning of that process which has so profoundly influenced the literature of the nineteenth century and which has given us Nietzsche and the contemporary doctrine of the Superman.

Rousseau's *Emile* became the basis of an individualistic theory of education which is a widely prevailing standard in the educational system of today. Its development has been attended by an ever increasing secularization of education. Worse than that, the place of morality and religion in cultural development has not only been ignored, in too many quarters it has become educational anathema. It has been dubbed unscientific and a prejudice has been created against it. Pure culture has been held as not only complete when separated from deep religious sentiment, but religious sentiment has been widely held as incompatible with deep culture or with scientific attainment. The influence of individualism in education has run the limit of its progress in the Prussian *Kultur*, and has exerted a marked influence in many institutions of learning.

On the ethical side the progress of individualism was strangely influenced from behind its own age. Spinoza was scarcely known for a hundred years after his work was done. That he then became a power was largely due to the resurrection of his system by Herder and its acceptance by Goethe. Spinoza's doctrine that we become one with God by an act of reason became the key-note of Goethe's *Faust*. Whatever increases the understanding or is useful to the individual cultural development is morally good. According to this ethic, pity, shame, remorse, repentance are but vices that repeat the offense. One who regrets an evil past is weak and conscious of his weakness. The will to knowledge and to power are the moving impulses of great characters. Thus was injected into the world of education, art and literature that subtle

poison which has embarrassed individualism with an intolerable burden.

This ethical development might have been far more wide-spread among the nations of democracy had there not been another movement contemporaneous with it and which prospered on the soil of individualism. This movement was religious, and though commonly identified with the name of Wesley, has permeated all surviving forms of Christianity. It turned the wine of the new enthusiasm for individualism into new religious wine-flasks. Great emphasis was placed upon individual internal experience and upon individual culture. While no doubt this led to many excesses and to some misunderstanding of religious reality, it had the balance wheel of moral and religious devotion which kept it from running into a pure selfishness like that of Super-manism. When eventual history comes to be written it will be discovered as an inestimable influence in individual restraint, and in the moralization and strengthening of free institutions. Had it not been for this deeper religious influence running parallel with the movement of individualism, individualism could have accomplished little for democracy but ruin. Democracy without moral and spiritual restraint is impossible, and has been so demonstrated from the time of the excesses of the Reign of Terror to the exaltation of Russian Bolshevism. True democracy means self-government and self-government is impossible without the presence in the individual of restraining moral and spiritual influences.

In science, individualism has manifested itself in the emphasis upon the empirical method. Each individual can conduct his own experiment, and his experience becomes the ultimate word for science. The tendency has been to protest against the restraining influence of any unity or system and to emphasize the pluralistic view of life. The extreme of this development is to be seen in men of the

type of Haeckel, and in many unjustified claims of modern materialistic science.

In philosophy, the movement has been along the lines of empiricism, realism, positivism, and intellectual skepticism. A persistent attempt has been made to clear the philosophical field of all religious and theistic implications in an effort to be more scientific. The result has been an inadequate and one-sided view of the human personality. Viewed as a mere receptacle for material and outward born impulses, or at best a conglomeration of reactions, the individual has become in philosophic thought little else than an automaton incapable of moral action and passing on the exact ratio of impressions received.

With such an interpretation of the person it is easy to arrive at a perverted view of individual culture, such as possessed the minds of many of the early and late romanticists. The emphasis on the evolutionary theory seemed to put the weightier elements of development beyond the power of individual responsibility. It further laid great stress upon the development of the individual as the goal of all progress. While it exalted the development of individuals it likewise taught that less fortunate forms must perish to create the typical man. If one were, then, a "free-spirit," typical man, or "Super-man" there should be no distress at the suffering of the less perfect for one's own better advancement and deeper culture. One needed only a certain egotistic assurance that he was of the "Super-man" type, and all the world was to lie like an oyster at his feet, to be opened and swallowed at his pleasure.

It does not take such an individualism long even though it start from a socialistic standpoint, to become the narrowest and meanest kind of an autocracy. It may be the autocracy of class, of birth, of education, of religious beliefs, or even of the proletarian. Its significant mark is

that its hand is set against all other classes; its dream is of individual preferment and exaltation. Its hope is the renovation of the world by the subjection of all other wills to its own. Its weakness is in its selfishness. In the name of individualistic development the greatest crimes have been and are being committed. The only reason that such a theory can blind the hearts of men is because they fail to take into account the reality of moral and spiritual values. An æstheticism which leads the poet or artist to plunge into moral excesses for their cultural value overlooks the fact that any moral excess removes the fineness and delicacy which alone can make art or poetry great. A culture which is built up at the expense of toil and hardship on the part of forgotten multitudes is a false culture which carries with it its own curse and its own undoing.

It is not strange that the individualistic theory of culture should eventuate in the immoral and perverted doctrines of Nietzsche and that these, in a land where all scientific and cultural attainments have for many years been divorced from the deeper religious and even moral elements, should yield a fruitage of barbarity that has shocked the whole world. Such is the outcome of a morally untempered individualism.

At the present moment, the fitful gleams of a better spirit that showed amid the flames of war, in self-denial, comradeship, and sacrifice for the common good seem to have gone out in the darkness of a turbulent social night. Men who but lately fought their way from tyranny seem now under the form of Bolshevism desirous of inflicting upon others a deeper slavery than that from which they themselves have sought escape.

Will the reaction which ever follows in the train of violence bind more firmly the hands of selfish individualism—shall we go forward to out-and-out anarchy, or can the way to a new freedom be won by the coming of a

hitherto scorned and neglected principle.

The outcome of the Roman culture was an institutionalism which subordinated the individual without his consent. The outcome of the Hellenic culture which has held the stage since the Renaissance has subordinated the institution to the individual. May not the hidden demand of the times be an individual who freely contributes his best for the making of humanity?

It has been shown that individualism cannot yield the highest culture because there is in it that element which is hostile to self-discipline. The individual is forever misusing his freedom. What hope for new development in the world can there be except in the discovery by wide masses of men that life becomes great, cultured and joyous only as it forwards the general welfare. If man has gained his unquestioned right to take his life, that is to be master of it, is not the next step in moral progress the free and joyous laying down of life for the common good?

In other words, may not the culture of individualism found in the end to wreck itself by its principle of selfishness give way to the higher culture of personalism?

The dominant principle of personalism is the dependence of individual culture upon the moral and spiritual values. Recognition is given to the fact that any culture which lacks these is lacking in essential humanity and cannot possess a permanent influence over men.

In the following out of this higher individualism it may be necessary for the individual to make the utmost sacrifice of material advantage in order that he may seize upon the finer gifts which are possible to human personality. He may need to sink his individuality in a higher good in order to rise to the heights of personal attainment. The possession of life itself, often held to be the highest good, is seen by personalism to be inferior to the possession, say, of one's honor, or integrity, or self respect. Moreover, if

the well-being of the many demands the self-sacrifice of the individual, the individual reaches his highest possible development by joyful self-surrender. If to be loyal to the highest principles of morality it is necessary to lay down one's life, one by that very act does the thing of greatest cultural value to himself. If, on the other hand, one is to save his life by dishonor, by treason to the moral welfare of himself or others, life would be of little value because unfaithful to those higher interests which alone give it permanent significance. The truth is beautifully expressed in Emerson's lines for the soldier's monument in Cambridge;

'Tis man's perdition to be safe,  
When for the truth he ought to die.

In personalism the value of individual culture is not overlooked. It is simply carried to the higher realm of action and here the highest values can be attained only by the highest self-forgetfulness. The culture of personalism leaves no bad taste in the mouth, no pangs or heart-break for others, no blasting or festering trail of evil behind it. It is as benevolent in the general culture as it is in that of the individual.

Never in the history of the world has the battle been so clearly drawn between these conflicting ideals of life. Individualism with its exaltation of individual preference at the expense of the many, with its ethical doctrine that whatever is useful in furthering its culture is morally justified, with its scorn of the weak and helpless as beyond the pale of its care and responsibility, with its disregard for and skepticism toward all spiritual values, is lined up in a great world conflict against all who believe in the inviolable human rights of the last and feeblest in the social structure.

The personalists, despite their philosophy, their previous condition of cultural servitude, and their previous devotion to individualistic theories are seeing with new vision that no elements are cultural unless they include the well-being of all. The swift lesson is now being taught a slow moving world that when the fundamental human rights of one are menaced the rights of all are endangered. And, better than this, vast multitudes have learned how sweet and beautiful it is to lay down one's life not only for one's country, but for righteousness in the earth, and for the coming Kingdom of God. And just in the measure that men are counting not their lives dear unto themselves in that same measure do they experience the coming of the real Super-man—the man who can lay down his life for his friends.

One would be bold indeed who would propose the solution of the dark problem of evil, and offer a principle on which alone permanent institutions of society may be organized. Yet in these trying days gleams of light are coming to illuminate our way. Not that they have been wanting to other days, but that those which come now are very practical and very personal. We can see how a crisis has been brought upon the world in which if the things dearest to civilization are to be saved many men must voluntarily lay down life. Values superior to life itself have arisen above the horizon of the average human thought. What man in the days just gone was so thoughtless as not to prefer his son dead upon the field of honor to having him a slacker and a sneak—willing to live and prosper through the sacrifice of the noble and brave.

It is impossible that some other lessons of life should fail to follow in the train of this recognition. In days of luxury, comfort, and independence it was easy to listen to the devil of a selfish individualism. One could so easily shut one's ears to the sufferings and injustices of the mul-

itudes. One's personal comfort was so important that any demand of humanity or religion which broke in upon it was considered preposterous. That one should endanger his life for others was the brave act of a fool. At the same time we were obsessed by a fear of suffering and were crying out against a world of pain, demanding that the theists show us the solution of the problem of evil or cease prating about a good God.

In the meantime we are coming to see that the responsibility for the greatest suffering of these times, sufferings that make those of other days seem insignificant, are not the work of God, but of evil and selfish men the world over. Just as the real evil of the world is seen to be the result of an unholy, lustful, and greedy individualism, we are beginning to see likewise that it can be done away and an age of peace brought in only as men are willing to give up everything material for the greatness of a spiritual ideal.

There is in this fact also a suggestion for the solution of the problem of evil so far as it touches the individual. The individual can make the pains and sufferings of life yield him a rich treasure of personal and spiritual attainment, according to the spirit in which he meets them. Death itself may become but the glory which consummates his earthly career.

So much for the individual solution! Where it touches the wider ranges of society it is not so easy. There is much of mystery and darkness. Heavy responsibilities are thrust upon God—why did he make a world of men who could will to evil and to involve the innocent in suffering? Two considerations arrest the attention and constrain us at least to withhold judgment. The first is whether there would be any reality or value to moral freedom if evil were impossible. The second consideration regards the part of God in the matter. Suppose it be

discovered that this life of moral possibility is the superior goal of creation, and that in order to create men in his own spiritual likeness he has himself been willing to partake in their suffering? If the concrete solution of the problem of evil is to be found in the individual attitude toward the woes of life through a spiritual self-mastery that glorifies all, then the endurance of the cross by the Master and Creator of life himself must furnish the philosophical and theological justification of an uncompleted world.

If the world is to move forward to a better day it can only be by an advance from a selfish individualism toward an altruism which brings the highest development of personality.

The new day can come only as the way to it is made by individuals who look upon life from the attitude of the Man of Nazareth to whom the way of the Cross was the way of culture and of power.

I never choose the better part  
Until I set the cross up in my heart.

The world civilization has been Roman and it has been Greek. Can it yet be Christian?

## A GROUP OF AMERICAN IDEALISTS

JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM

PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION

Few teachers of philosophy are widely known beyond the bounds of their own profession and seat of instruction. Yet their influence is exerted upon minds of such a type and at such a period of life that, quietly but formatively, it enters into productive personalities and through them passes into the common life. A large degree of honor and gratitude is due to a group of able philosophical teachers in the history of our American colleges and universities which is almost coterminous with the large number of institutions of higher learning scattered throughout the land.

The brief sketches which follow will serve to indicate the character and quality of the teaching of this company of men and something of the contribution which they have made to the spiritual ideals of the nation.

## I.

Not many teachers in this country have done as much for philosophy as well as for his pupils as Professor G. S. Morris, for many years professor of philosophy at Michigan University.

George Sylvester Morris was born at Norwich, Vermont, November 15, 1840, and died at Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 23, 1889.<sup>1</sup> He was a true son of New Eng-

<sup>1</sup>The admirable biography of Professor Morris by Professor R. M. Wenley (University of Michigan Publications, 1917) to which I am indebted for the material of this sketch is an example of what should be done in the case of other of our philosophers.

land Congregationalism, acquisitive, conscientious, religious. His mind and heart were early set toward the ministry, and after graduating from Dartmouth College in 1861—followed by a two years' service in the Union Army and a year of tutorship at Dartmouth College—he entered Union Theological Seminary. Here began a period of questioning—the first waves of the sea of doubt which was surging in upon the youth of that period, and a turning toward philosophy as the means by which these problems might be met. Leaving the seminary midway in his course, upon the advice of that broad-minded member of the faculty, Professor Henry B. Smith, Morris went to Germany and spent several years in the study of philosophy under Ulrici, Trendelenberg and others. Upon his return, while awaiting an appointment to teach, and in the initial years of his work in Michigan University—to which he was called in 1870 as professor of Modern Languages and Literature—he went through a severe mental struggle in the effort to adjust the pressure of the incoming scientific and religious ideas to his early faith. Gradually he won through to a clear and tested unity of thought, philosophical and religious. Upon his appointment to the position of Lecturer in Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University and to the Chair of Ethics at Michigan he soon began to gain a widening influence. Before his death he had become “one of the chief philosophical teachers of America.”<sup>2</sup>

The quality and extent of the influence of Professor Morris over his pupils was due, as his biographer makes clear, to the strength and earnestness of his convictions as well as to the clarity of his thinking and the charm of his expression. “In him religious faith and philosophic knowledge was one—vitally and indistinguishably one,”

<sup>2</sup>—. Macbride Sterrett, (Op. cit., p. 296).

his pupil John Dewey said of him.<sup>3</sup> This judgment of Professor Dewey reflects his own statement: "The philosophical and the religious conception run hand in hand."

The first volume of Professor Morris—aside from his translation of Ueberweg's History of Philosophy (1872) was "British Thought and Thinkers" (1880), a searching criticism of the materialistic features of British philosophy. His second volume was entitled "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Critical Exposition" (1882), a work of blended interpretation and criticism. It reveals the Hegelian trend of his thinking and leaves the hesitant Kant far behind in its conception of God, who is here termed the Larger Self.

This larger self is divine, it is universal, living, effective reason, it is absolute Spirit. The individual's sufficiency "to think anything of himself" is, thus, of God. It comes from his participation in a light which can be, in its completeness, no less all-embracing and all-creative than divine reason.<sup>4</sup>

In this third volume "Philosophy and Christianity," the Ely Lectures of Union Theological Seminary (1883), we have what is unquestionably one of the few successful attempts in the history of American philosophy to interpret the philosophical meaning and significance of Christianity. This is done on the basis of the Hegelian metaphysic which lends itself with almost too great ease to this purpose. The discussion is free and original and is accompanied by a sympathetic and untrammelled use and interpretation of Biblical passages by no means common in philosophical literature. The point of view is colored by the Hegelian idea of faith as "abbreviated knowledge"—rather than

<sup>3</sup>Professor Morris took an active part in church life. He was confirmed in St. Andrew's Episcopal Church in Ann Arbor in 1873, and at the time of his death was senior warden.

<sup>4</sup>Wenley, *Op. cit.*, p. 269.

*adventurous knowledge*—but this depreciation of religious knowledge is not pressed into the service of pure intellectualism, as it is in extreme Hegelianism. Strong emphasis is laid upon personality.

What man, therefore, through his personality, is finitely, imperfectly, dependently, that God—the Absolute—is infinitely, perfectly, independently. . . . Upon any other than the spiritualistic (and experimental) view of the nature of absolute being, the plurality of particular, finite existence is reduced to the rank of a mere insubstantial phenomenon, or of a mere irresponsible ‘bubble on the ocean of existence’ as pantheists like to express it.<sup>5</sup>

Such assertions make it evident that the author’s Hegelianism was by no means controlling or restrictive. Indeed, as Professor Dewey writes of him: “His adherence to Hegel (I feel quite sure) was because Hegel had demonstrated to him, in a great variety of fields of experience, the supreme reality of this principle of a living unity maintaining itself through the medium of differences and distinctions.”<sup>6</sup>

Perhaps the most significant fact in this comprehensive study of Christianity is the complete accord of the lecturer with the Christocentric conception of Christianity. This appears in such passages as the following:

That the subject-matter of this knowledge (of God and Eternal Life) is written in infinitely larger, more legible and unmistakable characters ‘in the face of Jesus Christ’ than anywhere else, I do not hesitate, in the name of Philosophy, to assert.<sup>7</sup>

Referring to Paul’s enthusiastic affirmation: “In him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge,” he remarks:

<sup>5</sup>P. 88.

<sup>6</sup>Wenley, Op. cit. p. 317.

<sup>7</sup>P. 269.

That this saying of St. Paul is a true one, that Christ is indeed 'the Truth' that the spiritual knowledge of him is the key to all absolute intelligence, and that in this knowledge lies the indispensable way to man's perfection, to his true, self-mastering Freedom and to eternal Life,—of all this I am profoundly convinced.<sup>8</sup>

Such a volume as this makes one wish that the author's desire might have been fulfilled: "I wish I had two lives, one to devote to Philosophy, the other to Theology."<sup>9</sup>

## II.

Another of the finest American exponents of idealism was Henry A. P. Torrey, for thirty-two years (1868-1902) professor of philosophy in the University of Vermont. In many respects Professor Torrey resembled Professor Morris. Their faces showed the same intellectual refinement, the same courage, gentleness and high purposes. He, too, studied at Union Theological Seminary, completing his course in 1864 and was for three years thereafter pastor of the Congregational church at Vergennes, Vermont. Thence by reason of inherent fitness, readily discernible, he was called to his professorship. Upon assuming his post he at once plunged into a study of Kant in the original and by virtue of a philosophic mind and a native aptitude for teaching, fitted himself to become one of those rare benefactors who, as has been said of him, "teach their pupils not only to know but to become."

Professor Torrey published very little with the exception of a translation and selection of Descartes' works, whose fine quality was widely recognized. In the year 1885, however, he wrote for the Andover Review a series of three articles on "The Theodicée of Leibnitz," which

<sup>8</sup>P. 275.

<sup>9</sup>Wenley, Op. cit., p. 174.

constitute a contribution to the literature of philosophy by no means slight. They reveal the rare power of careful analysis and explication which his students found in him, as well as what has been well termed the "judicial character of his mind."

Reticent and conservative as he customarily was in stating his own philosophical convictions, at the conclusion of these papers he expresses himself in no uncertain tone in favor of the *validity of the truth of intuition*, thus aligning himself, though with entire independence, with his predecessor, James Marsh, and the "Burlington philosophy." The way in which this conclusion is reached is characteristic. Having made a clear and careful study of the Theodicée and having pointed out the challenging fact that there is a problem of evil, but no problem of good—good exciting no surprise and demanding no explanation—he continues:

When hard pressed by the difficulties which arise from the presence of evil, we accordingly betake ourselves to the shelter and illumination which our moral intuitions afford. We decline to pass judgment on what takes place in the sphere of perception and experience without taking into account what is necessarily and eternally true. The good is supreme in idea, and what is supreme ideally shall prove itself supreme in reality. . . . That what is true for intuition shall become true for perception, that what is in its own nature real and supreme shall finally assert its truth and reveal its supremacy in the sphere of experience, is not merely the hope, but the indestructible belief of the human heart. This is affirmation, indeed, and not argument, but it is, nevertheless, rational, for it is affirmation of the same sort as that upon which all reasoning finally rests.<sup>10</sup>

Here is a perspicuous glimpse into Professor Torrey's careful and mature conception of truth and into the work-

ing of his mind. He was not only an intuitionist, but in his own guarded and reserved way, a mystic. He did not have to struggle with doubt, or to win his faith by a slow and painful process, as did Professor Morris. "He could remember very clearly, he said, the moment of his illumination. To him walking in the woods in spring, alone and brooding, there came, suddenly and definitely, a clear shining, in the light of which the things of the spirit came into harmonious and vital relation, and that light grew and did not pass."<sup>11</sup> It was this reasoned reliance upon intuition, coupled with his judicial mental reserve, which held him back from that degree of consent to Hegelianism which so distinctly colored American philosophy in the later nineteenth century. He was a firm upholder of the testimony of consciousness. Nor would he assent to Kant's skepticism concerning the validity of our rational faculties, even in the interest of moral reason—as the writer well remembers when as a pupil of Professor Torrey, in the callowness of youth, he sought to win his approval of the Kantian agnosticism. He was as deaf to this as to the siren persuasions of Hegelian unity at the expense of the duality to which he could not blind himself. With intelligent tenacity he held fast to what he regarded as the fundamental principles of consciousness, refusing to be swept away from these moorings. Yet he was no mere frigid and impassioned arbitrator between conflicting systems. Like Morris, he was a great truth-lover, burning with quiet ardor for the truth—yet never with a hectic or superficial flame. He was a fine example of the apostle's saying, "The spirits of the prophets are subject unto the prophets."

To Professor Torrey as to so many other American idealists the realities of personality were the major factors

<sup>10</sup>Andover Review, Vol. IV, pp. 509-510.

<sup>11</sup>*In Memoriam*, Henry A. P. Torrey, LL.D., p. 26.

of reality. It was with great pertinence that his life-long friend, Dean Edward H. Griffin of Johns Hopkins University, said of him:

If you were to seek to indicate in a single word the predominant thought in Professor Torrey's mind as a teacher and thinker, it may perhaps be expressed in the word *personality*. So thoroughly was he persuaded that the self-determination of a rational and ethical being is the highest and noblest thing in the universe, that he could not look with tolerance upon any view, in respect to man, or in respect to God, which seemed to him to invalidate or to obscure this concept.<sup>12</sup>

### III.

A fine aroma of student admiration and gratitude lingers about the name of Amherst's beloved teacher of philosophy, Charles Edward Garman, who, like his predecessor, Julius Seelye, enriched the lives of the students of that well-known college by his personality as well as by his teaching.<sup>13</sup> As a teacher he was so filled with idealism, so absorbed in the love of philosophy, and above all so engrossed in the life of his students, that his life was consumed in unreserved self-sacrifice. The result reveals, in the words of William James, how "a life modestly consecrated to what nowadays seems the less fashionable half of a professor's functions, may yet reap its meed of fame, and burst, in spite of itself, into the wider publicity."<sup>14</sup> This appears in the letter written by him to President G.

<sup>12</sup>Memoir cited, p. 12.

<sup>13</sup>Professor Garman was born December 18, 1850, in Limington, Maine, when his father was pastor of the Congregational Church. He entered Amherst College in 1872, graduating in 1876, and after a period of teaching, studied at Yale Divinity School under Samuel Harris and George P. Fisher. In 1880 he became instructor in Mathematics in Amherst College, in 1882 Associate Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, and in 1889 full professor, continuing in this position until his death in 1907.

<sup>14</sup>Letters, Lectures and Addresses of Charles Edward Garman, p. 598.

Stanley Hall of Clark University, which is prefixed to the volume, "Studies in Philosophy and Psychology," commemorative of the twenty-five years of service of Professor Garman as teacher of philosophy in Amherst College. It is a revealing letter. From it I take the following:

It is my conviction that a young man can obtain inspiration, enthusiasm, absence of self-consciousness only by the steady contemplation of great truths. . . . The young man who philosophizes, who really understands himself and appreciates the truth, is no longer a slave of form, but is filled with admiration that is genuine and lasting.

Mr. Garman's early predilection was for the philosophy of intuition. "His graduating speech ("The Spiritual Philosophy") was an earnest plea for the main point of Hickok's psychology—the supremacy of the 'reason' over the understanding and the absolute need of the intuitive faculty."<sup>15</sup> From Intuitionism he passed into Monism. The publication of the memorial volume, "Letters, Lectures and Addresses of Charles Edward Garman" (1909) revealed his final point of view as that of an intensely spiritual Monism which is at the same time thoroughly rational and scientific. "God or Spirit," he writes "is the only independent reality, and any other being or event is but a dependent 'phase' or 'state' or 'product' of His activity. He is 'the all in all'."<sup>16</sup>

Spirit is the only substance in the universe, and material force is one mode of its manifestation and constant activity. How can we know more of this spirit? We answer, that since the entire universe is dependent upon it, we who are part of the universe, like it, live and move and have our being in it (Him). If we try to study its (His) mode of action outside ourselves we can only use the senses and obtain *phenomena*. But if we look within, we have the real

<sup>15</sup>Op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 247.

noumenal spirit revealed in our own consciousness. . . . *Both thought and things must be phases of one and the same Universal Spirit.*<sup>17</sup>

This interpretation of the material world as a phase of the Universal Spirit is an evidence of the spiritualizing quality of Professor Garman's mind, but it exhibits a certain lack of discrimination.

The material world, while it serves as a marvelous medium and instrument of the Spirit, has a certain nature of its own and is by no means in perfect harmony with Spirit. It seems to have had its source from Spirit, to be striving toward Spirit and to find its highest end in serving Spirit. But to make it a *phase* of Spirit is to drag Spirit down to a lower level and to confuse moral and spiritual values.

#### IV.

Less contemplative and reflective, more forceful and assertive and much more widely known than the men whom we have been considering was that vigorous and well-furnished champion of Idealism, Professor Bowne.

Borden Parker Bowne was a native of New Jersey, where he was born at Leonardville, Jan. 14, 1847. He graduated at the University of New York and studied philosophy from 1873 to 1875 at the universities of Halle, Paris and Göttingen. He was for a year on the staff of the New York *Independent* and from 1876 until his death in 1910, he was professor of Philosophy at Boston University and Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.<sup>18</sup> He was also Chairman of the Philosophical Conference at the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences.

A true Kantian, Bowne owed much also to Lotze, but was in no sense a mere follower of either. As a Kantian he was independent and critical. Not only did he do his

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 258.

own thinking, but in presenting his views he had all the fervor and effectiveness of a Methodist preacher directed toward the intelligent propagation of a spiritualizing philosophy. He had a firm faith in the mission of philosophy, clearly set forth in the first chapter of his "Personalism." He possessed also a complete command of his subject. To his students, his audiences and his readers, in a time of great intellectual uncertainty and confusion, he brought what was hardly less than a saving philosophical faith.

His main doctrines were; idealism, developmentalism and personalism. His idealism,—defined in his "Metaphysics" (1882) and "Theory of Thought and Knowledge" (1898)—accompanied Kant as far as the constructive power of the mind in knowledge is concerned, but parted with him when the latter denied that such knowledge is genuine and valid. His own definition of reality as "that which acts or is acted upon" is as satisfying as it is simple, provided there is due recognition of the fact that a lower order of reality is involved in being acted upon than manifests itself in action.

As a philosophical interpreter of Evolution, he belongs with that forceful group of American thinkers including Asa Gray, E. D. Cope, Charles Woodruff Shields, John Fiske and Joseph Le Conte who rescued the doctrine from the materialistic evolutionism of Herbert Spencer and Huxley and gave it its true spiritual significance. In this respect Professor Bowne—representing and speaking, as he did, to a great body of Christians—accomplished a notable service. The distinction which he drew between Naturalism as a scientific method and Naturalism as a philosophic doctrine (in the chapter on God and Nature of the volume "The Immanence of God" (1905) and also in "Personalism"<sup>19</sup> was most timely and luminous and helped

<sup>19</sup>For a study of Bowne's philosophy see Ralph T. Flewelling: Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy. "Pp. 219—.

greatly to dissipate the unfortunate misunderstanding which had arisen regarding the materialistic implications of the evolutionary hypothesis.

The dominant and most characteristic note of Professor Bowne's philosophy is his emphasis upon that which constitutes the title of his strongest and best-known volume, "Personalism," (consisting of a series of lectures delivered upon the N. W. Harris foundation at Northwestern University in 1908). The foregleams of this pronounced Personalism appeared in his earlier volumes, especially "Theism" (1902)—the principal contention of which is that the "World-Ground," as he terms God, is personal. The term "World-Ground" is itself hardly consonant with personality, and yet it served a good purpose in that it avoided those anthropomorphic implications in the Supreme Person suggested by "Creator," "Ruler" and similar terms. At the same time it is a broader conception than that of "First Cause" and less all-consuming than "Absolute."

The theism of Professor Bowne is a great advance in philosophic breadth and acumen over the conventional theism which it helped to supplant. He was one of the foremost interpreters of the Divine Immanence, and none did more to raise this leading conception of the New Theology into its now accepted place than he. His little volume on this theme has done much to clarify and restore this ancient doctrine of Greek Christianity. The discussion of "Immanent Providence" in the chapter "God in History" is perhaps the sanest corrective of crude and commonplace conceptions of Providence which has appeared in the theological literature of America.

It is in his "Personalism" however, that Dr. Bowne rendered his chief service both to philosophy and religion—a volume which has taken its place as one of the outstanding products of American Idealism. The two closing chap-

ters, "The Failure of Impersonalism" and "The Personal World" constitute a forceful statement, at once critical and constructive, of the foundations of a philosophy of personality. Man can be understood only as a person, "an inhabitant of the invisible world, who projects his thought and life on the great space and time screen we call nature."<sup>20</sup> "Personality is the real and only principle of philosophy which will enable us to take any rational step whatever."<sup>21</sup> The Divine Being must be personal in order to account for his relation to the external world and to ourselves.

The problem of knowledge is insoluble except as we maintain the freedom of both the finite and the infinite spirit. That all things depend on God is a necessary affirmation of thought, but that all things and thoughts and activities are divine is unintelligible in the first place and self-destructive in the next. . . . What is God's relation as thinking our thoughts to God as thinking the absolute and perfect thought? . . . Does he lose himself in the finite, so as not to know what and who he is, or does he perhaps exhaust himself in the finite so that the finite is all there is? . . . But if all the while he has perfect knowledge of himself as one and infinite, how does this illusion of the finite arise at all in that perfect unity and perfect light? . . . These difficulties can never be escaped so long as we seek to identify the finite and the infinite. Their mutual otherness is necessary if we are to escape the destruction of all thought and life. . . . Religion demands the mutual otherness of the finite and infinite, in order that the relation of love and obedience may obtain. Both love and religion seek for union, but it is not the union of absorption or fusion, but rather the union of mutual understanding and sympathy, which would disappear if the otherness of the persons were removed. . . . The extravagant lan-

<sup>20</sup>Personalism, p. 263.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 282-284.

guage of mysticism on this point is the expression of religious desire and is never to be taken literally.<sup>22</sup>

The outlines of a philosophy of personality are present in this notable volume in clear and comprehensive form, together with a trenchant criticism of opposing systems. It is true that many of the deeper problems of personality are untouched. The knowledge we have of other persons is not satisfactorily presented when it is described thus:

For each person his own self is known in immediate experience and all others are known through their effects. They are not revealed in form or shape, but in deeds, and they are known only in and through deeds.<sup>23</sup>

Were we dependent upon their deeds alone to assure ourselves of the reality and individuality of other persons, our knowledge of them would be but a meagre and hap-hazard one. Deeds confirm or correct, alter and enlarge our knowledge of other persons, but they can hardly be said to initiate or comprise it.

It remains for others to advance the boundaries of the philosophy of which Professor Bowne was so successful a pioneer and protagonist. Happily also he was one of the few american philosophers who passed naturally and without strain,—taking his philosophy with him—into the sphere of theology proper, where he exercised a most salutary and liberating influence. His theological writings are environed by no alien atmosphere, as of one invading another sphere than his own. "Studies in Christianity" (1909) as well as his little volume "Atonement" (1900) and "The Immanence of God," already referred to, place him among those who have done most to emancipate and broaden American theology.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 277.

<sup>23</sup>Op., cit. p. 269.

## A BRITISH ESTIMATE OF DR. BOWNE

DR. JAMES IVERACH

Former students and friends of Doctor Bowne will be interested in the following estimate upon his work from the pen of Dr. James Iverach, Principal of the United Free Church College in Aberdeen, widely known authority on Theism, of whom Dr. James Hastings in a personal letter to the Editor declares that he "knows as much about modern philosophy as any man in the British Isles."

The estimate of Doctor Bowne is in the form of a letter to Dr. Hastings which we are privileged to publish.

Aberdeen, 7th Jan'y, 1920.

Dear Dr. Hastings:

In 1882 a volume of Professor Bowne came into my hands and interested me so much that I kept a sharp lookout for any further writings from his pen. The title of that volume is "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer." It was the fullest and most able of the criticisms of Spencer which I had met, and it still occupies the first rank. Essays on Theism next attracted me. Afterwards I found his volume of Metaphysics. It was an exceedingly able book, but its dependence on Lotze was obvious. In fact, it might be described as Lotze stripped of his excessive verbiage and done into English. A more independent work appeared in 1887 called the "Philosophy of Theism," and notwithstanding the numerous Gifford Lectures bearing on Theism, it retains its freshness and its cogency.

He has written also an "Introduction to Psychological Theory," a "Treatise on Ethics," both of which I highly value, and which have proved exceedingly useful in my work. After many years of reflection on philosophical

questions, Bowne in 1898 published a revised edition of his *Metaphysics*, in which he dealt with metaphysics proper, leaving out all epistemological questions. When one compares the first edition with the revised, one can see how far in advance the second is; and observe how Bowne has attained to clearness and self-mastery. He dealt independently with *Epistemology* in the volume "Theory of Thought and Knowledge," and this is perhaps the greatest of his works. It was very helpful to me when I was writing *Epistemology* for you in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. There is also the volume on "Personalism" which you yourself reviewed.

I have not time to give you an estimate of the value of Bowne's contribution to Philosophy and Theology. He is of all one of the foremost of American thinkers of my time. I have known Royce and James and I have read for many years the *Philosophical Review*, and from it have learned much of present tendencies in philosophy in the States, but in my judgment Bowne is the equal of any other thinker in his knowledge of the history of philosophy, in the keenness of his intellectual grasp, and in the clearness of his exposition. His contribution to Theism is of the highest value.

I am sorry that I cannot write in greater fullness.

I am

Yours very truly,

JAMES IVERACH.

## PERSONALISM: A VITAL PHILOSOPHY

FRANK WILBUR COLLIER

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James Hastings said "Bowne came by way of philosophy to believe in the God of the Bible."<sup>1</sup> This distinguished and generally accurate scholar made a serious mistake here. Those who know the personal history of Bowne know that it is not true, and those who understand his philosophy would not expect to find this statement to be true.

Dr. Bowne was brought up in a Christian community in which there was a Christian church, and his was a Christian family. Hence he breathed in the great fundamental and even traditional teachings of Protestant Christianity from his childhood. His attitude towards life when he left home for college was not very much different from that of the average boy brought up in a Christian home where God is taken for granted, and where the religious attitude is part of the atmosphere of the home. So the late Dr. George P. Fisher of Yale University expressed the truth when he said that Bowne's "Theism" "presents in a condensed but lucid form the mature thoughts of an able and learned philosophical scholar *on the foundations of religious faith.*" And the very first things which came from his pen and found their way into print were in defense of the Christian doctrine of a personal God and of other fundamental things of Christianity.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Expository Times, November, 1915, p. 85.

<sup>2</sup>The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, 1874, pp. 23, 226, 258.

When young Bowne was finishing his course in New York University he had done such brilliant work in his different studies that almost every one of his teachers tried to persuade him to follow the respective teacher's particular line; but Bowne chose philosophy, and there are good reasons to believe that he made this choice because of his interest in religion. Dr. Charles Parkhurst, former Editor of Zion's Herald, said in his article on Dr. Bowne in the Boston Evening Transcript: "Dr. Bowne's interest in religion is even deeper than his interest in philosophy," and he adds, "Professor Bowne says that he is a born fanatic, but escaped becoming such by having an extra heavy balance-wheel of good sense attached to his machinery. Without this he would have become a fanatical mystic and a mystical fanatic, an uncompromising rigorist and a vigorist. It is because he understands this fanaticism so well that he is so trenchant and effective in dealing with it. A vein of saving common sense and of humor runs through all his writings—here a phrase, there an epithet or sly allusion, an echo from Scripture or literature lighting up many a difficult discussion and making many a point clear which otherwise would be obscure. This is more prominent still in personal intercourse. There is a deep Puritan vein of conscience, a contempt and a loathing for sham, pretense and unmanliness, but the whole is made human and no less effective by the continuous play of humor essentially sunny and optimistic." Almost all of the characteristics here mentioned by Dr. Parkhurst require time for development, and they are generally imbibed in childhood. This is especially true of quotations and allusions to Scripture.

Stress is laid upon this matter because it is fundamental in Bowne's system of philosophy that the experience of living men comes first, and reflective thought follows. He defined philosophy as "an attempt to give an account

of experience, or it is a man's way of looking at things,"<sup>3</sup> It is the interpretation of experience.<sup>4</sup> Life was always the big thing with Bowne. As he used to say, "Life is larger than logic." He contrasted what Matthew Arnold called the method of rigor and vigor with what he called the living method, saying, "the former assumes everything to be false until proved true; the latter takes things at their own report, or as they seem until proved false. All fruitful work proceeds on the latter method; most speculative criticism and closet philosophy proceed on the former. Hence their perennial barrenness."<sup>5</sup> Thus the actual method of living men is to "take our experience as a datum, at once indeducible and undeniable, and seek to interpret it for our own rational peace and satisfaction."<sup>6</sup> It is for this reason that we have many beliefs which are not held because we have proved them, but which we try to prove because we hold them, and which we insist on holding whether we can prove them or not."<sup>7</sup> And this is justified because life is the sacred thing, and in reality life is only found in the individual; and the individual person for Bowne<sup>8</sup> as for Christ<sup>9</sup> is the only sacred thing on this earth. It is interesting to note that Kant in that section of his Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason in which he shows that his moral system is in harmony with that of Christianity holds that man is sacred, being "an end in himself."<sup>10</sup>

Life as it is experienced by the individual person is the basal thing. But immediately second to it is the interpretation of experience. This is what is called philosophy. As Browne puts it: "Philosophy is simply an attempt to give an account of experience, or it is a man's way of

<sup>3</sup>Personalism, p. 4. <sup>4</sup>Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup>Theism, p. 16. <sup>6</sup>ibid., 35. <sup>7</sup>ibid., 35.

<sup>8</sup>Principles of Ethics, pp. 199-203, 209, 252. <sup>9</sup>Lk. 15:3-31.

<sup>10</sup>Kant's Critique of the Practical Reason, Tr. by T. K. Abbott, p. 229.

looking at things.”<sup>11</sup> Man being a self-conscious being cannot but reflect, too often very crudely, but nevertheless he does reflect upon his experience. And so even the most ignorant person has his philosophy. As Bowne says: “Every man has a philosophy of some sort, wittingly or unwittingly.” The only question is the kind of philosophy one has. “It is not, then, a question of having or not having a philosophy, but of having a good or a bad one. And this question is of great importance, for, while a good philosophy may not have much positive value, a bad one may do measureless harm. Nations may be paralyzed, and individuals may be wrecked, by a fatalistic and pessimistic philosophy.”<sup>12</sup> Henry Jones agrees with Bowne in this matter and expresses himself in equally clear language: “The only choice we can have is between a conscious metaphysics and an unconscious one, between hypotheses which we have examined and whose limitations we know, and hypotheses which rule us from behind, as pure prejudices do. It is because of this that the empiricist is so dogmatic, and the ignorant man so certain of the truth of his opinions.”<sup>13</sup>

So far, then, two points are clear in Bowne’s living method. Men do and must live before they philosophize: they eat, drink, work, enjoy pleasure, and suffer pain. But it is also true that very early in the history of the race and of individuals men begin to reflect upon just what is the meaning of all this eating, drinking, working, enjoying pleasure, and suffering pain. That is, first they must have the experience, and then they find that they instinctively try to understand the experience. But the reflective faculty develops very slowly. As Tennyson expresses it: “Science moves, but slowly slowly, creeping on from point

<sup>11</sup>Personalism, p. 4.

<sup>12</sup>Personalism, pp. 4-6.

<sup>13</sup>Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher, 35.

to point." In the meanwhile men must live, and so they cannot wait for the development of reflective thought; for life is much more than the logical understanding. As Bowne says: "Man is still, conscience, emotion, aspiration; and these are far more powerful factors than the logical understanding. Man is also a practical being, in highly complex interaction with his fellows and with the system of things. Before he argues he must live; before he speculates he must come to some sort of practical understanding with himself, and with his neighbors, and with the physical order."<sup>14</sup> That is, philosophy, when it seeks to be something more than logic-chopping, and endeavors to keep in touch with reality and life, must remember that life is always the end and logic can be but a means; for the function of logic "is not to create life or even to justify it, but to formulate it, to understand it, and to help it to self-knowledge."<sup>15</sup> This is the actual way living men approach all their problems; and no doubt Bowne, being one of these living men, approached philosophy, as do all men, with all the beliefs which he inherited in the home, in the church, and in the community. Here we see the great significance of institutions for human development.<sup>16</sup> They are the organs of social heredity; and it is through them that the great catholic beliefs of the race, and the conceptions and customs which represent the net result of the thought and experience of the race become the law of the individual.<sup>17</sup>

It may seem very shocking to those who imagine that they begin with the self-evident and only move by the sure steps of proof to be told that the method just described is the actual method of living men; and to be told that the

<sup>14</sup>Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 376.

<sup>15</sup>Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 383.

<sup>16</sup>Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 372.

<sup>17</sup>Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 372; Personalism, p. 311.

great philosopher Bowne did not come by way of philosophy to believe in the God of the Bible, but came to philosophy to try to understand the belief which he held in the God of the Bible. They will say that all of this is nothing short of a confession that one approaches the great problems of life with bias and prejudice. This is certainly the way men do approach the great problems of life; and for the simple reason that they cannot approach them any other way. Those who claim that it is possible for men to put aside all bias and personal interest are either not ingenuous or they simply do not know life. Bowne knew it was not possible, and not only said so, but insisted upon it, and made it a basal principle in his system of philosophy. It is interesting to know that this living method of the philosopher Bowne is confirmed by the historian and statesman Bryce: "Every one is of course predisposed to see things in some one particular light by his previous education, habits of mind, accepted dogmas, religious or social affinities, notions of his own personal interest. No event, no speech or article, ever falls upon a perfectly virgin soil: the reader or listener is always more or less biased already. When some important event happens, which calls for the formation of a view, these pre-existing habits, dogmas, affinities, help to determine the impression which each man experiences, and so far are factors in the views he forms."<sup>18</sup>

The life of men is dominated by their ideals; and these they receive in the community in which they dwell, and they speak with authority, "and on any theory of knowledge they must be allowed to stand, unless there be some positive disproof."<sup>19</sup> This inherited stock of community ideas are necessary for life; and every one bows to their authority to a greater or less degree; for as Bowne says,

<sup>18</sup>James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, vol. ii, 253.

<sup>19</sup>Personalism, p. 311.

"Men in general must live by authority. It is only the use of such abstractions as thought or reason which hides it from us."<sup>20</sup> And life has become so complex that even the greatest minds cannot investigate every field of thought, and thus they must depend to a very large degree upon the authority of the community. The reason for this is clear. The authority of the community arises from the strength of its practical beliefs, and these are the product of the necessities of life itself. This is why Bowne says that "the great catholic beliefs of humanity become expressions of reality itself, and on any theory of knowledge they must be allowed to stand, unless there be some positive disproof."<sup>21</sup> And this is the province of logic—to criticize, amend, and in case of positive disproof to reject any belief. This is Bowne's living method.

It is evident now that Bowne was a Personalist from the beginning. By Personalism he meant that the Ultimate Reality, and indeed all reality, as distinguished from appearance, is Personal Intelligence.<sup>22</sup> Having been born and brought up in a Christian home and in a Christian community he inherited the belief in a personal God, which is not only the God of the Bible, but which, as F. B. Jevons says, has always been the God of religion.<sup>23</sup> This great catholic belief is what he began with, and as he progressed in his philosophical study, he not only never found any reason that suggested positive disproof, but on the contrary everything led back to personal intelligence as the source of all things. The impressiveness of this grew until he reached the point where he was not satisfied with any one of a number of terms which he suggested, "provided the thing be understood," and finally adopted the

<sup>20</sup>Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 373.

<sup>21</sup>Personalism, p. 311.

<sup>22</sup>Personalism, pp. 157, 158, 265, 266.

<sup>23</sup>Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion p. 136.

term Personalism which he gave to his last philosophical work, the A. W. Harris Lectures, published two years before his lamented death. But from the publication of his first work in 1874, in which he objected to the system of Herbert Spencer because in it there "is no personal God,"<sup>24</sup> until we received the last formal philosophical treatise of this great thinker, his claim was that "nature and history both, more and more clearly testify to

'One God that ever lives and loves;  
One law, one life, one element;  
And one far-off, divine event,  
To which the whole creation moves.'"

This living method of Bowne neither discounts life as experienced nor does it discount the rights of the intellect or of formal logic. Hence while he could have little sympathy with modern Pragmatism as a theory of truth, his doctrine of the practical nature of belief which we have said so much about, and which is so fundamental in his system, has very close affinity with what Prof. W. E. Hocking calls "critical pragmatism," and which is the fruitful factor in modern pragmatism.<sup>25</sup> As a protest against the artificial and barren method of an over-wrought intellectualism Pragmatism has been of service; but all the good in it is found in Bowne's doctrine of the practical nature of belief. The trouble with modern pragmatism is that it is an extreme development of Kant's doctrine of the supremacy of the practical reason, and like all extremes, the outcome is, to say the least, very obscure. James said he might be forced to "a sort of polytheism," but he did not pretend to defend it, and in another place he said there could be no objection to this, "provided we be only allowed to believe that the divine principle remains

<sup>24</sup>The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, pp. 23, 226, 258-269.

<sup>25</sup>The Meaning of God in Human Experience, xiii.

supreme, and that the others are subordinate.”<sup>26</sup> The brilliant and genial James is unfortunate in the use of the term polytheism, for as Bowne says, “Polytheism implies a plurality of independent beings.”<sup>27</sup> And they are certainly not independent if the divine principle remains supreme. Nor is the replacing of polytheism with pluralism in his later works less unfortunate, especially as Prof. James was reaching out to touch the popular mind. As to his actual position Prof. James, after reading Bowne’s “Personalism” wrote the latter, saying that their positions were the same, they differed only in terminology. And Dr. Bowne told the writer that this was true. As to James’s agreeing with Bowne in his doctrine of the practical nature of belief, there can be no doubt.

Buffon said, “The style is the man. Hence it cannot rise of itself, or change or shift. If it be noble, sublime, and elevated, the author will be admired similarly in all time; for truth is durable, aye, eternal.” Bowne’s style is always elevated, it is noble when the subject is noble, and in certain sections of his “Metaphysics,” “Theism,” “Personalism,” and “Studies in Christianity” it becomes sublime. Of course, the reason is the subjects treated are sublime, and the author has the mental and moral greatness to appreciate them. But the profoundest truths are the great commonplace truths by which the individual and the race live. Not the ordinary man, nor indeed very many of the extraordinary men, can give expression to them; but when one who understands them and has lived them gives expression to them the great heart of humanity recognizes them and responds. For Bowne did live his philosophy, as he held that the purpose of philosophy was to help us to understand life and to formulate life; and

<sup>26</sup>William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 526, compare p. 132.

<sup>27</sup>Theism, 289.

so he gave us a vital and a vitalizing philosophy. As Eucken said, Bowne's works read like personal confessions; and we have known those who have used his "Metaphysics" as devotional reading. Personalism is a philosophy which springs from human life, and is intended for human life. Hence it is devoid of the volubility, artificiality, and rigidity which make so many volumes on philosophy so barren and repulsive to the average intelligent person.

## THE COMMON THREAD IN FRENCH AND ENGLISH CULTURE

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The recent war has brought together in the closest alliance for the reconstruction of a war-torn world the English-speaking and Romance peoples. Among the five nations who have ruled the Council at Paris, two are English-speaking and two are Latin or Romance. The question which arises in the mind of the thinking man is: Will the alliance hold, or is it a mere temporary conjunction which will easily fall asunder? Those brought up in the German school of thought, who were taught to begin the study of English literature, not with Chaucer and Shakespeare, but with Beowulf, have regarded the tie between the Anglo-Saxon and the Teuton as vital and essential, that between the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin as accidental and temporary. English culture has never given in to the German propaganda, which it regards as in the final issue based on linguistic studies, which are in the domain of science proper rather than of civilization. Chaucer bore a French name, and his canons of poetic law were absolutely at one with French and Italian traditions. Shakespeare also is so Italian in his themes and his handling of them that the wonder is he never visited Italy. And the book which has fixed canons of rhythmic beauty in language more than even Shakespeare, the Authorized Version of the Bible, is rhythmically and æsthetically a successor of the noble Vulgate Latin version of Jerome. Matthew Arnold, with a sure instinct for literary charm,

would even at times turn to the sonorous phrases of the Vulgate as even more telling and weighty than their English equivalents.

Modern science has been accustomed to regard these æsthetic traditions and affinities as merely accidental and disturbing in the investigation of human progress. The scientific student of political economy—rightly termed at Oxford, as taught by the scientific school, the “dry and dismal study”—started from the base that an advantageous code of social action may be determined irrespectively of the influence of social affection. Regarding the human being merely as a covetous machine, developed from the amoeba and the ape, he would bid us examine by what laws of labor, purchase and sale the community may accumulate the largest amount of wealth. The only stable and constant elements in human nature being avarice and the desire for progress, other elements like religion, morals and art are so far negligible.

Unfortunately for this reasoning, which has imposed itself as final truth not only upon individual thinkers and coteries, but also upon nations, these merely “extra” elements in the social problem cannot be treated under the same law as the supposed constant elements; they alter the essence of the creature under examination the moment they are added. The man religiously moved becomes “a new creature; old things are passed away; behold all things are become new.” The really vital things in life are, in fact, not those supposed constants, but the rejected “disturbing elements,” which demand new canons entirely, in the three domains of religion, morals and art. These canons appeal not to the intellect but to the emotions; since we are not what we think, but what we trust in, what we love, what we admire. The Maker of men, as Ruskin rightly remarks, intended that human actions should be guided, not by balances of expediency, but of justice. Ex-

pediency is of the intellect, justice is of the heart.

There have been three great social movements in Europe during the past four centuries: the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the period of Illuminism in Germany, of which Lessing, Schiller and pre-eminently Goethe were the exponents. Two of these were intellectual and practically pagan; the men of the Renaissance reverted to ancient Greece for all their canons of truth, and thus broke with Christian revelation, and with Christian ethics. In doing this they also broke with Christian art. And the center of all art is not painting nor music, nor sculpture, nor the decorative; but poetry and the life of the higher law. In his discussion of this theme in the "Epilogue to Lessing's *Laocoön*," Matthew Arnold, prince of critics, who knew and appreciated modern life and art, strikes the true note:

No painter yet hath such a way,  
Nor no musician made, as they,  
And gather'd on immortal knolls  
Such lovely flowers for cheering souls.  
Beethoven, Raphael, cannot reach  
The charm which Homer, Shakespeare, teach.  
To these, to these, their thankful race  
Gives then, the first, the fairest place;  
And brightest is their glory's sheen,  
For greatest hath their labor been.

To them must be added the author of Job and the Ninetieth and other Psalms, Isaiah, and the inspired writers down to St. John, who have given Hebrew literature its unique place in the development of the higher life of mankind. Narrow in many of its aspects, the Reformation remained true to the central element in our civilization and art, the consecrated life and the poetry which nourishes it. It was a reaction and a needed reaction against the chilling paganism of the Renaissance.

When Germany began to seek after national thought and expression in the eighteenth century, after two hundred years of disunion and backwardness—except in music—its leaders decided to build, not on any past, whatever its high authority, but on the teachings of modern science and an intellectual estimate of the value of all things. This may be termed the period of Illuminism, associated with the rise of libraries and of laboratories, and all the appurtenances of the modern university. The movement began in the rationalistic period, which related all truth to the thinking personality. In its thoroughness of method and its self-sufficiency, it broke with the traditions of the divine life in man, which are spiritual rather than intellectual, and need brotherhood and the community soul for their existence and expression. The real fundamentals of our life have a spiritual basis of belief, and are in the domain of social heredity; they lie outside of the things that may be discussed and dissected, outside of the inquisitive-intellectual. Our civilization rests—to quote the words of the late Professor Royce of Harvard—on “the possession of a common tradition, a memory of suffering endured and victories won in common, expressed in song and legend, in the dear names of great personalities that seem to embody in themselves the character and the ideals of the nation, in the names also of sacred places where the national memory is enshrined.”

The standard of goodness and beauty for a man is, in fact, a community sense. The authority of the Christian church is lodged in the communion of saints.

It is told of the philosopher Kant, that on the yearly occasion when the faculty of the University of Koenigsberg went in state to church to worship, he turned at the church door, and made off home to his study. The act revealed a deficiency in his whole attitude to truth, which demands brotherhood and worship, and even wholesome

play, for health and sustenance. He broke with sound psychology. This coldness to the genial comradeship of life is particularly deadly to Art in the best sense of the term. In his recent brilliant story, "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse," the novelist Vicente Ibañez brings out this defect. It annoyed his hero, an Argentinian of French descent, "to have his family everlastingly holding up as a model a German cousin of his, "who only knew life as it is in books, and passed his existence investigating what men had done in other epochs, in order to draw conclusions in harmony with German views. . . . The people, appreciating that these near-sighted authors were incapable of any genial vision of comradeship, called them *Sitzfleisch haben*, because of the very long sittings which their work represented." Now the self-sufficiency of this *Sitzfleisch haben* type is the most deadly foe to Art, because of its utter obtuseness to the call of human brotherhood. On the next page the German cousin thus delivers himself of his findings regarding the Celt. Addressing a Spanish friend of the hero's: "You were miserable Celts, sunk in the vileness of an inferior and mongrel race whose domination by Rome but made your situation worse. Fortunately you were conquered by the Goths and others of our race, who implanted in you a sense of personal dignity."

Now it is just in the field of brotherhood and of Art that the Celt is the superior of the phlegmatic German. Take this from Matthew Arnold's lectures "On the Study of Celtic Literature," which he delivered as Professor of Poetry at Oxford some sixty years ago: "The Celt's quick feeling for what is noble and distinguished gave his poetry style; his indomitable personality gave it pride and passion; his sensibility and nervous exaltation gave it a better gift still, the gift of rendering with wonderful felicity the magical charm of nature." Arnold was a Celt through his mother, of the Cornish Penrose family. Still

more thoroughly Celtic in his ancestry was another Oxford voice of the century, John Ruskin, whose theories of Art and Life have a truth and a fervor that thrill us today. The Ruskins came from the heart of the Highlands, from the neighborhood of St. Fillan's Well in west Perthshire; and three of the London lad's grandparents were Ruskins. His first love was a French girl, and his sympathies remained with France. In the disasters of the War of '70-71 he still believed that the future of civilization was with her rather than with her whilom conqueror Germany. The following passage reads as if it had been written, not so far back as 1874, but since 1914, when the world awoke to the ruthless brutality of German *Kultur*:—"Accordingly, when the Germans get command of Lombardy, they bombard Venice, steal her pictures (which they can't understand a single touch of) and entirely ruin the country morally and physically, leaving behind them misery, vice, and intense hatred of themselves, wherever their accursed feet have trodden. They do precisely the same thing by France—crush her, rob her, leave her in misery of rags and shame; and return home, smacking their lips, and singing *Te Deum*.

"But when the French conquer England (here he refers to the Norman Conquest) their action upon it is entirely beneficent. Gradually, the country, from a nest of restless savages, becomes strong and glorious; and having good material to work upon, they make of us a nation stronger than themselves."

A recent writer, Dr. Dawson, has pointed out the difficulties in appreciating Ruskin: his many subtleties and variations and extraordinary transformations, so that he seems sometimes reactionary, and at other times ultra-progressive. Tolstoy regarded him as a great man misunderstood by his countrymen and underrated. Perhaps it might be said of him with justice, as it was said of Shakes-

peare: "He saw life steadily and he saw it whole." At any rate he had the French gift of fearless sincerity; a supreme *intellectual conscience*.

The following characteristics mark all Ruskin's thoughts and discussions. First a belief in the unity of life, with religion as its center and active power. He expressly states that when art is not in the service of religion, it forthwith becomes debased. Yet, while religion asserts a unity of life and conduct, it also and equally asserts a dualism in philosophy; a higher law entering into and antagonizing the law of nature and the senses. The philosophical monist who asserts with Edmund in "King Lear":

Thou, nature, art my goddess; to thy law  
My services are bound,

saps the foundations of religion and morality.

Again, Ruskin shows a deep distrust of beauty as an aim or object. He holds that the artist who starts with the sole object of producing something beautiful will fail in his endeavor. Art for art's sake or ornament's sake is a fatal motto. Beauty in art, like happiness in life, is not a legitimate aim, but is only really found as a sanction or accessory of Truth. Lastly, he stands for a humanism which regards man as essentially well-motived, and not to be appealed to in the best way from his selfish side. The "unnatural" in man is what is immoral; an unnatural act is an act which is strikingly selfish or without feeling, while a heroic, unselfish act is intensely human.

In *Les Problèmes de l'Esthétique Contemporaine* by M. Guyau, I found these assertions of the unity of life and the serious character of all art worth the name worked out with a lucidity and a succinctness that were impressive. The writer died young, and his ideals have been

developed by his father-in-law, M. Fouillée, whose *Histoire de la Philosophie* is one of the best of modern textbooks on the subject. Guyau was bred in an idealist nursery. His early teachers were Plato the Academician and Epicurus the Stoic among the ancients, along with St. Paul and Marcus Aurelius; and, among the moderns, Immanuel Kant. When he arrived at the parting of the ways, where he must clarify, unify, and make consistent all that he had borrowed from the past, he found certain problems demanding his best energies: How to reconcile the Platonic and the Christian idea of the good with the Kantian idea of the categorical imperative, while at the same time giving due weight to the analytical results of modern experimental psychology, and the inflexible laws of evolution as determined by Darwin and his co-laborers.

Rejecting atheism and pantheism as furnishing no proper explanation of the Will, he regarded a theistic-idealism as getting its strength from its appeal to the religious instinct in man, which always enters into the metaphysical instinct; and the metaphysical instinct tends to discover in all things Mind, Thought, the Intellectual and the Moral. The whole drift of his philosophy was towards a rejection of the word "illusion" applied to Aspiration, Sympathy, Beauty and Love, as if these were accidents of the real world—a kaleidoscopic show, a mirage—while the seriousness of things rests elsewhere; and towards a positing of spirit as expressing the reality of existence. The so-called stern reality of life, external nature and matter conceived in terms of atoms, becomes in the last issue an illusion furnishing no final explanation of being.

According to Guyau, we cannot consider the beautiful and the good, objectively considered, as mere illusions, having only a subjective value. For long they were regarded as metaphysical realities, but now the evolutionary

school would reduce the beautiful, for instance, to a certain kind of pleasure, attached like every pleasure, to the life development. If we were to do away with sentient beings entirely, then the beautiful disappears, just as light and colors disappear when the eyes are closed; and the poetry of nature is thus confined to human brains. Here Guyau broke definitely with the teachings of Kant, who refused, even extravagantly, to consider beauty in terms of the useful and the perfect.

The German referred beauty to the "free play of our imagination and our understanding"—as something detached from real life, and wholly "disinterested." Schiller, formulating the same thought, but with more precision, concluded that art was essentially a play. The artist, according to him, rejecting material realities, finds the highest art where we come to play, so to speak, with the very basis of our being; of this nature is poetry, and above all dramatic poetry. Kant and Schiller's theory has been adopted by Herbert Spencer and most contemporary writers on æsthetics, who give it a more scientific form and attach it to the idea of evolution.

Does this theory, so widely accepted today, so passionately rejected by Ruskin, really grasp the true nature of æsthetic feelings? By clinging so exclusively to the pleasure of pure contemplation and of play, and wishing to keep art aloof from the true, the real, the useful and the good, and thus favoring a species of diletantism, has it not missed the serious, yea vital character of the highest art? So thinks Guyau.

He finds that Force, Harmony and Grace come from a will in harmony with its surroundings and with other wills; and they constitute beauty. Do the beautiful and the good differ in the sphere of the feelings? Spencer and Kant say they do; the identity of the two would destroy their theory that art is in the domain of the non-

serious, of play. Of course the good cannot be sport, and is above all things serious. Now if the beautiful lies in play, it must be separated from the good; for in the good we think of the end to be realized. In the beautiful, according to Spencer, it is the activity itself which realizes the end. Guyau will have nothing to do with this distinction. The activity, the will, for instance, which accomplishes an act of patriotism, is not only beautiful; it is good in the same measure that it is beautiful. The end, the country saved, is not only good, but beautiful in the same measure that it is good. In moral as in æsthetic judgments we cannot abstract the end pursued any more than in our moral judgments; sympathy, pity, indignation are beautiful and good at the same time. The art which has for its essential condition the sympathy we take in the pains and pleasures of others, is a "social creation"; it rests on a sure basis. A being is so much the more moral, the more capable he is of feeling profoundly an æsthetic emotion.

Ruskin, brought up by his Evangelical mother to recite the Bible off by heart, and Guyau, also a deep student of St. Paul, that master-psychologist, were both true to the apostle's magnificent Monism of Life, absorbing and engulfing in a higher unity the philosophical dualism of the law of nature and the law of the spirit. It is in this Monism that all art worth the name inheres. A close study of these two exponents of English and French art ideals at their very best reveals a hidden and profound sympathy between the two nations that has been somewhat lost sight of for a century or more. But it will appear more and more manifest as the years go by, and the present alliance demands a common purpose, and further glorious sacrifices and glorious victories for the cause of humanity.

## Book Reviews

### PROGRESSIVE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN AMERICA.

By JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM, Professor of Christian Theology in the Pacific School of Religion. Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston, 1919. Pp. IX, 340. Price \$2.00.

If we are to regard our favored country as the "land of the Pilgrim's Pride"—to quote the words of the national hymn—then the book just issued from the leading New England press is particularly timely. This year there will be a celebration of the third centenary of the landing of Robinson's devoted companions at Plymouth Rock; and Dr. Buckham's pages aim at being a "Survey of the Enlarging Pilgrim Faith," which is the sub-title. No one is better fitted for the task than the genial and scholarly Berkeley divine.

He follows on the line of a Scottish treatise that came forth from old St. Andrews University when the reviewer was a student there; John Tulloch's "Religious Thought in Great Britain During the Nineteenth Century." The "Progress" described is fairly well limited to the past sixty years. There is a basis of personality in the treatment, the author having chosen seven theologians with whom he was more or less intimately connected and to whom he feels spiritual indebtedness, as themes for successive chapters. Prefacing the chapters are short biographical sketches after the manner of *Who's Who in America*. It is significant that the two leaders with whom he starts out are both Yale University men, Horace Bushnell and Theodore Munger. In many essential respects Yale is the most characteristically American of our universities in the religious and political type of public men it sends forth.

None of the sketches have more of a pleasant hero-worship flavor, approaching eulogy, than that of the octogenarian divine who spent a year or more of the closing period of his busy life in the metropolis of Southern California. Indeed, after a winter in the pulpit of the First Congregational Church of Los Angeles, Dr. Washington Gladden went home to Columbus, Ohio, to die. This association with California is not, however, recorded as it should

be in the biographical summary. Not so with Horace Bushnell, who spent some years in the Golden Gate when the state was still young, and was one of the founders of the College of California, at Oakland, which moved later to Berkeley and became the great State University of today, second largest of the universities of the country. Bushnell was offered the Presidency in the year 1861, but declined and returned to the East. This vigorous thinker and innovator Dr. Buckham rates as the second in chronological order of our three great American theologians: "Jonathan Edwards, Horace Bushnell, George A. Gordon—this," he states (p. 87), "is the true American theological apostolic succession. This estimate may seem at present extravagant, but I am convinced the future will confirm it. . . . William N. Clarke has had wider influence in the field of irenics, Borden P. Bowne in that of philosophy, but in insight and breadth and total accomplishment none has equaled Dr. Gordon." The last-named is still with us, a vigorous voice in the pulpit of the historic South Church of Boston.

To have Dr. Buckham at his best, read his tribute to Washington Gladden, "author of that immortal hymn, long ago discovered and adopted by the Christian consciousness and now illuminating every modern hymn-book worthy of the name, 'Oh, Master, Let Me Walk with Thee.' This hymn was written under the sense of loneliness caused by the author's theological isolation. It is a heretic's hymn—a 'heretic of yesterday' and a saint of today. Is the latter too exalted a title to fit this rugged, everyday man, companionable servant of righteousness and teacher of the people? . . . —a saint after the order of the Pilgrim fathers."

J. M. DIXON.

THE SELF AND NATURE, by DE WITT H. PARKER, assistant Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1917. Pp. VII. 316.

So much of modern philosophy and especially of Radical Empiricism has been written in complete disregard of the nature and definition of the self that it is a great relief to pick up this book which though assuming to proceed on the method of Radical Empiricism frankly declares that systems must be judged by their treatment of the doctrine of the self. By this standpoint the author wishes his system to be judged.

After showing a considerable tendency to identify the self with its mere activity he proceeds to affirm that the unity of the mind is a fact of immediate experience and that "the self is primary." "The unity of the mind," he says, "consists in the first place, of the contact of self with content; and, in the second place, of the interweaving of the many activities, which are the self, one with another. The activities are interwoven among themselves and with the content, and this web is the mind" (27). This description of the self is not complete, however, as it concerns only the contemporaneous phase. Speaking of the other or sequential phase of the self, he concludes that identity must be found in the region of the mind in which identity is given, and that this region is the self.

This conclusion is impossible if the mind is to be identified with its activities. There is nothing in fleeting activites that would bind the world of experience together. Each activity would be conscious of itself unless it were some transcendent activity able to survive and understand the whole process, maintaining an enduring identity through its power of relating all other activities to itself. Such transcending self the author assumes though he has made no provision for it in his system.

This assumption appears in his definition of perception as a contact of the self with a sensuous reality, and a representation through idea of other sense elements which might be given (53).

"Perception is never, as we know, the mere existence of a sense element in the mind; it always involves, in addition, the creation of a meaning. The sense elements in perception are recognized, interpreted, employed as signs; but recognition, interpretation, the signitive function are activities which belong to the self" (55).

He recognizes the necessity of affirming personality in order to provide an adequate doctrine of time and change, because in the existence of any impersonal thing change destroys its original character and makes it something essentially different. "In the self we have the most direct knowledge of the combination of new and old, of identity and diversity, essential to change" (96).

Likewise in the discussion of causation he clearly shows the impossibility of demonstrating the causal connection outside of personality itself. "In the phenomena of will alone does there exist the possibility of making the past a law for the future" (136). To this statement he adds another most significant for philosophy and particularly for theism; "He only can hope to understand who

finds it reasonable to interpret the processes of the external world after the analogy of the inner world" (143). After declaring that there are but two known types of necessity, logical and purposive, he writes: "Is it unlikely that the same type of necessity which exists within the mind should characterize the whole from which the mind sprang and upon which it depends" (145). And again, "There is necessity and law only where there is a will seeking fulfillment" (152). This would seem to be a clear enough charter for the theist to make some assumptions regarding the reasonableness of a supreme creative intelligence, but such a conclusion the author with an odd perversity rejects as impossible.

The conclusion of the book is sadly negative. After building nobly he decides for the impossibility of immortality and theodicy. Indeed considers that he has proved the mortality of personality. The fact is, however, that it is no greater leap to assume the reasonableness of personal immortality than is his assumption that the cause of the world is personal. If that personal cause is not itself the mere plaything of matter it must in some sense transcend the material order. Such transcendence is the very essence of personality. But if there be transcendence of any kind it might well be able to survive the tools with which it works just as here and now it survives material change and passing events. While openly denying it, the author is unwittingly theistic.

**THEOLOGY AS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE**, by DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH, Dwight professor of Theology in Yale University. MacMillan and Co., New York, 1919. Pp. XVI, 270.

Those who are acquainted with Dr. MacIntosh's *Problem of Knowledge*, will take up this book with large expectation and will not be disappointed. It is a book not for those who have no doubts, but rather for those who seek apart from tradition and dogma the confirmation of Christian belief. From the beginning the author aims to meet the attack of scientific doubt and to defeat it upon scientific grounds rather than by appeal to authority or dogma.

Through the volume he holds to the scientific validity and reality of religious experience and hopes to discover therein all the facts needed for a tenable working theology.

Just as William Newton Clarke brought an answer to the theo-

logical questionings of fifteen years ago the author will do an undoubted service to the present time. The direct resort to religious experience for the proofs of ordinary doctrine is made because the writer believes that "Speculation can only elucidate what is involved in a hypothesis. It cannot, apart from any resort to experience provide verification. . . . And if theology is to become scientific it must be by becoming fundamentally empirical" (11).

The foundations of the discussion are laid upon the answers to the following questions:

"(1). Is there *religious perception*, or something in the religious realm corresponding to perception, viz., cognition of the divine as revealed within the field of human experience? (2). Is it possible to formulate, on this basis of the data made available in religious experience, *theological laws*, or generalizations as to what the divine Being does on the fulfilment of certain discoverable conditions? (3). Can *theological theory* be constructed in a scientific manner upon the basis of these laws?" (26).

Calling attention to the necessary presuppositions of all science he claims the same need for a theological science. Having done this he proposes to proceed with only such theological material as may be beyond proper scientific question or cavil to see if there is not enough to provide the necessary supports for religious theory. This method will of course be unsatisfactory to the theologian who deplores any compromise with the modern scientific spirit. The value of the volume, however lies in this, that it shows how without resort to those doctrines that give offense to many reverent thinkers, a vital and convincing theology may still be constructed.

So out of experience he draws conclusions for immortality, for the profound nature of sin, for the existence of God, and the uniqueness of Christ as the revelation of God.

His discussion of the attributes of God gains force by the settlement of the conflict of immanence with transcendence by means of personality in the divine Being (131).

With many points, the reader will find himself in disagreement, and some of these should doubtless be brought out in this review, except for the fact that the attempt made to furnish an empirical grounding for theology is so wholesome, and is here done so skillfully and with such constructive results that criticism is relatively unimportant in the face of positive advantages to be gained. It is a volume worth reading and owning for one's self.

HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY. By HOWARD C. WARREN, Boston.  
Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1919. XX., 450 pp. \$2.75.

One is impressed upon reading Professor Warren's contribution, "Human Psychology," to the long list of elementary psychology texts, with the scholarly and painstaking care that everywhere shows itself in both style and arrangement of the book. At the same time, one who is dealing hand to hand with the perplexing and pressing needs of human life, both as it comes before one in the college class-room, and in the larger associations in the complex community life, finds the book rather too academic, one might say, almost too prosaic, in style. The reviewer is convinced that the most effective text book in elementary psychology must be far more than a dry, mechanical, systematic though conscientious presentation of the accepted facts of the science. All too frequently, the course in elementary psychology is the only contact the student has with the scientific study of human behavior. If we keep in mind the great need that he shall better understand himself, and be better able to control and direct his own conduct through understanding and control of the mental factors that make conduct what it is; if we understand the central aim and purpose of education to be that of helping the individual to make more successful and constructive adjustments, then we must write our texts not merely as an introduction to the succeeding "courses" to be given in the further pursuit of our subject, not merely as a preparation for advanced study, but with the life needs, the practical human needs, of our students as the guiding and motivating purpose.

It would have added greatly to the strength and value of the book had this purpose been permitted to permeate its pages, rather than the more aloof and impersonal purpose of a presentation in most carefully chosen language of certain facts.

On the other hand, as a presentation of cold facts, as a combination of the view-point of the behaviorist, and of the older viewpoints and methods of the so-called structuralistic and functionalistic schools, the book is admirably done. This is not the place to approve or disapprove, according to one's own convictions, of any of the special modes of treatment or investigation of psychological facts, or to side with one school or the other as to what properly constitutes the field of psychological investigation. But to revert to the idea thrown out as a constructive criticism above, the author's leaning is so far toward the behavioristic method and

attitude in dealing with his facts that the student is likely to receive the impression that behavior is purely a matter of mechanics, and gain no impression of the dynamics of consciousness. Let us by all means use all objective devices of observation possible for determining what both overt and implicit behavior are. But let us not omit to make central the fact that through the study of behavior we are learning something more about the nature of conscious processes, the forces that go to make up human personality. Let the psychologist not forget, in his eagerness to get at the objective facts of behavior, that these objective facts must be facts to him and can be facts to him only in terms of his own consciousness, if they are to have any part in his world at all. And finally, if we shall accept the position, no matter in what particular words we may express it, that psychology has to do with the scientific investigation of human behavior, its causes and conditions, then let us by all means keep constantly before ourselves and our students the dynamic part played by consciousness in its relation to behavior, its relation to success or failure in making our adjustments to life situations. In actual experience, we find ourselves translating everything into conscious life to make it ours. In actual experience we find ourselves face to face with differences in conduct or behavior that grow out of thoughts, feelings, ideas, judgments, that is, not to continue the list, out of forms and factors in the mental life, the life of consciousness. Then let us not be content, in presenting to immature minds, to men and women whose most urgent need is self-control, and whose most insistent call is for action, a scientific introduction to the facts and laws of human behavior which is coldly anatomical, a catalogue of events, a glossary of technical terms, rather than the dynamics of human personality as it manifests itself in behavior. Better still, let us constantly take the dry bones of our science and clothe them with the living flesh. Let us use our anatomies, our structuralistic facts, our physiological substrate or correlate of consciousness, our classifications and our laws always as a means toward helping the student, in this his first and perhaps his only contact with our science, to see the dependable and inescapable relation between the forms and factors of the mental life and his adjustments, which constitute both his objective and his subjective behavior, and aid him in his peculiarly human task of so reconstructing or remaking this *psycho-physical* human nature of his that he shall make some progress in the direction of acquir-

ing that conscious control of conduct which alone gives any assurance of behavior that shall be progressively constructive.

Professor Warren's book is a most excellent anatomical analysis and is written with a painstaking care, and a clearness of diction that quite equal the range of scholarly knowledge which is evidenced on every page. But, on the other hand, we cannot but regret that there is everywhere lacking that dynamic element of vital contact with life needs, that vital translation into terms of life adjustments, which have been pointed out above. In this respect, the book is certainly not unique upon the ever lengthening shelf of psychology texts.

F. E. OWEN.

**SPIRITUAL VOICES IN MODERN LITERATURE** by TREVOR H. DAVIES. George H. Doran Company, New York, 1919. Pp. X, 312.

Some will complain that the use of literary criticism to bear a religious message is a perversion. Such criticism is short-sighted however in this, that there is no great literature which does not deal with the fundamental human instincts and as such is full of conclusions of the greatest moment for theology. The greatest study and the greatest interest of the human mind is ever the human reactions, those of human souls. These studies in this book are full of the homiletic interest but are therefore not the less valuable for purposes of moral teaching. It is appropriate that from time to time the deeper teachings of the masterpieces should thus be set forth.

The author begins by discussing Francis Thompson's "The Hound of Heaven" as the epic of the love that will not let us go. He follows with Peer Gynt as the example of the ignominy of half-heartedness. In the remaining lectures he deals with Ruskin's Seven Lamps of Architecture, Tennyson's In Memoriam, The Letters of John Smetham, Wordsworth's Ode to Duty, Morley's Gladstone, Browning's Saul, Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter, and Masefield's Everlasting Mercy. He does this with a freshness and vigor which is likely to add to the interest already present for these books and to send his readers back to a review of them under the light of his teaching.

Only those will be disappointed who find it always difficult to tolerate seriousness, or who cannot be satisfied with a book which is less than a thorough-going critique. This book is correct in assuming the aim of great literature to be a serious one. It possesses no

particular value as a critique, nevertheless it is valuable as sending many people back to the original springs of inspiration.

**THE VITAL MESSAGE**, by ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE. George H. Doran Co., New York. 1919. Pp. VII, 164.

It is not unusual for the desperate partisan frequently to declare the complete annihilation of the same enemy, because the partisan mind dwells upon the instances favorable to its conclusions and as stolidly overlooks those that are unfavorable. One can never look hopefully to such a source for scientific accuracy. Such a case of special pleading and inaccuracy is to be found in this book. Yet it will have considerable influence with the uncritical minds of such as will to believe it.

It frequently happens that men who are famous in one field of human endeavor carry the conceit of confidence to other fields of which they know nothing. They thus come to be listened to by the ignorant and uncritical while they make themselves ridiculous to the clear-sighted. There are illustrations a-plenty in contemporaneous history, as when a successful manufacturer attempts to enter the field of international diplomacy, or a chemist speaks with unabashed dogmatism in the field of theology.

The partisan bias of the book is disclosed by an attack upon institutionalized Christianity so obviously unfair and untrue as to be evident to one who has even read in the newspapers of the philanthropic and humanitarian effort to which the church is at present giving itself.

The author looks for the dawn of a new day through the discoveries of spiritualism, but he does not show the benefits. Neither does he disclose any moral and ethical values to flow from the substantiation of such doddering and feeble messages as are supposed to come from the unseen world. One might well pray for annihilation rather than to look helplessly forward to such an order of intellectuality as seems to be "disclosed" in the widely heralded "manifestations" of spiritualism.

Why are so many widely known men seeking after the occult? It is an indication of spiritual poverty, a loss of the sense of the things worth while. It is pursued by those who have lost or never had a religious faith worthy the name. It has been emphasized by the effect of the tragic events of the war upon many whose former materialism proves no longer adequate for the load of human tragedy.

## Notes and Discussions

### LIFE'S IDEAL

WE are going to be through with this life before very long. The longest life is short when it is over; any time is short when it is done. The gates of time will swing to behind you before long. They will swing to behind some of us soon, but behind all of us before long. And then the important thing will not be what appointments we had, or what rank in the conference, or anything of that sort—not what men thought of us, but what He thought of us, and whether we were built into His kingdom. And if, at the end of it all, we emerge from life's work and discipline crowned souls, at home anywhere in God's universe, life will be a success.

—*Borden Parker Bowne*

### IBÁÑEZ AND THE CELTIC REVIVAL

The visit of the writer of "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse" to America brings us into closer touch with old Spain, for he may be regarded as the first Spaniard in these modern days who has struck the international key and found readers all over the world. Russia, Sweden, Norway, Hungary with Tolstoi, Laegerlof, Ibsen, Jokai and other notable writers have given their quota to world literature; and now Southern Europe—the sunny Mediterranean—is coming in for a share of popular interest. Part of the story, it is true, is laid in South America, of which the hero is a native; but the interest soon passes definitely to the Old World, and the intensity of the European crisis where the "horsemen," conquest, war, famine and death, have been riding in spectacular form as never before in the history of man.

It is to be noted that the novelist pays particular attention to the preposterous claims of the swelled-head Teuton to be a superior world race, especially when compared with the rival Celt, to whom many have never ceased to grant pre-eminence in the higher civilization. And the Prussian classed Spain with the Celtic peoples who were now decadent. In the new appreciation of values in civilization, which has definitely dethroned the Hun from the leading

place which he so coveted and has bidden him educate himself a little more in humanity before he takes even an equal rank among the nations, Ibáñez is determined that the Spaniard shall be classed as one with France and her allies in her civilization and her race ideals; standing for "culture" and not for "kultur."

The world has scarcely recognized as yet how much it has been saved from, in the matter of a pompous, dull and brutal tyranny, by the defeat of a Prussianized Germany in the late Titanic struggle. The higher literature, to begin with, owes more in the past to the Celt whom the Prussian bigot affected to despise than to the "dull German." This is Ruskin's term for the German pedant in his worst mood of self-complacence. To German dullness and English affectation he remarks in one of his best-known essays, "On the Pathetic Fallacy," "we owe the tiresome words 'objective' and 'subjective' which divide life as it was never meant by the Maker of all to be divided."

Ruskin was a Celt of the Celts. A writer in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* twenty years ago declared that he was the most analytic mind in modern Europe, a marvel of keen and just psychology, underrated by a Germanized world who talked in terms of the subjective and the objective. And Matthew Arnold, who was of Cornish Celtic stock by his mother and was termed "David the Son of Goliath" by Swinburne, who did not fancy the dogmatic set-up of the elder Arnold (great man as he undoubtedly was) made it his mission when appointed professor of poetry at Oxford sixty years ago to reassert the claims of the Celt to literary hegemony in Europe. Here is what Matthew has to say on the subject: "Style (which adds dignity and distinction to literature) the Germans are singularly without. . . . The Normans may have brought in among us English the Latin sense for rhetoric and style—for, indeed, this sense goes naturally with a high spirit and strenuousness like theirs—but the sense for style which English poetry shows is something finer than we could well have got from a people so positive and so little poetical as the Normans; and it seems we may much more plausibly derive it from a root of the poetical Celtic nature in us. . . . The Celt's quick feeling for what is noble and distinguished gives his poetry style. . . . His sensibility and nervous exaltation give it a better gift still, the gift of rendering with wonderful felicity the magical charm of nature." No wonder Señor Ibáñez wishes to be classed as a Spaniard with the Celtic peoples and not as a Goth.

J. M. DIXON.

## THE CHRISTMAS SCONCE

It is only a tarnished and twisted piece of brass, shaped by some thoughtless oriental after the pattern of the lotus in the hope of appealing to some Christian eye and thus to bring the daily meed of rice. The connoisseurs of art know it not for to them it is negligible. Yet its journeys have been wide and various. It has sailed the seven seas and has crossed many lands.

It has outlived the wrecking of numerous parsonages by the moving van, and has survived the critical inspection of parsonage committees. Like Paracelsus it "plunges into a dark tremendous sea", namely the box that holds the kitchen scullery, and unlike him it is hauled forth at the other side of a continent with the freshness of that morning when the stars sang together. Again and again it has been triumphantly mounted in mother's room, though whether its dilapidated receptacle would hold a candle is subject to debate.

It has a place in the family life distinct and individual. That is why it outlasts all vicissitudes of time and change. Time can but temporarily dim it and evil circumstance can only add oddity to its form. It does not meet the demands of "Household Art." It is innocent of the skill of East Aurora, but it will never be left behind. Why? O, that is another tale!

The "boy" in a high idealism to find a Christmas gift worthy of mother had visited store after store in the great city, even to the point of exhaustion trying to bring his ideal into step with the paltry sum in his hand. At dusk he drifted into a "Japanese" store, and the clerk saw the chance to get rid of a broken sconce.

How much would you take for it? There you err, my friend. The "boy" has grown to manhood, and though he would, could not repeat this gift. To us it is more precious than rubies.

#### "THE YOUNG VISITERS"

London and other literary centers today are much tickled over an unnamed effort in fiction, *THE YOUNG VISITERS*, by a girl of nine, to which Sir James Barrie supplies a Preface. In many respects it is so delicate a satire on fashionable England of the immediate past, that, notwithstanding Barrie's emphatic guarantee of its authenticity, many have suspected a Barrie camouflage. Some of the ingenuous scenes in the narrative, such as the week end in London of two young unmarried people, recall objectionable incidents in some of Eleanor Glyn's stories, like "The Career of Kath-

erine Bush." Even the quaint spelling, with the intrusive South of England r's, has been carefully reproduced. The writer, now grown up, is living in England, and there seems to be no doubt whatever of the genuineness of the story. The triumphant face of the little authoress serves as a frontispiece. As a girl she was known in the neighborhood where the family lived—in Sussex—as a wonderful creator of impromptu charades and playlets.

## The Philosopher's Shears

"Damning the abstract sinner is an easy matter, and seems to be meet, right and a bounden duty, but it looks different when it is our own flesh and blood."—*Bowne*.



"The coldest reasoner, the bitterest enemy of emotion, is as much the slave of temperament as the religious fanatic; he is driven by a concentrated passion for truthfulness."—*Sheldon*, "Strife of Systems."



"There is a cross at the heart of every human blessedness."—*Davies*, "Spiritual Voices in Modern Literature."



"As a rule there is not enough man in the pessimist to believe in anything great and reverent."—*Bowne*.



"We understand the acts of our fellows only on the basis of what we have done or longed to do."—*Parker*, "The Self and Nature."



"Every age has its pet hypocrisies, and our own is perhaps the self-righteousness of the crowd."—*Sheldon*, "Strife of Systems."

"A hogshead of soap bubble punctured, sinks into a teaspoonful of soap, and that is all there was ever in it."—*Bowne*.



## Our Contributors' Page

ALBERT CORNELIUS KNUDSON, S. T. B., PH. D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in Boston University is unusually qualified to speak of the work of Professor Bowne, having had an important part in the editing of Bowne's posthumous work *Kant and Spencer*. Beside this he is the author of many important works, the latest of which, *The Religious Teachings of the Old Testament*, is just from the press and will be reviewed in a future number of *THE PERSONALIST*.

EDGAR S. BRIGHTMAN, PH. D., will be read with interest because he has just been inducted into the chair formerly occupied by Professor Bowne. His inaugural address *The Personalistic Method in Philosophy* forms a leading article in the current issue of *The Methodist Review*.

It is unnecessary to introduce again to Personalist readers DR. JAMES MAIN DIXON, F. R. S. E., whose work forms such an important part of the accomplishment of *THE PERSONALIST*. His latest book *The Spiritual Meaning of 'In Memoriam'*, is reviewed in this number.

THOMAS BLANCHARD STOWELL, PH. D., was long prominent in the educational affairs of New York and has been in recent years Dean of the College of Education of the University of Southern California. He has given over his active duties in the University and has found time to give us his idea of the philosophy essential to an educator.

FRANCIS M. LARKIN, PH. D., as the Editor of *The California Christian Advocate* has proved himself a conspicuous success as editor and writer. It is not usual for one in his position to turn aside from his own special interests to help another. For that reason the present article in *THE PERSONALIST* will be particularly appreciated.

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Manuscripts and communications should be addressed to THE PERSONALIST, University of Southern California, University Avenue and Thirty-fifth Street, Los Angeles. Stamps for the return of manuscripts should be enclosed.

## TO THE GENTLE PERSONALIST

IT MAY please you to know that Mrs. Bowne has most graciously consented and we expect to begin shortly in the pages of **THE PERSONALIST** a series of papers dealing with the biographical detail of Professor Bowne's life. The need for something of the kind has long been felt. They should create a freshened interest in our master's work.

¶ All around the field we learn of preparations to participate in the future numbers of **THE PERSONALIST**. We hope that some of the people of whom we have heard will bring their good intentions to the point of early action.

¶ We are fairly bursting to give the names of some of the notables who have written us but fear there are some who would dislike our giving publicity to their testimonials. So here are a few that have been properly shrouded in anonymity.

¶ From the presidents of two eastern colleges :

¶ "I have read the first number of **THE PERSONALIST** with a great deal of interest and satisfaction."—"I read over the articles in **THE PERSONALIST**, and desire to congratulate you upon this journal. It is an ambitious enterprise for an institution and I trust it will meet with great success."

¶ From three college and university deans :

¶ "I spent five minutes looking at it and at once decided I could not afford to do without the magazine."—"I am glad that the good cause is getting gruffer voiced champions."—"I enjoyed it and learned from it."

¶ From five college and theology professors :

¶ "Please accept my hearty congratulations upon the advent of **THE PERSONALIST** so attractively clothed and in so right a mind. It means much to the intellectual and spiritual life of the Pacific Coast that we have in **THE PERSONALIST** a fit organ for philosophical and religious thought."—"You have made a splendid beginning and you deserve a wide patronage."—"We trust that it may be the beginning of a larger hearing for the personalistic way of interpreting life."—"I have read almost every word of the first number, and regard it as a very auspicious beginning."—"I rejoice that you have undertaken this work and I wish you success. I like every feature of it. . . . The mechanical workmanship is of a high quality and the result is very handsome indeed."

# The Personalist

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## BOWNE AS TEACHER AND AUTHOR

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Borden P. Bowne was pre-eminently a teacher. His professional chair was his throne. Authorship simply extended the range of his voice and multiplied the number of his students. Both activities, lecturing and writing, went together. One supplemented the other, and in both Bowne attained unique distinction.

Over those who sat at his feet he exercised a magnetic influence. To an almost unprecedented degree he possessed the power of excitation over his students. He frequently sent them forth from the lecture room so stimulated by his profundity and brilliancy that they felt, as one of them said, as though their "heads were expanding to the bursting point." The secret of this wonderful power lay, no doubt, in its ultimate analysis, in the indefinable personality of the man. There were, however, several conspicuous qualities that contributed to it.

Perhaps the first thing about Bowne that impressed one was his marvelously clear insight into the fundamental problems of thought and life. He penetrated at once to

the heart of every question, brushing aside what was superficial and irrelevant. Much philosophical instruction, he justly felt, was confusing and misleading because it failed to mark out clearly the great highways of all logical and consistent thinking. To these, therefore, he largely devoted himself. The by-ways and hedges he left to lesser minds. His own thought was concentrated upon the great fundamentals, the first principles of philosophy. These he lifted out of their obscurity and set in the clear light of day. There is, as he used to say, a good deal of blind staggers in philosophy, much of confusion and aimlessness. But in him there was none of this. His discussions were always to the point and as sun clear as human speech could make them. Free from the pedantry of the merely professional teacher, untrammelled by the philosophical fashion of the moment, and heedless of the favor or disfavor of the stall-fed philosopher, he kept close to the vital and persistent problems of thought and life. He saw distinctly the true aim of all sound philosophy, and knew with the unerring vision of a seer how best to realize it. To listen to him or to follow him in his books was to see the mists arise from the valleys, and the clouds and the shadows flee away. His work was a veritable *Aufklarung*, as the Germans say, an illumination. As a result of it the dark places of human thought were penetrated and the hidden roots of human belief laid bare.

Along with this profundity of insight and clearness of mental vision Bowne possessed an equally remarkable gift of expression. Had he devoted himself to polite literature instead of to philosophy he would certainly have attained high distinction as an essayist. As it is, his writings have a marked literary flavor. The same finish and taste for words were also characteristic of his ordinary conversation. His speech had a classic quality. Few men have ever so completely mastered the terminology of his sub-

ject as did he. On the most fundamental questions he expressed himself with a freedom, precision and grace that the present writer has never heard equaled. His class room lectures were models from the standpoint of form as well as from that of matter. Those who were privileged to listen to him from day to day will never forget the impression of boundless reserve and of extraordinary mastery that he first made upon them by the ease, lucidity and profundity of his extemporaneous lecturing.

Another quality that contributed in no small degree to Bowne's popularity and influence was his humor. He possessed it in abundance and made free use of it. In dealing with hostile views he not infrequently fell into a sarcastic vein. This some regarded as a weakness. But it never interfered with the solidity of his argumentation, and it always lent spiciness and color to his discussions. His wit was not with him a mere digression, nor was it resorted to simply to evoke a smile. It was admirably adapted to the profundity of his thought, and acted as a striking illuminator of it. Then, too, it gave to his class-room an unsurpassed brilliancy and charm. If the humorous stories and witty remarks that appeared in his lectures during the course of a year had been gathered together, they would have made one of the choicest books of humor ever published.

But there is yet a deeper fact that needs to be mentioned in order to explain Bowne's remarkable influence as a teacher. He had a system. He did not content himself with merely historical and critical studies. He worked out a comprehensive theory of reality and of the intellectual, moral and religious life. The conclusions he reached were essentially those of Lotze, but they all bore the stamp of his own individuality. In the preface to one of his earliest books he quoted the saying that "there are many echoes but few voices," and classed himself with the echoes. But

that soon ceased to be the case. He became early in life one of the few voices in the philosophical world of his day. He had a message. In his speech there was an unconscious tone of authority and finality,—a quality that resulted naturally from the systematic completeness of his thought.

Underlying his system there are two fundamental principles. First, *personality is the key to reality*, and, second, *life is the test of truth*. According to the latter principle logical demonstration is not necessary to belief. Indeed, such demonstration is impossible in the world of objective reality. Belief roots in life and finds its justification in life. It needs no other support. At the same time the intellect has its rights. It cannot, to be sure, solve the ultimate problem of existence. It must begin with some assumption, with some mystery. Every system of thought requires this. But there is a choice in mysteries. One mystery, if accepted, may leave the problems of life as dark and opaque as ever; another may illumine the whole of life and thought. Now the latter is the case with personality. Accepted as an ultimate fact, it illuminates our whole thought life. It makes us see that the categories of thought do not explain intelligence, but are explained by it. The whole universe, if it is to be understood at all, must be understood in personal terms. Nature, consequently, takes on a very different look from what it had before. It ceases to be mere being and becomes speech. The power, not ourselves, is changed from blind force to personal will. The whole universe comes to be charged with meaning and purpose. The old contradictions and discords are removed. The ideal and real are united in one consistent view. Behold, all things are made new. It would be difficult adequately to describe the effect which Bowne's exposition of this truth had upon many of his students. It proved to them a veritable gospel, a deliverance from intellectual bondage. What the doctrine of

justification by faith meant to Luther's religious life, that did this great truth concerning personality as the key to reality mean to their intellectual life. It wrought for them their intellectual redemption.

The four qualities which we have noted as characteristic of Bowne's work as a teacher appear also in his books. Indeed, the latter were in large part the precipitate of his class-room lectures. The wit and humor are somewhat subdued in the books, but the gift of expression is there in heightened form. "There is not," said a critic some years ago," one among the dozen standard works from his pen which is not almost as striking from the viewpoint of literature as it is suggestive and stimulating from that of philosophy. All of them have a rhetorical charm scarcely less potent than their intellectual and moral energy." Still they are wholly free from diffuseness. There is in them no striving after literary effect for its own sake. There is no padding. They are marvels of condensation, as well as of brilliant exposition and searching criticism.

His first book was published in 1874, having been begun while he was yet a student in college. It was entitled "*The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*," and was devoted to an examination of the first principles of the system. It exposed the inconsistencies and superficialities of the English thinker with a clearness and raciness that has never been excelled. Although written by a mere youth it has maintained itself almost down to the present as one of the most thorough and decisive criticisms of the Spencerian philosophy. In 1879 a larger book appeared from his pen entitled "*Studies in Theism*." This gave way in 1887 to a more systematic and more compact work on the same subject, called "*The Philosophy of Theism*." This in turn was revised in 1902 and published under the title, "*Theism*." No more masterly presentation of the theistic argument

has ever been made than is to be found in these three books, especially the last.

Bowne's chief works in the department of pure philosophy are his "*Theory of Thought and Knowledge*" and his "*Metaphysics*." The "*Metaphysics*" was originally published in 1882. A part of the material in it was later made the basis of "*The Theory of Thought and Knowledge*," which appeared in 1897. The remainder was revised in 1898 and published under the old title. These two volumes furnish us with a comprehensive exposition of his philosophical system. In 1886 he gave to the public an "*Introduction to Psychological Theory*," in which he applied his philosophical principles to the more important problems of psychology. He laid bare the inconsistencies and confusion in much of the so-called "new psychology," and pointed out the highways of every sound psychological theory. His "*Principles of Ethics*" was published in 1892. In this book his firm grasp on life and reality is especially evident. He exposes with relentless rigor the inadequacy of the theories of the past, insists on the necessity of uniting the intuitive and experience schools, and finds the aim of conduct not in abstract virtue but in fullness and richness of life.

With the revision of his "*Metaphysics*" in 1898 and his "*Theism*" in 1902 Bowne's creative work in philosophy was virtually done. After this he devoted himself largely to popularizing the conclusions he had reached and to applying them to the problems of religion. We may, however, note a change of emphasis and also of terminology in the lectures which were published in 1908 under the title "*Personalism*." In the first edition of the "*Metaphysics*" (1882) Bowne had stressed what he termed his "objective idealism." In the revised edition (1898) he characterized his system as "transcendental empiricism." And now in 1908 he used the simpler and more expressive

term "personalism." This term was a step in the direction of the popularization of his system, but it also brought out the idea of a fuller and more concrete experience on the part of the world ground than that suggested by either of the other terms. It may be added in this connection that the book on "Personalism" was dictated to a stenographer in six sittings of about two hours each. The dictations were, of course, later revised, but the revision did not materially alter either the substance or final form of the book. This fact gives one some idea of the extraordinary mastery that Bowne had of the field of philosophy. Only a marvelous gift of expression and a life-time of reflection on the problems dealt with could have made possible such a feat.

One of the fundamental ideas in Bowne's philosophy is "the immanence of God." And this he took as the title of a small book of a hundred and fifty pages which was published in 1905. The principle of the divine immanence is here applied in a remarkably fresh and convincing way to our conceptions of nature, of history, of the Bible, and of religion. The book is both in style and content a classic. It was followed in 1909 by a series of essays published under the title of "*Studies in Christianity*." The three most important of these essays—those on "The Christian Revelation," "The Atonement" and "The Christian Life"—had already appeared in booklet form, and had awakened widespread interest. Some conservative people took alarm at what they regarded as the dangerous theological tendency of these essays, and the author in 1904 was brought to trial for heresy, but was unanimously and triumphantly acquitted. In fundamental matters Bowne was a most loyal adherent of the Christian faith. Indeed, he was the great apologist of his age.

At the time of his death in 1910, Bowne was about to publish another work under the title, "*The Present Status*

*of Faith.*" The essays that were to compose this volume had all, except one, recently appeared in various magazines. The last one, which was to be the first in the volume, he began to dictate to a stenographer the day before his death. About two-thirds of it was completed. But the volume has never appeared. Instead a series of sermons were edited by Mrs. Bowne and published in the fall of 1910, bearing the title, "*The Essence of Religion.*" These sermons give a better insight than any of his other books into the author's religious experience. They reveal a profound religious faith, and have been a source of inspiration and comfort to thousands.

For many years Bowne gave a course of lectures to his students on Kant and Spencer. These lectures he dictated to a stenographer with the idea of "mulling them over," as he said, and eventually publishing them. But at the time of his death he had not revised the dictations, and the lectures were left in somewhat imperfect form. It was, however, felt that after being corrected as carefully as possible, they ought to be published. Those especially who had heard the lectures would be glad to have them in permanent form, and others would want to know the author's latest thought on the two great thinkers dealt with, even though the manuscript had not received its final finish at the author's hands. So in 1912 the lectures appeared in a good sized volume under the title, "*Kant and Spencer: A Critical Exposition.*"

Bowne once remarked to the present writer that he felt pretty well satisfied with his literary output. And such may well have been his feeling. For his books, to quote a distinguished critic, contain "the largest, clearest, most comprehensive and adequate output of philosophic-theologic-religious thought from any one brain in the history of Methodism. Taken together they constitute a complete and coherent system of thought, the system of Borden P.

Bowne, a legacy of immense and enduring value to Christianity." What his reputation in the distant future may be, no one can say. Eucken has said of him that he was "distinctly America's first philosopher." Professor J. Cook Wilson, of Oxford, has declared him to be "the most important of modern American philosophers." Joseph Cook used to speak of him as "the greatest philosophic teacher of his age." And there are many others who share in this high estimate. Bowne himself was conscious of writing not only for the present but also for the future, "for the eternities." He devoted himself to the problems of fundamental and permanent significance, and it may well be that with the revival of interest in metaphysical studies at some future day a considerably greater importance will be attached to him and his work than is customary in professional philosophical circles at present.

In conclusion, a brief word ought to be added concerning the personality of the man. Bowne was not simply an intellectual genius. In him life and thought to an unusual degree went together. One complemented the other. Emerson's familiar saying that "what you are speaks so loudly that I cannot hear what you say" did not hold true of him. The very reverse was the case. What he was, spoke so loudly that one could not help hearing what he said. His whole personality spoke, not simply his intellect. This is finely suggested in the beautiful inscription which Mrs. Bowne has placed on his tomb. She there speaks of him as "a man of God through the unstained crystal of whose soul divine truths shone in radiant clearness on the world." It was his whole soul, not merely his intellect, that was a source of light. No one could have known him at all intimately without being profoundly impressed with this fact. Many a time as the present writer left him after a walk in the Boston Fenway, these words of Wordsworth would come unsummoned to his lips, "I have felt a pres-

ence that disturbs me with the joy of elevated thoughts." His was a regal nature. He trod the high places of the earth. The general impression which he made on those who knew him and his work best, may be summed up in the following statement. He was "one of the great thinkers of his day, brilliant in wit, profound in thought, luminous in exposition, rich in his literary output, author of a system of philosophy of enduring worth, vigorous defender of the faith, possessed of extraordinary power of excitation as a teacher, of towering nobility of soul, an idealist of idealists, unforgettable."

## PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN EDUCATION

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A teacher of philosophy was at his desk, endeavoring to philosophize. A knock at the door, and in comes a cub reporter from the *Sunday Bugle*. "Just a moment, sir," pleads the young man. "Tell me, what is the message of your philosophy for life? Give it to me quickly, in a few words that everyone will understand." Cub though the questioner was, he had asked a question to which society has a right to expect an answer. It is a hopeful sign of the times that the American Philosophical Association has just announced as the subject for discussion in 1920, "The role of the philosopher in modern life, with reference both to teaching and to research." It is as though the entire profession were laying the cub reporter's question on its conscience.

The answer to that question is of very great educational importance. In almost every American college and university there is at least one chair of philosophy. That chair exerts a disproportionate influence on students and the wider public included in the clientele of the college. It moulds thought and life. Mr. Fritz Kreisler has, it is true, been quoted as saying that art, religion and philosophy have nothing to do with life. Mr. G. K. Chesterton holds otherwise. For him, the most important fact about the members of any chance drawing-room assemblage is precisely their philosophy. Mr. Chesterton is right. Certain

it is that of all the humanities, indeed of all the disciplines taught in American colleges, philosophy is the one that, taken seriously, affects life most.

Some college students are voluntarily immune to any intellectual or cultural influences; philosophy does not touch them directly—they are self-condemned. Some earnestly struggling with the problems, become confused; the foundations of thinking and of morality totter, and an unhappy or a ruined life may result. Others may acquire an aristocratically philosophical aloofness from common humanity and its interests, leading to a doctrinaire and unreal dabbling in the latest radicalisms. For others, however,—and they are many—philosophy brings respect and capacity for clear thinking, an historical perspective, a sense of true values, and a new grip on life. <sup>1</sup>For them, morality is not shaken, but better understood; religion is not lost, but more intelligently found. Philosophy, then, has large possibilities of evil and of good; our interpretation of life as a whole reacts on the whole of the life that we interpret.

The educational value of philosophy is largely determined by the conception of what philosophy is. At least five different views are held at present by American teachers on the subject.

The first view, held by many teachers of "the old school," regards the study of philosophy as primarily historical culture and research. According to this view, the function of the teacher is to acquaint his students with the great historical systems of the past. Know the great minds of the race; let their achievements and their mistakes pass before your thought; and you will imbibe something of their spirit. Thus trained, you are equipped to face the perplexities of human experience, and form your own

<sup>1</sup>It is regrettable that the fundamental significance of philosophy is so often overlooked in current programs of religious education.

opinions. So runs the first view, calling attention to one essential function of philosophy. Its error would lie in making this one function the only one.

The second view is what Professor De Laguna has called "disciplined scepticism." Dissatisfied with merely historical studies, this view would regard philosophy as an instrument of inquiry in the spirit of the Socrates of the earlier dialogues. Philosophy is not a system, but a problem; not an attainment, but a search. Let us therefore guard ourselves against conclusions, and occupy ourselves forever with debate, "wherever the argument may lead." This view represents an essential mood or aspect of the philosophic spirit. But the attitude that is entirely open-minded on every issue is logically self-contradictory as well as practically impossible to carry out. Avoiding all conclusions, it easily comes to the most pitiful conclusion that nothing matters; for about the proposition that anything does matter, doubts may always be raised. A "disciplined scepticism" may eventuate in bogs that demonstrate Bowne's pregnant saying, "Truths which bear on practice soon grow vague and uncertain when abstracted from practice."<sup>2</sup>

The third conception is very popular at the present time; namely, the conception of philosophy as "scientific method," advocated chiefly by the New Realists. Here also would belong monism, and the various so-called radical empiricisms and positivisms. It is the naturalistic mood.<sup>3</sup> For this school scientific method means mathematical analysis as the only instrument of dealing with experience. This method logically leads to a universe of impersonal terms and relations, thoroughly fumigated and cleansed of all traces of ultimate value; to "a philosophy of disillu-

<sup>2</sup>Bowne, *Theism*, p. 260.

<sup>3</sup>See the present writer's article, "Personalistic Method in Philosophy," *Methodist Review*, May, 1920. Also Hoernle, *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, pp. 24-49.

sionment," that abandons every moral and spiritual ontology.<sup>4</sup> Personalistic theism is therefore anathema to scientific method. This view may be presented persuasively; the lives and character of its advocates may be noble. But any position that rejects the principle of personality, and tends, as it does, to a behavioristic account of all values, is not calculated to perform a wholesome function in education. Under its tutelage, the lion and the lamb, science and the humanities, would lie down together, with the lamb inside. It has less cultural value than either of the two previously mentioned conceptions; and less religious and moral value than the historical approach.

The fourth conception regards philosophy as an instrument for efficiency in gaining ends; the ends being conceived as largely given in the process of biological adaptation of organism to environment. This pragmatist-instrumentalist standpoint is, like the neo-realistic, dominated by science, but by biology rather than by physics and mathematics. John Dewey, the chief representative of instrumentalism, has been ably criticized by Professor Cohen.<sup>5</sup> "The America which believes in faith above visible works gets no recognition in Dewey. . . . Unlike James, who had a more rigid scientific training, Dewey is willing to abandon all interest in the mystery of the universe at large. . . . Dewey is a thorough-going and consistent naturalist. . . . Thus when Dewey rejects God, freedom, and immortality on the general ground that philosophical concepts can no longer serve as sanctions, he opens himself to the *ad hominem* argument that his alternative concepts, experience, evolution, and democracy are also sanctions, resting on no really superior evidence." Thus speaks Professor Cohen, himself no partisan of personal-

<sup>4</sup>The above characterization, from Perry, is true of the movement as a whole; but Spaulding's New Rationalism, with its "Neo-realism of ideals" is in a class by itself.

<sup>5</sup>The New Republic, 22 (1920). 82-86, dated March 17, 1920.

ism or "Protestant philosophy." We may conclude that the efficiency engineering of "Creative Intelligence" produces important practical results in many fields; but that it is not a comprehensive way of interpreting life as a whole nor of developing a sense of the higher ideal values. Nay, it is intolerant of some of those values. Professor Dewey once wrote these significant words, "Democracy is an absurdity where faith in the individual as individual is impossible; and this faith is impossible when intelligence is regarded as a cosmic power, not an adjustment and application of individual tendencies."<sup>6</sup> This implies that all philosophical idealism and all rational theism are necessarily anti-democratic, hence to be rejected. It would appear that this philosophy on the whole emphasizes those tendencies in American life that need castigation, or at least spiritualiation, instead of encouragement. It is not the philosophy that will perform the highest educational function, wise though it be in the machinery of education. We need efficiency; but much more we need a clear and intelligent vision of the ends which are being efficiently realized. The national anthem of America might well be made that erst-while popular song, "We don't know where we're going, but we're on the way." Unless we think about the "where" as well as the "way," we may find at last, with Socrates, that the unexamined life is not worth living, however "efficiently" it may be charted.

Fifth and last is the conception that philosophy is an interpretation of the whole of life and its values. This is by far the most comprehensive conception on our list; the most catholic and humane; and the one most nearly heir to the historic mission of philosophy from Plato to Kant, Hegel and Lotze. At the present time there are three outstanding schools that are seriously undertaking to fulfil this mission. I refer first, to the better side of the prag-

<sup>6</sup>Lecture, Ethics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1908, p. 14.

matism of the James-Schiller type (as distinguished from Dewey's instrumentalism, and James' own later radical empiricism); secondly to absolute idealism, represented by men such as Bosanquet (and others in England), Hoernlé, Creighton, and many others; and thirdly to personalism as held in England by James Ward, Rashdall, Pringle-Pattison and Sorley and by the Bowne school, Hocking and many of similar outlook in America. This classification is not perfect; Miss Calkins, for example, would object to it because her absolute idealism (and possibly that of Royce and some others) is personalistic. There is, however clearly, an impersonal tradition in absolute idealism that differentiates a powerful current of thought from personalism.

It seems to the present writer that if a philosophy is to have any significant place in education it must aim at what this last group is striving for. A department of philosophy should aim to stimulate in its students sufficient intellectual initiative to lead them to an intelligent working hypothesis as to the total meaning of life and its values. If it does not somehow do this, it fails to serve as a unifying and idealizing force in education; it loses the greatest opportunity open to any department of an American college.

But certain radical objections to philosophy have been widely urged, which, if they be valid, would cancel the claim of philosophy to a place in the curriculum. Perhaps the most serious of such objections are three: that philosophy is useless, that it is dangerous, and that it is servile.

According to its critics, then, philosophy is useless. These critics include not merely the famous Bushmen of Australia, and "the man on the street," but also trained thinkers, many teachers of the sciences, history, literature—indeed, teachers of every subject save philosophy, and perchance some of them. The charge of uselessness may

in a sense be brought against every type of current philosophy, except Dewey's instrumentalism. Yet is that charge to be taken seriously? Is it not, truly understood, a form of high praise? For to say that a thing is useful is to say that it serves some end beyond itself. The useful is an instrument for securing something else, like wealth, health, or social betterment. Knowledge of typewriting, pedagogy, economics, hygiene, and the like is essential to human happiness. But since all useful (practical, vocational) subjects in a curriculum are useful precisely because they serve some end, attain some value, or fulfil some purpose, it becomes most important to understand what ends, values and purposes are worthy of being striven for. It is not therefore necessary to review life as a whole in order to understand its meanings? This staggering task is that of philosophy. Only in the light of one's philosophy, one's conception of what Aristotle called the final cause, is any object or activity termed useful. That which is useful to the voluptuary, the profiteer, the clergyman and the actor is not one and the same. The differences are determined not merely by differing stations in life, but much more fundamentally by differing philosophies of value. In a strict and literal sense, then, philosophy is not useful; but because it interprets and determines for us the meaning of usefulness it is the most important of disciplines; for it constitutes the central focus of all our striving, illuminating and clarifying both our moral and religious fundamentals, and all our thinking about the meaning of experience. Let it be useless, without it everything would be useless. At best everything would be blind, instinctive animal life. Wisely was it said that philosophy bakes no bread, but that she makes all bread taste better.

The enemies of philosophy return to the attack from a different angle. If its "uselessness" is not fatal, it is charged with being dangerous. It may be regarded as dan-

gerous both intellectually and practically. It is said to be dangerous intellectually, because it cultivates habits either of vagueness and inaccuracy or of dogmatism. This charge is unfair; it is not just to charge the faults of some philosophers; "made useless to the world by the very study which you extol" (Rep. VI, 487), against philosophy itself; and if any discipline exacts clearness, accuracy in use of terms, and an undogmatic temper, it is philosophy. It is also said to be dangerous practically. As we have pointed out above, it leads to the investigation and questioning of all principles and foundations. In some instances, students of philosophy not only reject convention and tradition in thought and conduct; they even lose their hold on the higher values, and spend their lives in mere groping, or worse still in cynical abandonment even of the groping for truth. There are many such cases. They are tragedies. It is difficult to see how they can be entirely prevented so long as man is finite and free. But the educational value of philosophy cannot be denied on the ground of such cases, tragical though they are. Every educational system and every discipline in every curriculum fails sometimes. Whoever the teacher, whatever his methods and convictions, some students will fail to profit by his instruction. But over against these possibilities of peril are probabilities of insight, inspiration, intellectual and moral progress. The promise surpasses and overbalances the peril,—yet only for those that are strong enough to learn to fight their intellectual battles through to the end.

The most deadly charge brought against philosophy is that it is too often servile. A philosophy "which, burdened with a hundred aims and a thousand motives, comes on its course cautiously tacking, while it keeps before its eyes at all times the fear of the Lord, the will of the ministry, the laws of the established church, the wishes of the publisher, the attendance of the students, the goodwill of colleagues,

the course of current politics, the momentary tendency of the public, and Heaven knows what besides,"<sup>7</sup>—such a philosophy however irreverently described, is not precisely free. A philosopher must be both morally and intellectually honest; if he makes any mental reservations in his pursuit of truth he will justly acquire the contempt both of his students and of his colleagues.

Now the charge of such servile unfreedom is often brought against teachers of philosophy in avowedly Christian colleges and universities. Their conclusions, it is argued, are mortgaged in advance. How can they be free? It is possible to consider this problem of freedom abstractly. Abstract academic freedom would logically make a teacher free in every respect,—free to teach or to practise any theory of morality, however low; free to employ any pedagogical methods, however inefficient; free to assume a disdainful indifference to the results of his instruction in the lives of his students and others whom he may influence. Such abstract freedom is irresponsible license; immoral, if any conduct is immoral.

We are thus confronted with one of the many antimonies for which philosophy is justly famous. Thesis: academic freedom is morally necessary; antithesis: academic freedom is morally absurd. If a solution is to be found, it must be in a definition of academic freedom. Given a freedom characterized by intellectual and moral integrity, a sense of social responsibility, and a conviction that philosophy has a real message for life,—the thesis must be affirmed, while many of the corollaries that have been drawn from it must be denied. Philosophy may, despite contrary assertions, be taught with full freedom in "religious" colleges, as it was by Bowne at Boston for so many years. A teacher in a Christian institution may pre-

<sup>7</sup>Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, Eng. tr., London 1906, Vol. I, p. xxx.

sent philosophy fairly and objectively, pointing out opposing views, welcoming and discussing all standpoints open-mindedly, while at the same time holding his own fundamental philosophical convictions, and explaining his reasons for them at the proper time. If those convictions are personalistic and theistic, it is difficult to see why he is any less free in presenting them than he would be if they were anti-theistic. The egregious assumption seems to be made that only he who stands outside the church and rejects the entire Christian faith is free; and the result is sometimes the pathetic circumstance to which Mr. Goodwin has recently alluded, that "institutions today are not religiously free, but free from religion."<sup>8</sup>

Our social situation is so complex that it ill becomes any of us to hurl epithets such as "servile" at any honest effort to clarify human thinking. Professor Alexander's remarkable "*Apologia pro Fide*"<sup>9</sup> (the presidential address at the 1919 meeting of the American Philosophical Association) reveals intimately how complex are the practical problems of a philosopher who is a man of religious insight and conviction. Professor Alexander has solved his personal problems by remaining outside all churches, believing that one may thus exert a greater influence over non-church-members, the "inquisitive and sceptical youth (children of the hour)"; fearing lack of sympathy, harsh misunderstanding and misinterpretation from within any church to which he might belong; and suspecting his own power to be utterly loyal to truth in the midst of creed and dogma. No one could charge his philosophy with servility. But a Bowne solves his problem by laying chief stress on a raising of the standard of religious thought rather than on an appeal to sceptics; confronting unsympathetic misunderstanding with a clear conscience; and aware that he, at

<sup>8</sup>Phil. Rev. 29 (1920), 113-134.

<sup>9</sup>In The Chronicle (Poughkeepsie, N. Y.), March, 1920, p. 432.

least, could not maintain his integrity without a social interpretation of his task as philosopher that combines intelligent loyalty to the essential faith of a great denomination, with the utmost freedom in non-essentials. No thoughtful person could charge Bowne's philosophy with servility any more than Alexander's. The difference lies in the particular group each wishes to reach; not in the common basic and utterly sincere zeal for truth.

Much fun has of late been poked at philosophy as edification. We may reply that a philosophy that does not edify is not of much value; it is useless and dangerous, if not servile. But a philosophy that really edifies need not be servile. If an *ad hominem* argument must be resorted to, mention may be made of the fact that the present peril in philosophy lies in its servility to science rather than in any assumed servility to religion.

The case against philosophy, particularly against a philosophy convinced of the fundamental validity of spiritual values, fails. One final objection may be raised. It may be said that if the function of philosophy is only to reenforce and to expound the moral and religious values, i. e., to edify, we might as well confine ourselves to those values directly,—to art, literature, religion, and social service. The answer is clear. The function of philosophy is not merely to expound and reenforce previously known values; its function is to understand, to correlate, to criticize life as a whole. Every type of existence and value must be taken into account, and in this process new interpretations of the spiritual values, yes, in a sense, new values, are created. The place of philosophy is secure. It is the supreme foe of dogmatism, superstition, intellectual sloth and all easy-going beliefs or doubts. Without philosophy the life of value is in grave peril; for, as the *Phaedrus* says, while there is agreement about silver and iron, there is disagreement about goodness and justice. Left un-

solved, this disagreement can result only in practical chaos. Quoting the same dialogue, we may recognize a profound insight behind the allegorical form of the statement that "the soul which has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form."

Ultimately, the defense and progressive movement of civilization rest not alone on might and on power, but on Spirit. The task of final leadership is that of the philosophers, or of whoever furnish to the age its philosophy. During the War it seemed as though the intellectual side of the defense of civilization rested with the scientists, the physicists, the chemists, the experimental psychologists. Where, we may be tempted to ask, was philosophy in the War? Let her reply. "I have been laboring since man began to think at many tasks, but chiefly at the task of discerning the ideal and eternal in human life, and pointing men to them. The values of truth, of beauty, and of goodness have been my quest. I have sought God. I have not found them as science finds, but I have given objects of loyalty to the loyal of all ages. In the War, where was I? I was living in the hearts of everyone to whom these highest values were dear; sustaining and inspiring whole armies and nations—not in technical, cloistered forms, but in the concrete life and religion that owe far more than most men know to my reflective thought."

Let us bring together the threads of our thought. We have been arguing that philosophy is a discipline of the highest educational value, while conceding that it involves more complicated problems than any other discipline. It develops the power to think freely and objectively; it accustoms one to breadth of vision; its history offers acquaintance with the greatest minds of the race. The profoundest conception of its function regards it as especially interested in the interpretation of moral and religious values.

One important educational problem should be discussed explicitly in conclusion. Ought a teacher of philosophy to confine himself to the raising of problems and the objective presentation of the history, leaving his students in the dark as to his personal convictions, and seeking to build up no positive and systematic world-view? This we may call the purely objective method. Or ought he, while retaining the merits of the objective method, to present his own philosophy as a working hypothesis for his students to build on, to criticize; and to discuss? This we may call the systematic method. Now, the purely objective method would be quite satisfactory if life were to be a piece of eternal graduate research; as educational training for real life it is almost futile. Professor W. H. Sheldon has recently<sup>9</sup> criticized the new realism and pragmatism because "no systematic metaphysic has issued from their minds, nor have they essayed any great plan of reality—and consequently they have little or nothing to teach." Professor Norman Kemp Smith in his inaugural address at Edinburgh<sup>10</sup> reviewed "The Present Situation in Philosophy," on the assumption that the systematic interest is and ought to be supreme. For him, the philosophical issue is that between naturalism and idealism. "They are," he tells us, "the summary and expression of opposing types of civilization; for there is little in human life that will be left unaffected, according as we make our decision for the one or the other."

If philosophy is to play her part in education, it must be through what I have called the systematic rather than through the purely objective method. This is not the time to present reasons for preferring one system to any other. But it is the conviction of the writer that personalism can defend itself against all forms of naturalism on the one

<sup>9</sup>Phil. Rev. 29 (1920). 135-144.

<sup>10</sup>Phil. Rev. 29. (1920). 1-26.

hand, and impersonal absolute idealism on the other. Not that personalism solves every problem, but that it treats them more completely and more clearly than any other system of thought. The verdict "unclear, unclear" pronounces a philosophical system the victim of intellectual leprosy. The clarity of personalism (although it is no philosophy for the infant class), its appeal to the forum of logic and common human experience, its view of the universe as a society of persons, its estimate of morality and religion all fit it to serve as the unifying climax for an education, as well as an inspiring background for service in the world of today where social questions are burning issues, and where insight and a true sense of values are so imperatively needed.

## UNIVERSITIES AND LEADERSHIP

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In the recent talk regarding a world "safe for democracy," sufficient stress has not been laid upon "democracy made safe by proper leadership." The genius and habit of capable leadership are not mere popular gifts, associated with glib oratory and deft handling of wage-earners' unions. They are qualities requiring a long and reverent training in history and science; association with the best leaders of the country; knowledge of its traditions and ideals; social manners that command respect. Personality with all its elusive elements of judgment and intuition comes in as a requisite influence, descending from father to son in social life; from teacher to pupil, from senior to junior, in the close association of university life.

A hundred years ago, with the democratic wave that passed over the world in the generation after the first revolution, and gave us among other things the republics of South America, it was supposed that education by books would supply the place of the old university training with its social limitations and special life. Napoleon, a militarist to the core, broke up the ancient universities of France, disliking the ideologues with their traditions of intellectual leadership. His University of Paris was a mere apex of the educational institutions of the country, directing studies generally and examining for degrees. On its model was founded the University of London, in 1836, which de-

manded no attendance at lectures. It would examine the work of students anywhere in the British Isles, and after a series of examinations grant a degree. A like institution in ideals and methods was the University of the City of New York. They were both pronounced failures, and have since been altered to conform to the old requisites of personal contact and guidance. One of the results of the disastrous war of 1870-1 was the determination of the French to restore provincial universities, with teachers and resident students. It was believed that the war had largely been lost by the lack of that richer leadership that is a fruit of university life.

The excellent civil service reorganization that marked English political life in the middle of last century opened up posts in India and over the world to capable youth, entirely on the basis of merit. After the Indian Mutiny of 1857, when the East India Company surrendered its rights to the British Government, in place of the old patronage system of appointments a strict examination was held in London for all candidates, and those who gained the highest marks got the best places. The ablest lads at the different universities, or home-trained by skillful tutors, competed, and a fine body of budding officials was sent out. But in a dozen years or more it was felt that the mere passing of an examination, however thorough, was not sufficient test or preparation, and successful candidates had to proceed to the universities for further careful personal supervision. In the case of consular appointments, a regular system of further training in linguistic and other studies was established at the different legations from Bolivia to Japan.

Along with this reorganization of the imperial civil service on democratic lines, with the aim of securing capable administrators, there was also a democratization of the universities. Religious creed requirements were

abolished at Oxford and Cambridge, the Scottish universities systematized their curricula, and new provincial universities sprang up. The University of Durham was already in being, as well as the Victoria University of Manchester; these were organized and developed. With the beginning of the century there were established universities at the busy centers of Birmingham (1900), Liverpool (1903), Leeds (1904), Sheffield (1905), Bristol (1909); and now all of them place women students on the same plane as men, the old universities of Oxford and Cambridge alone discriminating.

The Scottish universities have on the whole been the model for the broadening out of university privileges for the masses, including women. At the University of Edinburgh in the early seventies, Dr. Jex Blake and a small band of enthusiasts were attending medical classes in the face of much opposition. By the year 1880 women were admitted on an equal plane to classes in the ancient University of St. Andrews; and to-day they have won all along the line. British women have always taken a keen interest in politics, more so than American women, who devote their energies more exclusively to social and purely educational ends. It is said that Asquith's success in the recent election at Paisley was due in large measure to the activities of his daughter, Lady Carter, and the enthusiasm of the women voters, who thoroughly understood the issues.

Our American system of education, which on the whole has been a wonderful success, labors under two drawbacks. In the first place the officering of the public schools by an overwhelming majority of women, who had no vote and took little interest in politics, meant a type of teaching that was too thin and uncritical in its handling of political issues. These were neither properly dealt with nor rightly understood; how could this be the case? The subtle training in political thinking, which the cultured man teacher is

able to give without any partisanship, has been absent here; it has always been present in British teaching. In the second place, politics itself depends on religious conviction for its fundamental basis; and a constant avoidance of the religious theme in school teaching—which is demanded our state schools—means a deficiency in the inculcation of political instinct and wisdom. As our leading American critic, Dr. Paul Elmer More, who for a decade edited the *Nation* so brilliantly, has pointed out, it is necessary for a sane outlook on life, political, literary, aesthetic, to believe that we live in a world ruled in righteousness, a Will superior to human wills, and to which these human wills of ours must be subordinated. Either we are Christians or we are not; and if we are it must be in a whole-souled way that covers all of life, including national and international questions. We cannot take our leaderships from state institutions that must be dumb on the matter of religious conviction. Machiavellianism, the political dogma that ruthlessness and roguery are pardonable in the politician and the statesman so long as he secures his immediate end of success, as against a Puritanism that demands a constant appeal to a higher law of world righteousness, was the undoing of the German empire. Its state system of education which made tools of her best thinkers in the interests of so-called national efficiency, produced such a monstrous document as the *Appeal to the Civilized World* of the ninety-three German professors. It is the product of moral slaves not of moral leaders.

To-day it is to her universities that Great Britain is looking for her leaders in the troublous days of reconstruction that are before the nations of the world. Labor has too narrow a horizon, and too selfish a history to allow for the operation of any higher law in human institutions; it appeals to a constituency that regards man as living by bread alone. Economical considerations on the basis of

selfish enlightenment are supposed by the labor leaders to have the final say. Such a life doctrine will never produce the type of leader demanded by the nation; he must be a man who bears the White Man's Burden in the nobler sense understood by Kipling when he wrote his verses. The phrase implies political responsibility assumed in a religious spirit, to the point of martyrdom in the cause of truth.

The two ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge have always been nurseries of statesmen, particularly Oxford. They have been free absolutely from government dictation, have been indeed constant critics of the government. And they have also handled religious questions as vital to the inculcation of any culture worthy of the name.

If we follow the analogy, it is to Harvard, Princeton, Yale and the universities and colleges that have grown up on a religious base, that the country must look primarily for her leaders. The state type of institution tends distinctly to develop the official and professional man, efficient but narrow. It is a significant remark of Sir Auckland Geddes, the present British minister at Washington, himself a scientific man by training, that "it seems to be a law that once Science is science the emotions of human betterment are perverted. . . . In the world with which statesmanship has to deal, mass emotion is infinitely more powerful than accurate knowledge." Religion is especially dependent on this "mass emotion," and men who have been brought up in a system which persistently and deliberately ignores it as a live educational issue (is this not the boast of our state system of education?) are thereby less fitted to lead the people. There is always a clamant reason why our churches should take interest and pride in their colleges; the men they turn out are needed in the national life. And conversely the churches need the pulsation of the national life in their colleges, lest they become "seminaries."

In one respect our state primary and secondary schools, admirable as they are, have not helped as much towards the nursing of budding talent as the schools of Great Britain. For many years it has been customary, especially in Scotland, to select and encourage youthful talent even in the elementary schools, so that a boy, however poor his parents may be, is able to proceed from grade to grade, without expense, until he enters the university. Town and country councils provide funds in the shape of "bursaries," which relieve parents of the heavy and often impossible burden, and also save the boys from overworking themselves or unnecessarily prolonging their school period. The municipality of Paisley, which has recently come to the fore as ex-Premier Asquith's new constituency, has an enviable record in this respect; and it has been followed all over Great Britain. London University depends at present for its best talent upon youths so encouraged. This was part of the message of Professor Newton, of the History Department of that great institution, who recently visited our universities. The system reveals in an excellent way, how to make democracy, instead of working for the domination of class tyranny, function in the development of that greatest need of all political organizations, capable leadership.

## THE PHILOSOPHY ESSENTIAL TO AN EDUCATOR

DEAN THOMAS B. STOWELL

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Back of his procedure and in large measure determining his success, the teacher has a more or less consciously organized system of principles which constitute his philosophy. It is the purpose of this article to present some of the fundamentals upon which the writer predicates his Philosophy, hoping that the presentation will prove helpful and inspirational; helpful by suggesting a method of procedure, and inspiring by demonstrating the degree of certitude of results when this procedure is followed.

As the starting point, the teacher should have a clear conception of the nature of his work, hence is suggested the necessity of knowing the nature of the education and the nature of the changes effected in him by the educative process: is this process essentially spiritual, psychic, or is it neural, a matter of creating or connecting neurons. As an aid to answering this inquiry the following simple experiment is suggested:

Let the teacher arrange a group of a dozen students so that each may grasp with the index finger and thumb, the thumb of the individual on either side thereby making a closed circuit back to the point of departure (the teacher). Let the teacher give the "signal" by pressing the thumb at his right, and this individual in turn transmit the signal to his right and so on around the circuit reaching the teacher's left. Repeat until each member of the circuit understands what he is expected to do.

Having appointed a "time-keeper" the teacher starts the "signal" saying simultaneously "Go," and when the signal reaches his left he announces "Here." Record the time required to complete the circuit. Repeat the experiment; then *reverse* the order of the circuit from left to right, recording the time as before.

N. B. Failure to secure the transmission of the signal does not invalidate the experiment. The discrepancy between the interval of transmission and the time for neural transmission through a nerve tract of the same length is so great; also the increase of the interval when the order is reversed, as to require for explanation the introduction of a medium other than the neurine; which demand is emphasized by the fact that each individual of the circuit is conscious that he received the signal and transmitted or suppressed the same.

Call this medium by what name you please, psyche, soul, ego, etc., two facts are incontrovertible, it has none of the properties of physical force, hence it is not conserved physical energy, (heat, light, electricity, etc.). It is an entity *sui generis*. Its genesis and its destiny are alike mysterious, hidden from the ken of finite mind. It must be accepted as a potency. The psycho-physical laboratory demonstrates that this "Soul" has a physical basis through which stimuli affect it, it receives impression and through which this potency is expressed as dynamic, is active, usable, available.

This "Psychic Dynamic" is experience, the basis of knowledge, after it is "tested" made definite, clear, and positive by comparison with previous experiences "it will work," knowledge may then be defined as psychic dynamic which is apperceptive, relative and applicable under specific conditions.

It is not a possession of Soul, it *is* Soul, its very essence. "It is not so much that the truly educated soul has cer-

tain portions of knowledge, as that it *is* those portions; they become its very essence."\*

Much of so-called knowledge is "knowledge about" and not "knowledge of" the given subject, it does not work; it cannot be applied when needed, it is not available in a given situation.

There being no simpler experience into which psychic dynamic can be resolved, it being non-transmutable, no explanation can be given of the process whereby inherent potency is rendered dynamic as the result of neural (cortical) excitation. The preconditions are well known, a specific stimulus having adequate intensity and duration to effect reaction.

When these conditions obtain, the reaction is automatic, sure.

From the nature of knowledge, it persists: Soul cannot become something else, it is not transmutable force.

"The mind is in its own place, and in itself  
Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven."

—Milton—Paradise Lost.

"I can give news of earth to all the dead  
Who ask me; last year's sunsets, and great stars  
Those crescent moons with notched and burning rims and  
that day  
In March, a double rainbow stopped the storm,  
Gone are they, but I have them in my Soul."

—Browning—Pippa Passes.

"All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of good, shall  
exist,  
Not its likeness, but itself."

—Browning—Abt Vogler.

\*Adams—Evolution of Educational Theory: 189.

From this conception is seen the radical error of considering the educative process as analogous to digestion, for in the process of assimilation the food becomes like the assimilating organism, whereas in the educative process the nature of the dynamic is determined by the stimulus, the educand is made like the subject studied.

“I am a part of all that I have met;  
Yet all experience is an arch where through  
Gleams that untraveled world, whose margin fades  
Forever and forever when I move.”

—Tennyson—Ulysses.

In the foregoing the reader will find answer to such inquiries as the following:

Is knowledge specific or generic?

Does it matter what the educand studies?

Will all subjects contribute equally to a given end?

Does it matter how a subject is presented?

The influence of associates, amusements, reading, etc.

## SUMMARY

The Educand *is* Soul; inherent potency; not material; not conserved physical energy.

It is the function of education to render this potency dynamic; usable, available.

The Soul has a physical basis, the nervous system, through which it functions. The teacher should study to keep this system in a normal condition.

Stimuli are specific: they require intensity, duration.

Psychic dynamic is specific: it gets meaning by “testing,” “Will it work?”

Knowledge is psychic dynamic, which discovers relations and determines their applicability in a given situation.

Knowledge persists: its value is seen as forming the basis for "testing" experience and for creating increased capacity for knowledge.

The nature of knowledge answers numerous inquiries regarding

School Curriculum,  
Selection of School,  
Value of Studies,  
End of Educative Process,  
Educational Procedure.

## SELF LIMITATION FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY

THE EDITOR

These halcyon individualistic days seem characterized in certain portions of society by an increasing resentment of all forms of discipline or limitation. Education shows a tendency to be extensive rather than intensive; theology to be broad rather than deep; politics to be opportunist rather than fundamental. If the reader smilingly replies that this is an old charge, oft repeated during the last hundred years it must be admitted and laid to the account of the long development of the individualistic spirit.

From putting the supreme emphasis upon individual development, it is easy to proceed to an insistence upon the right of every man to do as he pleases. Lack of restriction is frequently identified with freedom and the presence of restrictions of any kind is looked upon as a sort of tyranny.

This philosophy of freedom enters the home in the training of children in a method which brooks no restraints upon the child's "natural" development. The function of the teacher becomes the directing of the mind, the teacher a convenient place of resort for such questions as come by chance. The college symptom of the disease is to be noted in the demand for untrammeled electives, now happily going out of vogue. In the church it appears in a lazy indifference to theological statement, as though one's philosophy of life had no bearing upon one's living. It

shows itself in the family by a loose view of the sacredness of matrimony, parental responsibility, and by easy divorce. In its application to the state it has put us in an entirely negative and unprogressive attitude. The state is thought of as existing chiefly for the maintenance of certain undefined individual "rights" rather than as the organ of mutual cooperation for human betterment. In its doctrine of God this mood has left us questioning the possible self-limitation of God as an invasion of his freedom. With this notion in possession there can be no tenable theory of incarnation nor even of a God possessing any meaning for life. The academic question of how an infinite can enter into or have relation to a finite in historic time, though purely academic, has been raised to a place of actuality and has confused the thinking of multitudes. There is need for a new consideration of the mutual relations existing between self-limitation, freedom and democracy.

## I.

### SELF-LIMITATION AND SELF-EXPRESSION

Reflection shows that all self-expression is in the very nature of the case a kind of self-limitation. Language itself, and with it thought, must fall under the same stern condition. The element of self-repression, under-statement rather than over-statement, truth rather than extravagance, gives the highest and most pleasureable form as well as the greatest power to literature. It is the secret of what we know as chasteness of style, literary form and poetry. It is the marshalling of ideas with due regard to form, cadence, meaning and desired result. The writer can revel in all sorts of literary ideas, but to consign them to writing is to confine them to definiteness. Who has not in that subtle hour between sleeping and waking, composed notable epics, Iliads and Odysseys, only to have their beau-

ty and deathlessness fade under the stern necessity of transferring them to the written page. If he is to find any medium of expression the writer must be satisfied to limit himself to language, however disappointing may be the result. The reason is to be found in the law that all worthy self-expression is conditioned by self-limitation.

The artist, likewise, can never find the perfectly pliable material. Like the platonic ideal, the result always falls short of the full expression of his dream of beauty. This is because he must work with the concrete material. The work of life is thus made up with attempted expression through the materials given it. All strong life is just that. Who waits for wind and tide to agree never sails. Who watches the weather never sows. Who ever gets any worthy work done must be satisfied to limit himself by the acceptance of the materials that are presented and these are never ideally perfect. We are limited to task and time and tools, and the interpretation of others.

But this self-limitation becomes the source of our highest self-realization. Not only is there the joy of carrying our meanings and our enthusiasm to others but the very effort needed to put them concretely forth becomes the basis of new powers of expression making us more and more completely masters of the materials of expression.

All are acquainted with the pretense of people who are sure that they could express themselves well if they would. It seems easy for them to say what they would not do if they were painting a picture or writing a book. But the average man takes this for what it is, the unwillingness of mediocrity to put itself to the test. After all we must put our high theories of whatever kind to the test of a necessary pragmatism. Self-limitation is our only chance for either expression or growth.

It is strange that this universal principle should have been lost sight of so frequently in the realm of theology.

Here our "pure" theories have stood in the way of the recognition of the beneficent law. An incarnation of God in a finite time has seemed to some to be an unthinkable paradox, an unaccountable thing. On the other hand if Divine self-expression is to mean anything it must imply a measure of self-limitation, if only the bending to finite human understanding. That God should be able to move upon the spirit of man so that man should come to understand his will means that his will is shown to particular men, that it is cast in the forms of prevalent human understanding and language. Nor is this fact a more difficult one to deal with than the supposition that the Infinite is the source or creator of the finite. The Infinite as the source of the finite limits itself to the possible expression which it can find in finite space and time. If the Infinite can in any way find a means of expression the belief in an incarnation is no more difficult than the belief that the visible world has its source in Infinity. Upon an Infinite which can never express itself and is forever unknowable in any degree there is no warrant for any of us to waste any thought. Whatever it might be it would be entirely outside the plans of our thought, life or existence. On the other hand such self-limitation is not to be taken as we so often think as an act of debasement. The one secret of all life physical or spiritual can be seen to be this realization of the highest possibilities only by submitting to the limitations which surround the individual and by making them yield something of moral meaning. It would be a strange thing indeed if God refused to submit himself to the same rigorous discipline which he sets before his creatures as the source of power and moral character.

## II.

## SELF-SUPPRESSION, THE BASIS OF FREEDOM

When we come to apply this principle to a discussion of freedom we shall find many untenable notions of freedom. That there is any relation between freedom and self-suppression will seem an oddly paradoxical and impossible statement to an individualistic age like ours. However, of all impossible ideals of freedom the most impossible is that which identifies freedom with license, the will to do whatever appeals to one. Among us all the man of unrestrained impulse is the least free and the most the slave of unworthy motives which deprive him in the end of all powers of self-mastery or self-control. As a fact such a man never can be rightly said to exercise the power of choice. He is the slave of whims the nature and direction of which he never takes the trouble to know and such slavery removes from him the birthright of manhood lowering him to the level of the beast. Rather he is below the level of the beast because he cannot quite rid himself of a moral self-consciousness. The rights and privileges which make him human he delivers over to the dictation of chance and fitful impulse which proceeds from accidental event, association, or suggestion.

He is really free, and he alone, who looks upon possible action in its various bearings upon the future, who can hold the balance between desires long enough to consider the consequences and then has power to decide for the higher. It is the bending to or the obedience to the truth which makes men free. All else is a species of slavery which renders him prey to the forces of the moment and drives him on such a whirlwind of passion as Dante in the Divine Comedy represents as the doom of Paolo and Francesca. By a short-sighted self-interest the future is sacrificed to the passing whim. Such a choice is never freedom.

The prevalent mood in political discussion for a hundred years has been toward the ideal of a freedom uncontrolled and irresponsible. The dread of ancient tyranny has too frequently turned us over to a new tyranny of lower motives. The thought of government has frequently been that the individual should be left free to pursue his own schemes so long as they might be accomplished under legal forms. We have thus come to be exponents of multiplied legislation. There has been a belief amounting to obsession that the passing of law is necessarily coincident with real reform. Liberty has been thought of as something which the individual could claim over against the common welfare. Political reform has for generations consisted in the wresting of these so-called "rights" from individuals who had used their "rights" to defraud and debase their fellows and to get for themselves unfair benefits. Hence these reforms have always been looked upon by the reluctant parties as an "invasion of personal liberties." As there can be no real freedom which does not consider the higher motive, the general good and the future outcome, so that which these parties have wanted has never been consonant with liberty of any kind but only with a selfish license and slavery to the lowest.

While the unchecked emphasis upon the "rights" of the individual has been growing there has been a contrasting disparity in the consciousness of civic duty and responsibility. Too many Americans are more thoughtful of their rights than mindful of the service which their citizenship implies for the common good.

Without individual self-restraint, without a choosing of the best for one's self, as well as for others there can be no freedom in the body politic, only a struggle of mutually devouring interests which turn society into a battlefield and individual men into mutual enemies. With such a view of society, very common today, the supreme question be-

comes the question of which class and ultimately which individual shall be able to subdue and enslave all others so that it shall be free to follow its own impulses.

### III.

#### TRUE DEMOCRACY IS DEPENDENT UPON TRUE FREEDOM

In the life of a democracy it will be seen that individual self-restraint is the basis of firm government and order. This fact is too frequently forgotten. Government is never strong from long existence, from armies and navies nor even from education if it be unmoral. Government is as strong as the self-control of the people. When the popular power of self-control is gone the power of the government is gone with it. Miss Follett in her new book *The New State* calls attention to the fact that democracy is not belief in the poor, the rich, the laborer nor in any other class as such. Democracy is rather a faith in the general existence among all classes of a love for order, justice and self-control. All democratic constitutions are founded on the belief in the ability of the people, not to be governed by laws so much as in the ability of the people to govern themselves. The laws are for that small minority who are not truly self-governing. The self-governing individual is the bulwark of the state.

No pretence is here made of a complete analysis of the motives of self government, but there seem to be three chief ones. These are self-interest, consciousness of duty, and love of order and righteousness.

The motive of self-interest is perhaps the one most relied upon in average thinking. The cure for democracy is said to be more democracy, in the belief that men will eventually awaken to a knowledge of a far-sighted self-interest. Surely there is a truth here which needs to be emphasized at this time. However dangerous the times

in which we live denial and hampering of democracy is no safeguard against peril. Being committed as a nation to the principles of democracy we must abide by the results and appeal to democracy to save the situation. Nevertheless the sole appeal to self-interest is dangerous and embarrassing. Many are unable to distinguish between the immediate or seeming self-interest and far-sighted or real self-interest. The motive of self-interest taken alone is sure to lead to controversy and struggle.

The motive of duty is a high and powerful motive in the activity of men able to assume the Stoic attitude toward life. There are moments of national peril in which the sense of duty becomes supreme in the national consciousness and furnishes the basis of national action. These moments however are rare and, once realized, the plane of common activity becomes a much lower one. The relation of duty is a difficult one to establish in many minds and in most minds when immediate selfish interests are involved.

There remains then the motive of love of righteousness and order. This motive however, is dependent upon individual moral self-control and moral self-control cannot get along without moral education. The cynic will be ready to declare that this motive is the least prevalent and the least powerful of all. We believe on the contrary that it is the most prevalent and powerful. No democracy can be trusted for an hour in which the overwhelming majority of the people are without standards of moral self-control. The strength of the law lies not so much in its drastic execution as in the moral support of those whose obedience is not of the letter but of the heart. Those who seldom have recourse to the law, those who are not inclined to break the law, these are the people who are the very foundation of orderly society.

Any course of education, any view of life, any type of

popular amusement or thought which tends to break down the highest moral sanctions or create disrespect for them, is then in the deepest sense of the term subversive of democracy.

If this then be true there is a demand in our day as in no other day for a revaluation of freedom and democracy and a restatement of the proper relation of the individual thereto.

In one of Wordsworth's sonnets we have the confession that the sources of power lie in a voluntary surrender on the part of the individual.

Nuns fret not at their convent's narrow room;  
 And hermits are contented with their cells;  
 And students with their pensive citadels;  
 Maids at the wheel, the weaver at his loom,  
 Sit blithe and happy; bees that soar for bloom,  
 High as the highest peak of Furness fells,  
 Will murmur by the hour in fox-glove bells:  
 In truth the prison unto which we doom  
 Ourselves, no prison is: and hence for me,  
 In sundry moods, t'was pastime to be bound  
 Within the sonnet's scanty plot of ground;  
 Pleased if some souls (for such there needs must be)  
 Who have felt the weight of too much liberty,  
 Should find brief solace there as I have found.

Which words we respectfully commend to literary realist and *vers libre* people, to cubists in art, to devotees of Jazz everywhere, to the growing multitude of divorcees, to political and social bolsheviki of every description whose idea of freedom seems absolutely opposed to any sort of self-restraint. Art, literature and even social manners take on a beauty and meaning which is deep for life only when they are the evidence of self-discipline and self-control.

## THINKING ABOUT GOD

FRANCIS M. LARKIN

EDITOR CALIFORNIA CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE

"What is God thinking about that he does not stop this war?" was the remark of a troubled mind. It expressed the feeling of a very large number of people. "How can you say that God is love?" is a common question asked by persons in great affliction. The answer to such questions by one who thinks clearly about God would naturally be, "What are such people thinking about God and man made His own image when asking such questions?"

The idea of God is fundamental in all religions. If we think of Him as a great sovereign, reigning as a tyrant over His creatures, it will necessarily produce a certain type of religion. If we think of Him as a great Creator, who brought into existence the universe and then retired to some unknown place and now simply looks on to see the mechanical contrivance work out under a reign of law, we will have difficulty in believing in any kind of religion.

A good deal of skepticism has resulted from a failure to teach people how to think about God. A large number of skeptics are coming out of our Universities as a result of teaching students to think as a man ought to think about material things and a failure to teach them to think as a man ought to think about spiritual things.

Men may be very learned in science and the things of the world and yet be children in their religious thinking. We sometimes forget that Paul speaks about thinking

when he was a child, as a child, and the importance of having mature thoughts about all things when he became a man. It is probable that more people leave the church because of a failure to discern this fact in their education than any other one.

One of the professors in a great university had his attention called to this some years ago by a careful student and he immediately saw the point and said, "That is perfectly true. While I have gone through the university and have been thinking about the world in scientific terms, like a mature man, I am trying to think my religion in the language of my childhood, which was taught to me in the Sunday school."

Some years ago a pastor preached a series of sermons in a university church in which he endeavored to assist the student body in attendance to maturity in religious thinking. The father of one of those who attended was a pastor in the same city. He carefully questioned his daughter as she returned from the services and finally was so disturbed that he declared that he would bring the pastor to trial. The daughter exclaimed, "O, please don't. I thought I had to leave the church in order to be true to my intellectual life, but now I know that I do not have to do so."

Children often refrain from expressing their doubts in the presence of their parents for fear of reproof or giving pain, as they see no way out of their dilemma. If there is one thing more important than another in the realm of religion, it is to give our young people an adequate and reasonable idea of God as fundamental in all their religious thinking.

If anyone wishes to illustrate what we have been trying to say, let him turn to the works of some eminent clergymen of two generations ago. Let him take therefrom their method of thinking about God and try to teach it. He will

soon find the human mind revolting and declaring, "If God is that kind of being, I can never again think of Him as a Heavenly Father and as benevolent." The only idea of God that an intelligent world will accept is a Christlike God, the God revealed in the incarnation.

#### GOD A SCIENTIFIC NECESSITY.

Says Dr. John Fiske: "We may regard the world of phenomena as sufficient in itself, and deny that it needs to be referred to any underlying and all-comprehensive unity. Nothing has an ultimate origin or destiny; there is no dramatic tendency in the succession of events, nor any ultimate law to which everything must be referred; there is no reasonableness in the universe save that with which human fancy unwarrantably endows it: the events of the world have no orderly progression like the scenes of a well-constructed plot. \* \* \* They drift and eddy in an utterly blind and irrational manner, though now and then evolving as if by accident temporary combinations which have to us a rational appearance. This is atheism, pure and unqualified. It recognizes no Omnipresent Energy."

Its very description states that it is irrational. It does not account for our world of experience. It provides no system, has no rational end; it means nothing.

Hence the growing sentiment of Lord Kelvin that belief in God is a scientific necessity; and Herbert Spencer's words that there is "the one absolute certainty that we are ever in the presence of an infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed."

But what is the character of this Eternal Energy? Is it a being, who, after his creative acts, exists "apart from the world in solitary, inaccessible majesty?" As Carlyle suggests, "An absentee God, sitting idly, ever since the first Sabbath, at the outside of his universe and seeing it go?"

If God is no more than this, we have little interest in

Him; and if the great machine is self-controlling and self-moving, we have no further use for Deity. We soon come to the conclusion that nature can do so much by itself, that God is only needed to explain the outstanding facts beyond scientific discovery. It is only a question of time when all will be described as processes of law, and God will be dispensed with. This has been the usual landing of skepticism in the past.

But under this reign of law, everything becomes necessary. Thought is simply a chemical process, error is just as necessary and just as good as truth. Like impressions produce like thoughts, just as truly and exactly as a mirror reflects the rays of the sun.

#### THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE GOD.

If we turn to pantheism, which is the god of Christian Science, we find no relief. After a little time we realize that we have again become entangled in a great machine in which it is necessary to view error and truth exactly alike. Christian Science having asserted that "God is all" seeks to evade the difficulty of a material God by denying the reality of matter. That while "God is all" and all is God, yet the all is unreal or illusion. If Mrs. Eddy had said that matter was nothing ontologically, having in itself no causality, but was phenomena, she would have gone in the right direction. Phenomenal matter is not illusion, but is real in experience and common to all. The Christian Science God does not dissolve our confusions.

As the late Professor Bowne said, "It is no doubt fine and in some sense correct, to say that God is in all things; but when it comes to saying God is in all things, and that all forms of thought and feeling and conduct are His, then reason simply commits suicide. God thinks and feels in what we call our thinking and feeling; and hence He blunders in our blundering and is stupid in our stupidity. He

contradicts himself also with the utmost freedom: for a deal of His thinking does not hang together from one person to another, or from one day to another in the same person. Error, folly, and sin are all made divine, and reason and conscience as having authority vanish. The only thing that is not divine in this scheme is God: and He vanishes into a congeries of contradiction and baseness. . . .

"What is God's relation as thinking our thoughts, to God as thinking the absolute thought? Does He become limited, confused and blind in finite experience, and does He at the same time have absolute insight in His infinite life? Does He lose Himself in the finite so as not to know what and who He is? . . . The notion of creation may be difficult, but it saves us from such dreary stuff as this. How the infinite can posit the finite, and thus make the possibility of the moral order, is certainly beyond us; but the alternative is a lapse into hopeless irrationality. We can make nothing of either God or the world on such a pantheistic basis."

#### THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD

The idea of God as an infinite personality may be a difficult one for conception, but it is the only one which provides a real and adequate cause for the world in which we live. Says John Fiske, "The world of phenomena is intelligible only when regarded as the multiform manifestation of an Omnipresent Energy that is in some way—albeit in a way quite above our finite comprehension—anthropomorphic or quasi personal. There is a true objective reasonableness in the universe—its events have an orderly progression: . . . the process of evolution is itself the working out of a mighty teleology of which our finite understandings can fathom but the scantiest rudiments. It recognizes an Omnipresent Energy which is none other

than the living God."

Victor Hugo long ago gave a very short and adequate reason for believing in a personal God when he declared, "I know that God is personal because I am a person." Sometimes minds are confused upon the subject of what is personality. They try to conceive of man as a complete person and then to imagine something greater to provide for God. The reverse order is the correct one.

We must think of God as the Infinite Personality with infinite self-consciousness, self-knowledge, and self-control. With these conceptions of God and of man we can at least remain rational and believe in both and understand how the present condition of the world should get into such a chaos. Just as the children of good parents, against all advice and education and training, wilfully turn into paths of disobedience and fall into dishonor and degradation, in spite of the desires and wills of the parents; so the human race may fall into error through ignorance and perversity, and acting contrary to the will of God and the wisdom of God as taught in all His works in the universe about us and in the Christian Scriptures, may reach a state of chaos.

We are well aware that all this reasoning may be regarded as superfluous on the part of many Christian believers who belong to that class who have not thought long enough upon these deep things to have any mental difficulties, or to see any mysteries in the world. Happy are they for verily they have their reward. But there are many who are not so. They are trying to square their intellectual life with the deepest hopes and desires of the human heart. They have been confused by false ideas of God and have been unable to realize that these ideas through all the years have not made or unmade Deity. He is the same yesterday, today and forever, regardless of what men think about Him. Their thoughts neither create Him nor destroy Him.

## Book Reviews

### STRIFE OF SYSTEMS AND PRODUCTIVE DUALITY,

WILMON HENRY SHELDON, Stone Professor of Philosophy in Dartmouth College, p. X, 534. The Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1918.

This book provides a keen analysis of the standpoints of contemporary philosophy which is distinctive as it is notable.

The author announces his aim to be the old philosophical task of harmonizing the principle of external relations with that of internal relations, or the reconciliation of Platonism and pragmatism, of idealism and realism, of "static" and "dynamic" views.

After describing the contrasting views of "subjectivism" and "objectivism," he turns to Radical Empiricism as the proposed solvent of these contradictions and finds it altogether wanting. The inadequateness, he declares, springs from the fact that the attempted solution is merely a verbal one ignoring the real conflict between subjectivism and objectivism.

Of radical Empiricism he says:

"The irony of life is evident here; the philosophy which talks loudest of experience and Empiricism has presented to us the abstractest and vaguest of all terms; most devoted to experience it has learned less *from* experience, than either subjectivism or objectivism. . . . For fear of insoluble philosophical puzzles it will not admit either subject or object to ultimate reality. And in order to escape the one-sidedness of these two, it adopts a watchword so exhaustive as to have lost clear meaning, and with it the power of imparting information." (100-101).

Idealism is described as Great Subjectivism, and under the term Great Objectivism we have a description of the faults of Neo-Realism. Neo-Realism is further analyzed as rationalistic (Holt, Russell, Spaulding), pragmatic (James, Dewey, Moore), or intuitional (Bergson).

"Any class that is formed from the given members of a manifold by some selective principle which is *independent of the principles which have organized the manifold* may be called a *cross-section*. And such a thing is consciousness or mind." Quoting these words from Holt, the author proceeds to ask:

"Is not that selective principle which marks out the mental from the total matrix of things, independent of that matrix? If the objective deduction is to be carried through, it must be shown that the power of the nervous system to select, to make specific response, to carve out its objects from the rest, is itself explicable upon quite objective grounds. . . . Does there not remain, then, something irreducible about mind, namely, the fact that there is a selective, responsive principle? (200). . . . That mysterious presence—in absence of the past event which constitutes memory, so impossible from the point of view of the physical order, remained as mysterious, as inexplicable as ever. (201).

Of the vain attempt made by Empiricism to secure an abiding unity, he says:

"In chemistry this thesis has occasioned the atomic theory; in modern logic and mathematics it is exemplified in the indefinables, axioms and postulates; in modern physics in the theory of electrons. In fact, every mature science which has grown far enough to assume rigorous deductive form, has taken the shape of a logical atomism. But the atoms, whether physical bodies or concepts, are the universals, the terms which enter now into one relation, now into another, without being altered thereby." (228).

What the author apparently does not see is that the unity which survives over all change, and the only unity of which we can be conscious is the unity which resides in personality.

Of Pragmatism, he says:

"If Pragmatism were true, then by its own criterion it should be a profitable doctrine; it should aid us in the understanding of reality. . . . On the contrary, present-day devotees of the doctrine have confined themselves almost wholly to extolling their methods; they have scarcely employed it upon a single problem connected with reality. . . . It does not seem to show itself fertile to account for the specific contours of reality, or of the human mind on its contemplative side." (282-283).

Discussing Intuitionism, he says:

"The Bergsonian system is distinguished from the general run of

mysticism by its preoccupation with *time*, and by certain corollaries consequent thereupon. Most of the mystics reveal the eternal; to the French philosopher of our fast-moving age, the eternal, the resting, all quietistic tendencies, indeed—are misconceptions. . . . The change-philosophy has had all along to appeal to the very thing it has contemned. What meaning is there in change unless in something which suffers change?" (294-307).

After such keen analysis of other systems one is not prepared for the author's conclusion. He points out that the real sickness in philosophy lies in the natural contradiction of thought—the externality and internality of relations. This disease he proposes to heal by a resort to the conception of Dyads, which occupy a place in his system analogous to the Monads in the philosophy of Leibnitz. This duality in monoism he finds illustrated in the antinomies of motion and rest (Zeno's paradoxes), the beginning of time, completed infinity, freedom and determination. He discovers freedom in the variations in the course of a leaden ball falling from the height as if these were to be accounted for by the presence of some individuality in the ball rather than by the personal equation of the observer which might easily be taken to account for variations not accounted for by the force of the wind and other measurable causes.

Freedom thus becomes to him a meaningless thing devoid of all purpose. Of human freedom he strangely refuses to write, "because its nature is not well understood." So he discusses freedom in inert matter which he cannot know but can only hypostasize, and passes as negligible the only freedom that man can experience directly—the freedom of creative personality.

By frequent resort to the devices of formal logic, noumena and phenomena, he arrives at the conclusion that "sameness-in-difference" is disclosed as a creative principle which accounts for causal connection. It is clear that in this he commits himself to a solution as purely verbal as that which he has criticized in others, and seems here to be wanting in that clear analysis so apparent in his earlier pages.

As a critique of systems the book has great and permanent value to all who would understand the thought movements of our time, but as presenting a constructive solution of the problems of philosophy, it is disappointing.

THE NEW STATE, group organization the solution of popular government, by M. P. FOLLETT, the author of "The Speaker of the House of Representatives." Longmans, Green and Co., New York. New Impression, 1920. Pp. 373. Price \$3.50 net.

This book offers a real challenge to students of political science. It is written with a rare literary power and is filled with quotable epigrams. The author pays respect to our mis-representative form of government as one in which the individual citizen has little chance to express the best which is in him, as one which prevents him from making any real political contribution to society. The remedy for this is taken to be in the formation of community centers in which each man shall have the opportunity to express his ideas. The theory is that any group when brought together for consultation for the common good will arrive at the best possible solution and at unanimity of feeling and action. The fundamental weakness of the theory seems to us to lie in just this assumption which overlooks the fact that the conclusion reached may not necessarily be the best. The result of such consultation is in some cases sure to drop to the level of the lowest and most obstinate individual. This is the experience of life.

However one may disagree with the conclusion of the author one must admire the spirit with which she writes, and be stirred with the challenge of the present order which she throws down. It is a book which all should read and digest, and is full of the suggestiveness which provokes thought.

ESSENTIALS OF AMERICANIZATION. By EMORY S. BORGARDUS, PH. D., University of Southern California Press, Los Angeles, 1919. Pp. 301.

This latest book from the head of the Department of Sociology in the University of Southern California, is a sane and comprehensive treatment of a live subject. He recognizes the conflict to-day between a "republican democracy" and a "democratic democracy." The first, he remarks, "throws the actual determination of legislation into the hands of a temporarily aristocratic few, who will be tempted to act secret'y and autocratically. The other *modus*

*operandi* puts public decisions into the hands of the common people who may not have the education or the inclination to decide independently and regularly upon public problems, many of which are highly technical. The tendency in the United States is towards a dualistic use of these two forms of political procedure." The need is so clamant today for wise and trained leadership—which it is the particular function of our universities to select and train—that it seems a pity to use the term "aristocratic" which carries prejudice, in this conjunction. A wise "aristocrat" of this type is in fact the most valuable asset in our democracy, just as a demagogue is its worst foe.

Dr. Bogardus is judicious and open-minded in his treatment of the Japanese question, and while recognizing that "California is right in her desire not to be overcome by Asiatic hordes," regrets that "her solution of the problem is myopic. It ignores Japan's willingness to accede to the fundamental desire of California." Its utter heedlessness of Japanese national dignity, with the injection of a furious race antipathy, ought to be a matter of deep concern to every real patriot.

JAMES MAIN DIXON.

RACE AND NATIONALITY. By JOHN OAKESMITH. New York; Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1919. Pp. 299.

One of the truths of a wise psychology is the limitation of the old individualistic interpretation of life. The individual man is a crank; it is social man that we know and deal with. Our conscience rests in communion and fellowship; it is unstable without them. Consequently the nation, which is the final unit for all social functioning, is a sacred thing; and patriotism and religion are inextricably woven together. There is ample room in the world for different national ideals, expressing themselves through different languages, institutions, forms of faith; and future peace does not lie with any obliteration of these distinctions, but with the neighborly acceptance of them in the spirit of brotherly love.

Race merges in the higher conception of nationality. It is a question to be met and solved within the boundaries of the country, not to be intruded into international affairs. A "race" interpretation of history gives us the "Law of the Jungle;" and so dominated Germany before 1914 that it hurried her into the most

disastrous war in history. "Germany as a whole," remarks Mr. Oakesmith, "was so persuaded of the superiority of her own 'racial' culture to all other national traditions whatever that she wished to impose it on the world at large, partly because it was for the good of the world at large that this should be, and partly because she thought that the 'race' possessing such a culture was pre-destined to universal empire."

Few recent books have sought to define and analyze the critical principle of nationality with more ripe reading and thought than this excellent work of Mr. Oakesmith, which blends the religious, the literary and the political in a wise outlook on the world situation. It is an invaluable bit of work.

JAMES MAIN DIXON.

THE SPIRITUAL MEANING OF "IN MEMORIAM," by  
JAMES MAIN DIXON. Introduction by James M. Campbell.  
Abingdon Press, 1920. Pp. 173.

In this delightful volume of essays we have James Main Dixon at his best. The author brings to the subject an unusual acquaintance with the literature, the movements, and the men of Tennyson's period. Tennyson's inner developments and reactions to the thought of his time are clearly set forth. The work is not an analysis of the poem but a fresh and vigorous re-estimate of the underlying philosophy in the light of recent world events.

The spirit of democracy in Tennyson is contrasted with the immoral "supermanism" of Goethe and Nietzsche. The Puritan conformity of man's will to God is shown to be the true basis of democracy, and the development of personality is pointed out as the goal of individual and national progress.

The author traces the spiritual advance of the poet through his reactions to other men and ideas. Goethe, Nietzsche, Milton, Drummond, Thomas Hardy, George Eliot, Plato, along with Arthur Hallam are shown to have had their share in the problems which the poet met and solved in the interests of faith and immortality.

Keen in its grasp of fundamental questions, lively and interesting in style and quality, this volume of essays possesses a timeliness and pertinence which give it unusual force.

THE PROPHETS IN THE LIGHT OF TO-DAY. By JOHN GODFREY HILL. New York: the Abingdon Press.

This is distinctly a modern book, the fruit of addresses delivered to audiences whose reading and thoughts are pretty well confined to everyday literature. Thoroughly to enjoy it, one must have read the latest from John Galsworthy, or from that racy teller of sea stories, James B. Connolly. The author is right in declaring that in this new age of ours, with its eagerness after human betterment, a new presentation of the gospel is imperative; at least a fresh and fuller apologetic, making use of the teachings of history and of science since the biblical record was closed. Biblical teachings, too, were the result of human life and experience:—"God is the source of the truth uttered, the spiritual fire in the prophet's soul, the infilling life of his genius, and the conscious personal friend who sustains. The prophet, nevertheless, expressed this unfolding of the Almighty in as natural a manner as we express our own feelings of the divine life within us."

This is well said by Dr. Hill; and is a truth that applies particularly, for instance, to such inspired teachers as the herdman of Tekoa. Amos is quite modern reading, for he insisted on an eternal truth, the call for moral righteousness in man corresponding to the moral righteousness of God. Yet, in avoiding a mausoleum-like aloofness, the author seems not to avoid the opposite snare; that of infringing upon the essential dignity of the theme. As when he speaks of God "tucking a fact into the soul," and deals with Jonah as a "humorist," a man "given to joking." The book of Jonah is full of high pathos; and the use made by our Lord for purposes of analogy of one of its incidents makes us anxious, in a scholarly way, to trace and explain the story. Nor does he always quite "hit it off" with his historical references. John Wesley, whom he compares to Jeremiah, instead of being a "timid scholar," came of fighting stock, and like his kinsman, the Duke of Wellington, born Arthur Wesley, was never so serene as in the midst of deadly struggle and danger.

JAMES MAIN DIXON.

YALE TALKS by CHARLES REYNOLDS BROWN, Dean of the School of Religion, Yale University, Yale University Press, 1919. Pp. 156.

These talks were given in the chapel of Yale University and at

various eastern colleges. They possess the fineness of feeling and clearness of expression that one who knows the author would naturally expect. There are ten of the essays including such subjects as, The True Definition of a Man; The Lure of Goodness; The Power of a Resolute Minority; Unconscious Influence; The Lessons of Failure; The Men Who Make Excuse, and The Wounds of Wrongdoing.

Free from cant the book has a spiritual vitality and directness which make it desirable for placing in the hands of any young man.

**LETTERS TO TEACHERS.** By HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER. The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1919. Pp. 253.

Should one of the ancient Greek scholars have come to life, spent the last two decades of the nineteenth century in some rural community of the Middle West and then sought some secluded nook from which he could send forth his ideas on education, we should anticipate such a book as "Letters to Teachers." Notwithstanding the fact that this book makes no new contribution to educational theory nor offers practical suggestions for the work of the schoolroom, it is wholesome and emphasizes a number of ideas that many schoolmen and teachers seem to have forgotten. While it is doubtful if many thoughtful students of education would be in full accord with the writer's ideas on a number of topics, especially "Foreign Language Study" and "Crafts and Vocations," the idealistic note permeating the entire book makes it worth reading and should lead teachers to appreciate more fully their opportunities and responsibilities.

LESTER B. ROGERS.

## Books Received<sup>1</sup>

**The Drama of the Face, and other Studies in Applied Psychology,** by Elwin Lincoln House, D.D. Fleming H. Revell Co., New York, 1919. Pp. 258.

**By An Unknown Disciple.** George H. Doran Company, New York, 1919. Pp. 246.

<sup>1</sup> The more important of these books will be reviewed in future numbers of THE PERSONALIST.

**Man and the New Democracy**, by William A. McKeever. George H. Doran, New York, 1919. Pp. X, 250.

**A Book About the English Bible**, by Joseph H. Penniman, Vice-Provost and Professor of English Literature in the University of Pennsylvania. The MacMillan Co., New York, 1919. Pp. VII, 444.

**The Apocalypse of John**, Studies in Introduction, with a critical and Exegetical Commentary by Ibson T. Beckwith, formerly professor of the interpretation of the New Testament in the General Theological Seminary of New York, and of Greek in Trinity College, Hartford. The MacMillan Co., New York, 1919. Pp. X, 794.

**The Order of Nature**, by Lawrence J. Henderson, assistant professor of Biological Chemistry in Harvard University. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Pp. IV, 234.

**An Introduction to Philosophy** by Holly Estil Cunningham, A. M. Ph. D., Head of the Department of Philosophy, State of Oklahoma, Richard G. Badger, Boston, 1920. Pp. 257.

**William James and Henri Bergson** by Horace Meyer Kallen, Ph. D., of the University of Wisconsin. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Pp. X, 248.

**A National System of Education** by Walter Scott Athearn, Director of Religious Education and Social Service, Boston University. George H. Doran Company, New York, 1920. Pp. X, 132.

**A Beginner's History of Philosophy** by Herbert Cushman, LL. D., Ph. D. Sometime Professor of Philosophy in Tufts College, Lecturer of Philosophy in Harvard College, Lecturer of Philosophy in Dartmouth College. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 2 Vols. Revised Edition. Vol. I. Pp. XX, 406; Vol. 2. Pp. XIX, 407.

**An Ethical System Based on the Laws of Nature**, by M. Deshumbert, trans., by Lionel Giles. Open Court Publishing Company. Pp. IX, 231.

**Our Knowledge of the External World**, by Bertrand Russell, M. A. F. R. S., Lecturer and Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago. Pp. VII, 245.

**Education In Ancient Israel**, from earliest times to 70 A. D., by Fletcher H. Swift, Professor of Education, College of Education, University of Minnesota. Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1919. Pp. XII, 134.

**The Rival Philosophies of Jesus and of Paul**, being an explanation of the failures of organized Christianity and a vindication of the teachings of Jesus, which are shown to contain a religion for all men for all times, by Ignatius Singer. Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1919. Pp. 347.

**The Contingency of the Laws of Nature**, by Emile Boutroux, member of the Academie Francaise, Authorised translation by Fred Rothwell. The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1919. Pp. VII, 196.

**Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics**, by R. F. Alfred Hoernle, Harvard University, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, New York, 1920. Pp. VIII, 314.

**The Relation Between Religion and Science**. A Biological Approach, by Angus Stewart Woodburne. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1920. Pp. 103.

**The Platonism of Philo Judaeus**, by Thomas H. Billings, Professor of Classics in Carleton College. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1919. Pp. 104.

**Immediate Experience and Mediation**. An inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Oxford, November 20, 1919, by Harold H. Joachim, Wykeham, Professor of Logic. Oxford, Clarendon press, 1919. Pp. 22.

**Leadership**. A study of the qualities most to be desired in an officer, and of the general phases of leadership which have a direct bearing upon the attainment of a high morale and the successful management of men, by Arthur Harrison Miller, Major, Coast Artillery Corps, U. S. Army. Foreword by Edward L. Munson, Colonel, General Staff, Chief of the Morale Branch War Plans Division. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1920. Pp. XII, 174.

**The Gloss of Youth**. An imaginary episode in the lives of William Shakespeare and John Fletcher, by Horace Howard Furness, Jr. J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1920. Pp. 44.

## Notes and Discussions

### THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA

Those who know Russian religious life at its best can hardly help feeling that the recent disastrous political change in the great empire will lead to a strong revival. In the Far East, Russian missionaries have been busy for a century; and the most apostolic figure in Christian missions in Japan at the close of last century was certainly Bishop Nicolai, who entered the country by way of Hakodate as soon as foreigners were admitted. Here he made the acquaintance of a Japanese scholar, Joseph Neeshima, who taught him the language. Neeshima, found his way to America and got an education here; and he returned to his native land to found the Doshisha University at Kyoto. He had a certain saintliness about his character that seemed to differentiate him from other Christian converts. Did he get this attitude from his first Western pupil, Nicolai? The writer knew both men, and appreciated their unique qualities.

In a recent issue of the *Hibbert Journal*, Prince Eugene Troubetzkoy discusses the religious situation in his hapless country, and declares that a religious movement is on foot, which is now becoming a powerful effort of the whole nation to recover its soul. He recognizes in Bolshevism not only a system aloof from Christianity but as one which regards Christianity as "an enemy to be persecuted and wiped out of existence." Detaching souls from the objects of sense, and the immediate realization of an earthly paradise, the Christian faith diverts them from the struggle to get the good things of this life. The Bolshevik despises religion as an opium for the people, serving the purposes of capitalist domination.

Interpreting civilization in a "scientific" biological way, the Bolshevik believes that the strife of classes is to be in all respects as cruel and implacable as the struggle for existence among the animals. Therefore Christianity must be extirpated. Already a condition of hate between the town workman and the country peasant has been set up, that is rapidly making life unsupportable to the masses. Christian love must take its place as the foundation of our civilization; and as the church is now rid of the questionable state connection, with its corrupting influences, it is developing a growing power over the suffering people. They will return he predicts, the peasants first, to the ardent faith of old Russia. So many martyrs have suffered for the faith, that the heart of their fellows is hungering for a live gospel of grace and devotion.

J. M. D.

#### SPENSER, THE TYPICAL ELIZABETHAN

In Mr. Oakesmith's very suggestive and illuminating "Race and Nationality," which is reviewed in this issue of *The Personalist*, there is a comparison of Shakespeare and Spenser that is worth considering. The great dramatist he conceives as an Elizabethan only accidentally; his "mind being so flexible and many-sided as to evolve greatness out of any environment." Spenser, rather than Shakespeare, he would regard as the typical and characteristic genius of the Elizabethan Age. A few pages later on he continues: "In him (Spenser), that something in the English character which responds readily to virtuous appeals was attracted to the severer forms of morality which were associated with the Calvinists who found their inspiration in Geneva. In religion, Spenser was a Calvinistic Protestant, that, is, a Puritan, and he had that deep sense of religion which characterized the Puritans." Such a judgment as this throws light upon John Morley's statement to the students of Oxford over twenty years ago, that the issue before the modern world was between Calvinism and Machiavellism. If Spenser is to be taken as the typical English poet of the age that gave England its final tone of nationality, then the English national sense is Calvinistic. The Prussian national sense was notoriously Machiavellian; so Morley's words were a foreshadowing of the Great War in perhaps its most vital aspect.

## THE GATE AT THE RUE VALLON

At one of those odd angles formed so frequently in the walls of old French cities, flanked on either side by huge pillars, overhung by trees, and displaying the fine art of the iron-worker of an olden age stands the gate of my friend of the rue Vallon.

A symbol of peace and retirement it guards the quiet and serenity of a French home. Within the enclosure bloom quaint flowers that remind one of his mother's garden, and the entrance to the house is quite as interesting as the gate. The gate is always locked and like the wall is unscalable. For admittance one pulls the handle hanging above the brass name-plate. From this handle a strong wire crosses the garden and ends in the depths of the house where my efforts are rewarded by the tinkle of a little bell.

Being an American I am unconscious of that delicate courtesy which I am told has settled into French social law, so I pull blindly and savagely at the bell lest I be not heard or my entrance be delayed. Had I been a Frenchman I would have indicated by the number of pulls at the bell whether I was tradesman, friend, or member of the family. I wonder if I pulled with such unwonted strength as to cause the master to mutter "That American again." Thus does the gate and the formality guard against surprise.

Is not the purpose of formality of every kind just that. Are not the decencies and courtesies of life the means by which the soul guards itself from surprise? The undue familiarity, the slap upon the back from a stranger, the use of a familiar name on slight acquaintance, these are discourtesies to the soul, transgressions of the personality.

Would it not be well if by some signal such as that of the rue Vallon you could indicate how you come to me, whether as tradesman, friend, or familiar? Then I should not admit you to the citadel of my heart as a friend only to discover that your sole interest in me is to sell me an encyclopaedia, or life insurance, or the last word in carpet-beaters. Then should I learn before you launched into the seventh chapter of the prospectus that your intentions are wholly mercenary and I should be saved the trouble of slamming my soul's gate in your face.

Whether any plan could be devised to keep out those subtler schemers who feign friendship only for profit is doubtful but alas! alas! the misfortune that we do not each possess a gate like that of the rue Vallon.

## The Philosopher's Shears

### THE BREAD OF SODOM

The hunger for food and clothes and riches can never be satisfied. Their possession leaves a deeper hunger. Only God can satisfy our immortality.



### THE PLUS-SIGN OF LIFE

Can we get out of life more than we invest in it? Would Livingstone or Lincoln, Paul or Jesus now live in the hearts of men but for the cross they bore?



Liberty is not measured by the number of restraints we do not have, but by the number of spontaneous activities we do have.—*M. P. Follett*, in *The New State*.



Nothing could be more absurd than to require the great majority of human beings to think for themselves in any field whatever.—*Bowne*.



A man's vision is the great fact about him. A philosophy is the expression of a man's intimate character, and all the definitions of the universe are but the deliberately adopted reactions of human character upon it.—*William James*.



Conservatives often make the mistake of thinking they can go on living on their spiritual capital; progressives are often too prone not to fund their capital.—*M. P. Follett*.



Not appropriation but contribution is the law of growth.—*M. P. Follett*.



The ignoring of differences is the most fatal mistake in politics or industry or international life; every difference that is swept up into a bigger conception feeds and enriches society; every difference which is ignored feeds on society.—*M. P. Follett*.



## Our Contributors' Page

To the readers of Miss JOSEPHINE HAMMOND's "Amy Lowell and the Pretorian Cohorts" we know there will be much interest in the suggestion that other articles from her pen are expected for future numbers. After an experience as head of the Department of English in the Practical Arts High School of Boston, she became Professor of English and Lecturer in Education at Reed College. Mitchell Kennerley recently published a morality play of which she is the author, *Everywoman's Road*. In Portland she recently organized and directed The Little Theatre, producing *The Pigeon*; *Magic*; *The Golden Doom*; *Antigone* (in Greek); and *Twelfth Night* on perhaps the first stage built according to the Fortune contract and the lately surmised measurements of the Globe; and also her own morality play which has received wide notice.



DR. J. W. SCOTT is Professor of Philosophy in Glasgow University, and widely known in philosophical circles. In addition to being the author of many books he is a frequent contributor to the Hibbert Journal and the other philosophical reviews. As his work is much sought after, we appreciate all the more his interest in **THE PERSONALIST**.



ROY FREDERICK SWIFT, Ph.D., is professor of philosophy in Illinois College. His work will be of special interest to our readers because he is a new comer to our pages and because he represents the later product of the Bowne school of thought.

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Manuscripts and communications should be addressed to THE PERSONALIST, University of Southern California, University Avenue and Thirty-fifth Street, Los Angeles. Stamps for the return of manuscripts should be enclosed.

# To the Gentle Personalist



THE reception of THE PERSONALIST has been most gratifying. Inquiries concerning the magazine have come to us from England, from Scotland, from Mexico, from Japan and India. The Manila P. I. Bulletin, a daily, recently quoted one of our articles entire.

¶ We have been enthusiastically reviewed by contemporaries in our field.

¶ Letters of appreciation and congratulation have come from the leading colleges and universities in America and abroad.

¶ Some very good manuscripts are awaiting publication.

¶ There seems to be a demand for the type of service we can render, and it appears worth while to provide an organ of expression for personalists around the world.

¶ A considerable number have seen the desirability of subscribing, and some have wished us well, without subscribing.

¶ Our friends can help us. If you have been delaying send us your own subscription. If you are interested in our enterprise send us a choice list of names and addresses of such as might be interested.

¶ To such we will send sample numbers of the magazine.

¶ If you will take this much interest so that we can keep our subscription list growing we can give you a better quarterly.

¶ Of one thing we are certain, we cannot do without your help.

¶ Act today!

# The Personalist

VOLUME I

OCTOBER, 1920

NUMBER 3

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## LINGERING PRUSSIAN GHOSTS

THE EDITOR

It is hardly possible that an event so tremendous as the recent war should be the result of either isolated or fortuitous circumstances. It is not likely that the moving spirit of barbarism which so characterized many of its events was the sole possession of a single nation or group of nations. It is more than likely that investigation will disclose the wide dispersion of certain principles in modern civilization which bear and did bear the seeds of tragedy. Or if such a statement be too strong in view of the somewhat casual nature of the discussion following we might be permitted to say that there are discoverable in the common thinking of many men, and in the proverbial and catch phrases of the day, indications that certain principles which worked as motives in German national feeling are not wholly dead with the dying of their unrighteous cause. These principles have as much need to be combatted as their more obvious counterparts, made obvious by the clash of war, and nationally personified. To make the forces of righteousness that have been released in the hearts of multitudes the dominant forces of the future, to make sure that the forces of greed and in-

justice shall not prevail, is a greater result and a sterner battle than any which culminated in the overthrow of the German power. This fact has been given expression by Maeterlinck in the following words:

“It is after we have won that we must really vanquish; it is in the hour of peace that the actual war will begin against an invisible foe, a hundred times as dangerous as the one of whom we have seen too much. . . . If we leave a single outlet to the beast at bay; if, through our negligence we give it a single hope, a single opportunity of coming to the surface and taking breath, then the vigilant fatality which has but one fixed idea will resume its progress and pursue its way, dragging history with it and laughing over its shoulder at man once more tricked and discomfited. Everything that we have done and suffered, the ruins, the sacrifices, the nameless tortures, and the numberless dead will have served no purpose and will be lost beyond redemption.”

Our danger from the Prussian sword has perhaps vanished, but our danger from Prussian principles is still immediate and living. The battle now to be fought is to be fought in the realm of ideas. It is more difficult than physical war because it is more insidious. A rampant Germany, looting the priceless treasures of the world which she had not the spiritual insight to produce, a barbarous Germany ravaging women and impaling infants makes so evident the evil of her principles that legions can be easily raised against her. But who shall be able to save us from the prevalence of moods and habits of thought which have within them the power of disaster!

We choose between ideas presented to us, we accept the statements of those in whom we have confidence, or we lean to the opinion which seems to favor our own interests. This is the general habit of thought with which the world gets along. It saves both time and

trouble. It obviates the work of thinking, study, and application. Having opinions is much easier than to think, and very often the strength of opinion is in exact ratio to ignorance. The tendency is aggravated by the existence of a partisan press and the multiplication of periodicals which have for their object an unblushing propaganda, combined with partial concealment of the facts. All this, together with the hurried character of our life and our ambition for wealth and comfort, has in spite of the advantages of popular education made us susceptible to "mushy" thinking.

This "mushy" thinking is gathered up into certain popular phrases often considered profound, the evidence of breadth and culture, but too often the lazy resort of shallow thinking and vicious in tendency. These phrases I shall characterize as Prussian ghosts. They are the lingering and sad reminders of the dire fate the world has so barely escaped.

"It's all right if it does good," might be called the wraith of a pragmatic ghost. While a certain degree of pragmatism is necessary to all true appraisals one must ever hold the pragmatic spirit in check to keep from falling into a merely unprincipled, and occasional utilitarianism. During the war it sometimes took the form "the right side will win," meaning by that, not that righteousness would determine the conflict, but that the right was so obscure that only the outcome could determine it. Historically this method is as old as the sophists. Sophism has always bred a race of moral weaklings for whom anything was true that served the convenience or pleasure of the moment. For such, truth had no deeper meaning than to be useful in pandering to present lusts or the momentary escape from the consequences of folly. In this way success comes to be lifted up to the standing of a moral mandate. The doctrine is Prussian in that the Hun used it to

justify his deepest sins. Utility, success, was to him as to the sophist and the extreme pragmatist, the measure of truth and there is no other. If to make Kultur prevail, murder, arson, torture or dishonor were necessary they were justified by success.

In our own civilization this is the principle appealed to when one is pointed to material possession as the best proof of the righteousness of one's cause the last and silencing word above all criticism: "Well, didn't he get there?" It is the ever fertile resort of those cults and systems which insist on being judged by the number of adherents, or by a consideration of some good they may do without any reference to the more than counterbalancing evil that they do. It serves equally well the reactionist who opposes all industrial reform, without regard for justice and the extreme radical who defends the Bolsheviks of Russia by pointing to the fact that so far they have been able to perpetuate an infamous tyranny.

Another venerable ghost masks himself in the garb of tolerance, and lays claim to special distinction for mental breadth. Yet no one dares to denounce him for fear of being charged with ignorance or narrowness. He often comes garbed in the expression: "It doesn't matter what a man believes if he is only conscientious." This ghost walks the earth only when beliefs have lost their vital note and have become only formally adhered to. It is the favorite form under which we veil our indifference to the truth. It overlooks the important fact that conscience is a matter largely of habit and training and may be evil and misleading as well as good. This ghost has been kept on the scene by those people who, wearied of judging a man by his formal beliefs, have not had the moral stamina to go on and assert that one's ethical standing is to be judged by one's actual practice of the ethics of the world's greatest ethical teacher. It is the assumption that without

moral guidance of any kind one will immediately feel what is right or wrong. As a matter of fact the most cruel and wicked men of history have many of them been very conscientious. Their cruelty has been the more outrageous because they concealed from themselves the enormity of their action. Their unrighteousness, their injustice and their hates have been masked under the cloak of the general good or a passion for truth, in maintaining a cult, a faith, or a state idea. History has yet to record the heresy hunter who was willing to accord a christian fairness to his victim. The late Prussian exercise of conscience toward Belgium has been full of a "Gott mit uns" enthusiasm for Kultur, but that has not saved it from a deadly diabolism.

We are not oblivious to the measure of truth that hides in the half truths of which we are speaking. Ghosts are kept about by reason of the measure of truth they represent. If there were not some scintilla of truth in the hoariest error it would find short shrift. This is especially true of the widespread sentiment that the ills of society are chiefly economical, that a readjustment of social returns will banish discontent. A righteous readjustment of returns for service to society there must be, based on both actual service and economic need. There can be no peace in society until this is done. On the other hand the sources of discontent lie deeper than any material satisfaction. There are too many social reformers who have the idea that the adoption of the Prussian industrial program is the surest way to secure the future of society. We too often dream that the erection of sanitary houses will satisfy the spiritual needs of the poor. This ought we to have done, but not to have left the other undone. One needs two legs for walking and it is not seemly for one leg to protest that the other is quite unnecessary. In our cry for industrial efficiency we are quite in danger of

overlooking the spiritual elements which alone can furnish the ultimate satisfactions of man. The economic prosperity of Germany created the temptation by which she lost her soul, and her body as well.

There is another ghost which during the months and years of war has had a sorry struggle for existence but has recently crawled out of the closet and will be found doing business at the old stand. Its name is Silly Optimism, and its one phrase is "All's well with the world." The idea is that the world is in state of evolution and that any movement whatever is sure to represent progress. The faith in this ghost is pathetic for it masks as being scientific and is continually received in the best circles. It considers man so good that all he needs is to follow his impulses. We have made it a part of our educational system. It does in fact mark the real Prussianization of our school life. The outcome is an untempered individualism which resents all order and all control. It represents the revolt of the individual from the tyranny of moral law. The things that it pleases one to do are right, and intolerance of moral restrictions is looked upon as a progress toward freedom. The existence of the base in life is taken as sufficient reason for its representation in a sordid literature and drama. Life is assumed to consist of the lowest in man rather than in the possession of ideals.

The same baneful influence has tempered religious teaching as well. Here the inner emotions are given precedence over ethical living, or it may be that the place of importance is given to formal belief. A formal and unrelated hell is thus to be avoided by certain religious magic. As a scientific age has largely removed the belief in magic there are many to whom the idea of damnation has become altogether unreal. In the meantime, the church, with a wonderful scientific argument behind it, has been more than timid in proclaiming that surest of all

truths, which even God will not fail to respect, "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." No words sound solemn warning above our age in clearer tones than these: "he that soweth to the flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption, but he that soweth to the spirit shall of the spirit reap life everlasting."

Perhaps the meanest ghost that stalks the earth is that one which assumes that all progress is cataclysmic. The doctrine has borne evil fruit in science and religion, to say nothing of its murderous career in politics. In science it is gathered up under the slogan of the survival of the fittest which is assumed as the sole law of progress. Whatever survives is fit and whatever is fit survives. Thus the existence of any iniquity is the proof of its fitness. No standard of fitness is named. The failure of the highest morality and mentality in conflict with a hostile environment is a proof of unfitness. This is the biological law by which the Prussian justified his cruelty, his ambitions and his beastliness.

In the religious world this ghost takes the form of overconfidence in a cataclysmic renewal of the world. Has much to say about the binding of the devil to cast him into the pit, and very little to do about actually forging his chains. It is in effect a profound disbelief in mankind, a deep infidelity as to the power of goodness. It has no faith in the power of humanity to work out its own salvation and does not believe in goodness when it sees it. It overlooks the fact that no moral gains can ever be made that are not voluntarily made by man himself. A world saved by a cataclysmic return and not by man's own advance in righteousness would not be saved at all, save by ridding it of all moral character. It is an ethical skepticism that removes from the individual a healthful sense of moral responsibility for his world and puts it where it does not belong, on God.

In politics this ghost is active as the spirit of revolution. Its theory is that any change will be better than no change. It has within it nothing constructive nor ameliorative. It would cure present wrongs not by educating men up to a sense of those wrongs but by arraying class against class in a deadly struggle. It does not believe that an equal justice is possible and it does not desire it. Here again we have the creation of a profound disbelief in the nature of man. Is this the highest outcome of more than a century of individualistic endeavor? Starting from the Rousseauan premise of the divine nature of man, is the end of that movement an entire disbelief in man's better instincts? This seems to be the sorry progress and outcome of our vaunted social evolution.

Whoever assumes to diagnose the whole sickness of modern society must possess a breadth of insight to which we lay no claim, but there seems one very obvious element in the dangers that haunt us. We appear to be suffering from an overdose of materialism. The world has been saddened by the obvious chill that has overtaken the high idealism that characterized many of the sacrifices voluntarily made during the war. We have been individually saddened and yet we have individually returned to the pursuit of the main chance. We are working all the harder at that job because of the feeling that in living after a higher order for a time we have missed something we had been accustomed to expect. This is perhaps because in this over-full age we had customarily lived in material satisfactions. We have still too much confidence in the material. We are still incapable of belief in the invisible. Even our desire for the assurance of the immortality of those who have been taken from us in the pursuit of the noblest ideals is made to hinge upon some physical materialization which overlooks the profoundest realities of human personality. The demand for spirit photographs,

and physical manifestation is materialistic to the very core. It means that we really do not believe in the existence of anything which cannot be physically handled and demonstrated, which will not yield to scientific methods of measurement. We fondly dream that the life of the spirit can yet be reduced to scientific formulæ and we mistake the echo of our own voices for the surest of realities.

We pretend to practice an optimism that we do not feel. We mingle freely with these ghosts of an unsatisfying order of life and make pretence that they still have power to satisfy us. But we are troubled with a divine discontent. On a thousand battle fields there were evidences of a brotherhood of sacrifice that we cannot quite get out of our mental perspective. There is an undying consciousness of respect for the reality of things that are invisible. We cannot move, for the motives that stirred us are now gone and we have not arrived at new ones that are strong enough to command us.

Whence is to come the spiritual genius who will reveal us to ourselves, who will make clear to us the reality of the invisible? We still speak as if science were the possessor of that secret, but in our heart of hearts we know better. The magic talisman that we seek is that subtle devotion of life that lifts the painter out of himself and makes him the artist: that transforms the clever arranger of words into a poet: that changes the purveyor of pious platitudes into a prophet: that renders the philosopher something more than the tedious conveyor of worn-out systems and enables him to touch his student with the fire and urge of the great realities. In the past it has never been manifested apart from a profound and stirring ethical faith in God and the power of the invisible. Science has provided us with power, but not with vision, with eyesight but not with insight. Who will give us faith!

## AMY LOWELL AND THE PRETORIAN COHORTS

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Thirty years ago, when Francis Thompson was cutting his immortal laurel leaf on Shelley's tomb, he turned aside to scatter anathemas among the Pretorian Cohorts of the poetry of his day. "Contemporary poetry, in general," he wrote, "as compared with the poetry of the nineteenth century, is mildewed. . . . Poetic diction has become latterly a kaleidoscope, and one's chief curiosity is as to the precise combination into which the pieces will be shifted. There is, in fact, a certain band of words, the Pretorian Cohorts of Poetry, whose prescriptive aid is invoked by every aspirant of the poetical purple, and without whose prescriptive aid none dares aspire to the poetical purple."

Against these Pretorian Cohorts, against this "exclusive coterie of poetic words," the common speech of our day has hurled itself. Helter-skelter have come the minute men of our new poetic diction; from the prairie and from coal pit; from dock and yard-arm; from drawing-room and from camp; from shop and terraced garden; from factory and from bar: harshly, gallantly, discordantly, harmoniously, gayly, moodily, the insurgents have flung themselves on the orderly ranks of the purpled Pretorian guards. Many a classic legionary, standing in rank only to preserve the melodic sweep of his line, has given way before a fire-tongued opponent. The disordered hosts have pressed on, anarchic, morbidly, healthfully barbaric, delicately, clumsily insistent, challenge rampant

to all clichés. Out of the rabble of penny pipers and veritable poets new groups of verse makers have come, *Vorticists*, *Imagists*, *Sense-Realists*, *Futurists*, *Vers-Librists*,—classifications full of sound and port, signifying little. In due time, no doubt, these cults will have run their courses, established their helpful variations, and will have become as useless as the Pretorian Cohorts now are—the cast-off insignia of a once vital poetry.

In the new order much brilliant work is being done, and much that is opaque and colorless. The cruder work presents too often the ill-assorted marriage of propaganda and verse, or the untidy rankness of adolescent speech: much of it is attenuated, the toys of the poetasters; much of it is as bloodless and obvious as the wax-works in Mr. Stedman's Anthology. But the better effort is bringing us the influx of delicate penetrations, vigors, fragments of wistful loveliness, broad fields of subject matter, some superb dramatic characterizations, recursions of worn and patient philosophies, not a little ironic revelation, and much honest passion.

Perhaps because the normal ear responds more readily to melody than to symphony, the normal mind to platitude rather than to suggestion, and the normal spirit to traditional accretions rather than to lone spiritual adventures, much of the experimentation in the latter-day effort in our verse has been generously condemned. Dr. Van Dyke suggests that free verse is but a phase of Bolshevism, and Somerset Maugham dismisses thus summarily the younger generation of word-fanciers: "To my mind, they know too much and feel too obviously: . . . their passion seems to me a little anæmic and their dreams dull. I do not like them." Much of the commentary has been curiously unsympathetic: some of it has been as undiscriminating as this blanket villification of all our new singers: "Self-centered, pompous, priggish, 'modern' poets, caring

nothing for life." Naturally, it is the pose of criticism to be sometimes unaware that life comes from change, to be unaware that creation, so far as we can predicate it, is the manifestation of infinite energies coming to birth in an infinitude of special forms.

Dr. Newbolt makes a poised justification of the busy experimentation, now going on, in his *New Study of English Poetry*: "Since poetry is a personal expression, and the essence of personality is distinctive, the tendency of poetic rhythm will be toward perpetual change. It is strange that any opinion, any feeling, however conservative, should fight against this, for it means that while we keep all that the past has given, what we shall receive from the future will be new gifts instead of copies of old ones. And whether welcome or unwelcome, the historical fact is beyond dispute that our poetry has shown a long-continued development of rhythm, and always the effort has been towards greater freedom, to be used for more complete and natural self-expression. . . . What poet has to learn from poet is not a trick of the hand, or a set of cadences, or a formula, or an orthodox tradition, it is a passion for sincerity. To one observer at least our poets seem to have recovered that passion. They have determined to be no longer unnecessarily hindered by old conventions of diction, of "scanning," or unnatural stress and ungrammatical inversion: they are bent on getting nearer to the inward melody, on moving more faithfully to the inward rhythm. In this determination I see no lawlessness, no 'aischrolatreia,' no cult of the ugly or the eccentric. I see and desire others to see in it the old and true instinct of the English poets, the belief that formal beauty is begotten, not of the hand of the artist, but of the spirit."

Fairly regarded, even the weak among our radical singers seem testers in an eager effort to strike from the instrument of our language finer and finer modulations of

our moods. To this end, traditional verse-forms, as well as the purple Pretorian phrases, have been overborne to make way for fresh cadences, newly-ordered observations and reflections. Even the poets who are working still with age-old verse arrangements are responding to the call for vital images and arresting discriminations. Certainly this activity, even when minor, is important. But, since Art is Nature-in-Order,—since it must needs be vertebrate, not merely protoplasmic,—these prentice-poets will become authentic makers only as their work achieves integration, motive, vividness, variation, unitary effect, essential reality, essential illusion: and they will become the seers of our times, "the advance-guard of life," only as they write across their pages that fine phrase of Stevenson's—*Enter God*. Manner and magic,—of such is the kingdom of verse.

The more fruitful of the poets who have cast the fresh moulds seem, in their artistries, to have developed into high distinction the suggestion, the concentration, and the design of poetry. Few have sung incomparably: their appeal is more often to the eye than to the ear: the architecture, the line, the color, have intrigued them more than tonal qualities; words have been chosen, in the main, for vividness rather than for charm: harmony has risen from the totality of cadences rather than from the lilt of single lines. Despite much use of the world-old devices,—the refrain or return, alliteration and assonance,—and despite many happy effects in the free-running verse, the ear is rarely caressed and haunted. The flexible, highly differentiated, unrhymed verse-form, now so much in use,—a verse-form harking back to Bardic chant, to Chinese song, to Japanese *hokku*, to Hebraic rhapsody, to classic quantities, to Campion, to Blake and Whitman, Henley and Sharp, to Continental experimentation, (and to what not besides!) waits, more needfully than other forms, perhaps,

its Israfel "to make the Pleiads pause in Heaven." And yet, although no living American poet has matched the marvel of Whitman's sonorous chant that throbs over the grave of Lincoln, lamenting,—the chant that long has marked the high-tide of an earlier cadenced verse—one of the newer threnodies, Mr. Fletcher's *Lincoln*, nobly approaches it. And if this piece and others of its kin lack appreciators, it may very well be that our crass ears have not yet been attuned to the mode of these measures. It may very well be that our evolving poetry is destined to appeal not so much to the grosser ear as to that inner sensibility that, in the meeting soul, can evoke sound, odor, image, and mood more competently, more poignantly, from hints, analogies, and concentrated utterance, than from obvious delineation and measured phrase. This method of indirection, of suggestion, throws a heavy burden of creation on the poet's audience. In us must lie the emotion, the thought, to mate the poet's imagery. When we, listening with full-stretched imaginative response, comprehend the complete magic of these new symphonic cadences, it may come about that we shall happily acclaim them "music music-born that well may Jove and Juno scorn."

Quoting Emerson leads to the vagarish query: how many Epimethean critics, frowning over the capers of our unsnooded Lady Poetry, have lately refreshed themselves with a reading of Emerson's *Merlin*? Fifty years ago he was writing, (with a pucker of eyelids, no doubt!):

Thy trivial harp will never please  
Or fill my craving ear;  
Its chords should ring as blows the breeze,  
Free, peremptory, clear.  
No jingling serenaders' art,  
Nor tinkle of piano strings,  
Can make the wild blood start

In its mystic springs.  
Great is the art,  
Great be the manners of the bard.  
He shall not his brain encumber  
With the coil of rhythm and number;  
But, leaving rule and pale forethought,  
He shall aye climb  
For his rhyme.  
'Pass in, pass in, the angels say,  
'In to the upper doors,  
'Nor count compartments of the floors,  
'But mount to Paradise  
'By the stairway of surprise.'

Here is assurance pat that if we will but have after our radical poets with faith, we may reach Paradise without counting compartments of the floors. On the stairway of surprise poetry, like life, may be adventure. Even the Brahmin, Emerson, sitting snug by his New England woodpile, was buccaneer in spirit and knew this. Doubtless, following the blossoming feet of our reincarnated Poetry, we shall find ourselves, too often, not in Paradise, but in wildernesses of sodden alley-ways: but doubtless too, if our faith be enduring, Nobility, somewhere on the road, will take us greatly by the throat—somewhere Loveliness will bend us to our knees.

It is poetic adventure (with a dash of the Spanish Main in it!) that lies at our hand in the work of one of the most significant of our new writers,—work of flavor, insight, wit, beauty, and arresting design—the product of the often-maligned, the often-belligerent Amy Lowell, Poet-in-Ordinary, by God's grace.

In the Sidneyan lists, Miss Lowell has been foremost in the assault on the Pretorian Cohorts, the hosts of supernumerary words. With right good will she has laid on against all feckless conservative worms: she has engaged

with fervor the slimy slugs-cant, smugness, prudishness, buckram, and small beer. Musty jargons she has routed, albeit, as radicals are wont to do, she has invented a jargon of her own, out-Sordelloing Sordello! If, sometimes, her right hand has not known her left hand's intent in critical fence, the twistywiseness has but added to the happy shock of strife: and if she comes from battle a bit wind-blown, overstrained, a bit self-conscious,—what would you? One cannot be at once Deborah to a host and tidy as the Tennysonian Gardener's Daughter!

Mercifully she has often walked apart and written poetry. Flute, trombone, harpsichord, and snare-drum have in turn been played to soothe or to assault our ears: the hundred-hued wonder of the common day has been evoked to sting or to allure our sight to clearer seeing. With a dramatic power not too humbly comparable to Browning's Miss Lowell has brought to life Men, Women, and Ghosts: through her magic, Roman, Frank, and Byzantine wake to pride and sin; gaunt New England women breathe again miasmas from stale yards of burdock; again grows Nelson's heart to be again eaten by the vultures; again St. Ursula dreams in cell cool and sweet as a lark's song. Better than any American poet of our time Miss Lowell has conceived a colorful, palpitant past: with more authority than any of her fellows she has brought to our somewhat spare American verse a cosmopolitan touch, an informed guidance, that makes us free in diverse scenes, in diverse moods. Moreover, she has developed with convincing mastery a new form of poetry, a form sponsored by Mr. Fletcher and most inadequately termed *polyphonic prose*. It is, according to Miss Lowell's explanation, a many-voiced verse, combining metre and cadence, alliteration, assonance, rhyme, and return: "polyphonic prose is, in a sense, an orchestral form. Its tone is not merely single and melodic as is that of *vers*

*libre*, for instance, but contrapuntal and various."

Students of Miss Lowell's work will find strains in it, and "warpings past the aim," but they will find too, a reading of life mellowed by a true poet's love for the worlds of sense and spirit; they will find work shaped by an artist eager to better artifice and cunning.

In her first volume *A DOME OF MANY-COLORED GLASS*, Miss Lowell dedicates herself to the patient toil of bringing beauty to revealment:

What is poetry? Is it a mosaic  
Of colored stones which curiously are wrought  
Into a pattern? Rather glass that's taught  
By patient labor any hue to take  
And glowing with a sumptuous splendor, make  
Beauty a thing of awe; where sunbeams caught  
Transmuted fall in sheafs of rainbows fraught  
With storied meaning for religion's sake.

In this first collection, also, Miss Lowell postulates her preoccupation with men and women: gardens she lingers in, seas, woods and streams are native to her taste, but the source of her deepest joy is the passional story of mankind.

Some men there are who find in nature all  
Their inspiration, hers the sympathy  
Which spurs them on to any great endeavor,  
To them the fields and woods are closest friends,  
And they hold dear communion with the hills;  
The voice of waters soothes them with its fall,  
And the great winds bring healing in their sound.

To me it is not so. I love the earth  
And all the gifts of her so lavish hand:  
Sunshine and flowers, rivers and rushing winds,  
Thick branches swaying in a winter storm,  
And moonlight playing in a boat's wide wake;  
But more than these, and much, ah, how much more,  
I love the very human heart of man.

So far, it is Miss Lowell's power to evoke the human scene with dramatic contrast, precipitation, and climax, that has given us her best work. Dramatic vigor and evocation are so rare in American letters that this poet's gift comes to us with special bounty.

Turn to the finely fashioned *Malmaison*, and watch the *First Consul* and *Josephine* meet and part before their divorce. I quote some passages even at the risk of distorting the poet's pattern:

## II.

Gallop! Gallop! The General brooks no delay. Make way, good people, and scatter out of his path, you and your hens, and your dogs and your children. The General is returned from Egypt, and is come in a *cleché* and four to visit his new property. Throw open the gates, you, Porter of *Malmaison*. Pull off your cap, my man. This is your master, the husband of Madame.

Faster! Faster! A jerk and a jingle  
And they are arrived, he and she.  
Madame has red eyes. Fie! It is for joy  
at her husband's return. Learn your place,  
Porter. A gentleman here for two months?  
Fie! Fie! then: Since when have you  
taken to gossiping? Madame may have a  
brother, I suppose. That—all green, and  
red, and glitter, with flesh as dark as  
ebony—that is a slave; a blood-thirsty,  
stabbing, slashing heathen, came from the  
hot countries to cure your tongue of idle  
whispering.

A fine afternoon it is, with tall  
bright clouds sailing over the trees.

“Bonaparte, *mon ami*, the trees are  
golden like my star, the star I pinned

to your destiny when I married you. The gypsy, you remember her prophecy! My dear friend, not here, the servants are watching; send them away, and that flashing splendor Roustan. Superb—Imperial, but—My dear, your arm is trembling; I faint to feel it touching me! No, no, Bonaparte, not that—spare me that—did we not bury that last night! You hurt me, my friend, you are so hot and strong. Not long, Dear, no, thank God, not long."

The looped river runs saffron, for the sun is setting. It is getting dark. Dark. Darker. In the moonlight, the slate roof shines palely, milkily white.

The roses have faded at Malmaison, nipped by the frost. What need for roses? Smooth, open petals—her arms. Fragrant, out-curved petals—her breasts.

He rises like a sun above her, stooping to touch the petals, press them wider. Eagles. Bees. What are they to open roses! A little shivering breeze runs through the linden trees, and the tiered clouds blow across the sky like ships of the line, stately with canvas.

### III.

The gates stand wide at Malmaison, stand wide all the day. The gravel of the avenue glints under the continual rolling of wheels. An officer gallops up with his sabre clicking; a mameluke gallops down with his charger kicking. *Valets de pied* run about in ones, and twos, and groups, like swirled blown leaves. Tramp! Tramp! The guard is changing, and the grenadiers off duty lounge out of sight, ranging along the roads towards Paris.

The slate roof sparkles in the sun,  
but it sparkles milkily, vaguely, the  
great glass-houses put out its shining.  
Glass, stone, and onyx now for the sun's  
mirror. Much has come to pass at Mal-  
maison. New rocks and fountains, blocks  
of carven marble, fluted pillars uprearing  
antique temples, vases and urns in unex-  
pected places, bridges of stone, bridges  
of wood, arbors and statues, and a flood  
of flowers everywhere, new flowers, rare  
flowers, parterre after parterre of  
flowers. Indeed, the roses bloom at Mal-  
maison. It is youth, youth untrammeled  
and advancing, trundling a country ahead  
of it as though it were a hoop. Laughter,  
and spur janglings in tessellated vesti-  
bules. Tripping of clocked and embroidered  
stockings in little low-heeled shoes over  
smooth grass-plots. India muslins spangled  
with silver patterns slide through trees—  
mingle—separate—white day fireflies  
flashing moon-brilliance in the shade of  
foliage.

"The kangaroos! I vow, Captain, I  
must see the kangaroos."

"As you please, dear lady, but I re-  
commend the shady linden-alley and feeding  
the cockatoos."

"They say that Madame Bonaparte's breed  
of sheep is the best in all France."

"But, oh, have you seen the enchanting  
little cedar she planted when the First  
Consul sent home the news of the victory of  
Marengo?"

Picking, choosing, the chattering company flits to and fro. Over the trees the great clouds go, tiered, stately, like ships of the line bright with canvas.

Prisoner's base, and its swooping, veering, racing, giggling, bumping. The First Consul runs plump into M. de Beauharnais and falls. But he picks himself up smartly, and starts after M. Isabey. Too late, M. Le Premier Consul, Mademoiselle Hortense is out after you. Quickly, my dear Sir! Stir your short legs, she is swift and eager, and as graceful as her mother. She is there, that other, playing too, but lightly, warily, bearing herself with care, rather floating out upon the air than running, never far from goal. She is there, borne up above her guests as something indefinably fair, a rose above periwinkles. A blown rose, smooth at satin, reflexed, one loosened petal hanging back and down. A rose that undulates languorously as the breeze takes it, resting upon its leaves in a faintness of perfume.

There are rumours about the First Consul. Malmaison is full of women, and Paris is only two leagues distant. Madame Bonaparte stands on the wooden bridge at sunset, and watches a black swan pushing the pink and silver water in front of him as he swims, crinkling its smoothness into pleats of changing colour with his breast. Madame Bonaparte presses against the parapet of the bridge, and the crushed roses at her belt melt, petal by petal, into the pink water.

There is something engaging, memorable, in this presentation in polyphonic prose of historic incident and character. Even more memorable are the pieces in CAN

GRANDE'S CASTLE, conceived, all of them, in this manner. Here Miss Lowell is served abundantly by the arts of sound, color, and design: with panoramic decorations, gorgeous as a Brangwyn fresco or slenderly etched in the manner of Whistler, the human stories rise, dissolve, rise and fall, beating with tremors and exultations. One is tempted to suggest that through Miss Lowell's pen the cinema has entered English poetry! But it comes—not cribbed and confined in its native dumb greys,—it comes vibrant with color, richly furnished, resonant, tingling with passion and satire.

So engaging, so memorable, are the movements and beauties of this polyphonic prose that it is possible, at first, to ignore its insistent fortissimo vibrations: it is only after repeated assaults that the battered ear begins to yearn for a saving measure, suave and Lydian,—for "Music that gentiier on the spirit lies, than tired eyelids upon tired eyes." Lack of modulation, of repose to alternate with climax, seems to be the chief defect of this concentrated verse form.

It is in CAN GRANDE'S CASTLE that Miss Lowell, haunted by war-devastations, traverses many courses of men's passions, seeking the springs of war. Now the tragedy of human woe sweeps by in the piteous mating of Nelson and Lady Hamilton, and now in Perry's buccaneer confrontation of the Great Gates of Japan. Often it is the historic scenes themselves that are sharp-set in graphic conflict, suggesting the clinch of the moods that animated them. So in the very remarkable piece, THE BRONZE HORSES, Rome is set over against Constantinople,—Constantinople against Venice,—the Venice of the Doges against Venice of to-day; deep-flowing in this surging tide of life are the currents that make for war—human greed, ignorance, and blind shapings. Above the tide, at the mercy of it, stand in mobile immobility the BRONZE HORSES, product of the

reach of man's skill when he vies with the gods. Miss Lowell's attempt to interpret present-day catastrophe by focusing the violet-rays of her vision on the past brings us work of profound ethical import as well as work of artistic satisfaction. Implicit here is the truism that mankind emerges slowly from the brute, and that the world grows fair only as men and women are personally ennobled.

Reverence for the personal, the particular, seems to be the essential spirit of Miss Lowell's philosophy: true artist she is in this—that she stands clear of group discriminations, and implies, in choice and treatment of her subjects, that true equality lies in the full recognition of inequalities—that progressive evolution demands that we secure for diverse characters free and fair play. Delineator of a rich-veined humanity, she ranges far and wide for her themes, plays many stops in the emotional gamut, and weaves patterns of multifold designs to deploy her visions and their moods. It follows, naturally, that she welcomes not only new creators but new forms. Yet, contrary to popular supposition, Miss Lowell is no more an anarchical technician than she is a formalistic one. Her allegory of Ezra Pound in *ASTIGMATISM* is an admirably satiric statement of her disdain for the bizarre.

The Poet took his walking-stick  
Of fine polished ebony.  
Set in the close-grained wood  
Were quaint devices;  
Patterns in ambers,  
And in the clouded green of jades.  
The top was of smooth, yellow ivory,  
And a tassel of tarnished gold  
Hung by a faded cord from a hole  
Pierced in the hard wood,  
Circled with silver.  
For years the Poet had wrought upon this cane.

His wealth had gone to enrich it,  
 His experiences to pattern it,  
 His labor to fashion and burnish it,  
 To him it was perfect,  
 A work of art and a weapon,  
 A delight and a defence.  
 The Poet took his walking-stick  
 And walked abroad.

Peace be with you, Brother.

The Poet came to a meadow.  
 Sifted through the grass were daisies,  
 Open-mouthed, wondering, they gazed at the sun.  
 The Poet struck them with his cane.  
 The little heads blew off, and they lay  
 Dying, open-mouthed and wondering,  
 On the hard ground.  
 "They are useless. They are not roses," said the Poet.

Peace be with you, Brother, go your ways.

The Poet came to a stream,  
 Purple and blue flags waded in the water;  
 In among them hopped the speckled frogs;  
 The wind slid through them, rustling.  
 The Poet lifted his cane,  
 And the iris heads fell into the water.  
 They floated away, torn and drowning.  
 "Wretched flowers," said the Poet,  
 "They are not roses."

Peace be with you, Brother. It is your affair.

The Poet came to a garden.  
 Dahlias ripened against a wall,  
 Gillyflowers stood up bravely for all  
 their short stature.  
 And a trumpet-vine covered an arbour  
 With red and gold of its blossoms.  
 Red and gold like the brass notes of trumpets.

The Poet knocked off the stiff heads of the dahlias,  
And his cane lopped the gillyflowers at the ground.  
Then he severed the trumpet-blossoms from their stems.  
Red and gold, they lay scattered,  
Red and gold, prone and dying.  
"They are not roses," said the Poet.

Peace be with you, Brother.  
But behind you is destruction, and waste places.

The Poet came home at evening,  
And in the candle-light  
He wiped and polished his cane.  
The orange candle flame leaped in the yellow ambers,  
And made the jades undulate like green pools.  
It played along the bright ebony,  
And glowed in the top of cream-colored ivory.  
But these things were dead,  
Only the candle-light made them seem to move.  
"It is a pity there were no roses," said the Poet.

Peace be with you, Brother, you have chosen your part.

Leaving her wide-ranging spirit, her dominant achievement, and coming to minor performances, we can readily find flaws at which to cavil. In her search for the vivid, specific word, Miss Lowell often neglects connotative significances: "Thirteen ships flying the tricolors, and riding at ease in a patch of blue water inside a jade-green *hem*": "—silver scintillations *snip-snap* over the top of the waves." Or, again, she is not above confusing fundamental images, winding about with such infelicities as

"The old house glowed, *geranium-hued*, with bricks  
Bloomed in the sun like *roses*, low and long."—

And this barrage fire:

"All day my thoughts had lain as *dead*,  
*Unborn* and *bursting* in my head."

Moreover, in rhyme, (and Miss Lowell in her first three volumes has used rhyme generously) many a false mating obtrudes. Surely Humor sat far off and chuckled when the moving finger wrote—

“Classic in touch, but *emasculate*;  
The Greek soul grown *effeminate*.”

Minor defects are insignificant dust-motes in the radiant summer of Miss Lowell’s performance. Only now and again does some full-length grotesquery cloud her brilliant and lucid reflections. We can but surmise that imps—grinning imps—sit sometimes on Miss Lowell’s pen: what they draw with their wriggling tails—well—it may be like Hamlet’s cloud, ‘a camel, or a weasel, or a whale, but, by the mass,’ we are left to wonder. This over-defined mirage gives us pause:

#### ON THE MANTELPIECE

A thousand years went to her making,  
A thousand years of experiments in pastes  
and glazes.  
But now she stands  
In all the glory of the finest porcelain  
and the most delicate paint,  
A Dresden China shepherdess,  
Flaunted before a tall mirror  
On a high mantelpiece.

“Beautiful shepherdess,  
I love the little pink rosettes on your shoes,  
The angle of your hat sets my heart a-singing.  
Drop me the purple rose you carry in your hand  
That I may cherish it,  
And that, at my death  
Which I feel is not far off,  
It may lie upon my bier.

So the shepherdess threw the purple rose  
over the mantelpiece,  
But it splintered in fragments on the hearth.

Then from below there came a sound of weeping,  
And the shepherdess beat her hands  
And cried:  
"My purple rose is broken,  
It was the flower of my heart."  
And she jumped off the mantelpiece  
And was instantly shattered into seven  
hundred and twenty pieces.  
But the little brown cricket who sang so sweetly  
Scuttled away into a crevice of the marble  
And went on warming his toes and chirping.

It is the seven hundred and twenty pieces that hint the imps. Only imps could be so exact. Of course, we suspect there is a woman in the cloud somewhere—a pampered woman—and there is, to be sure, the reliable nice brown cricket; but is the cricket nice to go on chirping when the descendant is in seven hundred and twenty pieces? Five hundred and two now, or even six hundred and four, but—seven hundred and twenty! On the whole, we may have to agree with Polonius—though backed like a weasel, the blur must be a whale!

Since the least admirable is the most inevitable, it is by such extravaganzas that Miss Lowell is often appraised. If it were a pity to let stray idiosyncracies obscure the fine craftsmanship of Miss Lowell's verse, it were a greater pity still to let them belittle its sensitive and powerful spirit. Nevertheless, if this poet persists in being wilfully obscure, she will not easily be forgiven. Of her, ardent champion of clarities that she is, sharply graven precision will always be demanded. Recondite and subtle she may be, and we will follow "on the stairway of surprise" as best we may, but when she attenuates her matter to

the vanishing point, leaving us in hollow caverns with no thread, then needs must we echo—"Peace, Sister, go thy way."

If we win past such drivel as "Flesh sawing against the cold blue gates of the sky," and "The air oozes blue—mauve—," we shall find beneath Miss Lowell's opulent imageries two contrasted gifts mingled with her dominant power for dramatic presentment,—the gift for irony, and the gift for gracious sentiment.

In ironic and satiric disclosure Miss Lowell's moral passion cuts staunchly into the jungle of human crime and folly. Sometimes it is a rapier-thrust that flicks the bloom and lets the poison ebb; sometimes it is a broadsword swing that leaves revealed the ground growths, fetid and malicious. The essential pity for human woe that has lived in the heart of every great satirist pulses behind each thrust. When the touch is light we have such a flash as

### TALK (At a Dinner-Party)

They took dead men's souls  
And pinned them on their breasts for ornament;  
Their cuff-links and tiaras  
Were gems dug from a grave;  
They were ghouls battening on exhumed thoughts;  
And I took a green liquer from a servant  
So that he might come near me,  
And give me the comfort of a living thing.

When the cut is deep we have VINTAGE, or THE GREAT ADVENTURE OF MAX BREUCK, or IN A CASTLE, or THE SHADOW, or THE CROSS-ROADS, or THE FRUIT SHOP, or REAPING, or PATTERNS, or THE CORNUCOPIA OF RED AND GREEN COMFITS, or DRIED MARJORAM, or such irony of intimate intercourse as this:

## A FIXED IDEA

What torture lurks within a single thought  
When grown too constant, and however kind,  
However welcome still, the weary mind  
Aches with its presence. Dull remembrance taught  
Remembers on unceasingly; unsought  
The old delight is with us but to find  
That all recurring joy is pain refined,  
Become a habit, and we struggle, caught.  
You lie upon my heart as on a nest,  
Folded in peace, for you can never know  
How crushed I am with having you at rest,  
Heavy upon my life. I love you so  
You bind my freedom from its rightful quest.  
In mercy lift your drooping wings and go.

Many times Miss Lowell turns from the broader scale of social satirics to the delicate nuances of personal encounters. Here, often, quite as effectively as in her objective creations, she translates with unforgettable purity of tone the keen joys and griefs of hearts attuned or desolate. Three poems from three widely separated periods of Miss Lowell's work will suggest the vigor, the distinction, and the exquisite grace of her lyricism.

## FRANKINCENSE AND MYRRH

My heart is tuned to sorrow, and the strings  
Vibrate most readily to minor chords,  
Searching and sad; my mind is stuffed with words  
Which voice the passion and the ache of things:  
Illusions beating with their baffled wings  
Against the walls of circumstances, and hordes  
Of torn desires, broken joys; records  
Of all a bruised life's maimed imaginings.  
Now you are come! You tremble like a star  
Poised where, behind earth's rim, the sun has set.  
Your voice has sung across my heart, but numb  
And mute, I have no tones to answer. Far  
Within I kneel before you, speechless yet,  
And life ablaze with beauty, I am dumb.

## THE GIVER OF STARS

Hold your soul open for my welcoming.  
 Let the quiet of your spirit bathe me  
 With its clear and rippled coolness,  
 That, loose-limbed and weary, I find rest,  
 Outstretched upon your peace, as on a bed of ivory.

Let the flickering of your soul play all about me,  
 That into my limbs may come the keenness of fire,  
 The life and joy of tongues of flame,  
 And, going out from you, tightly strung and in tune,  
 I may rouse the blear-eyed world,  
 And pour into it the beauty which you have begotten.

## MADONNA OF THE EVENING FLOWERS

All day long I have been working,  
 Now I am tired.  
 I call: "Where are you?"  
 But there is only the oak tree rustling in the wind.  
 The house is very quiet,  
 The sun shines in on your books,  
 On your scissors and thimble just put down,  
 But you are not there.  
 Suddenly I am lonely:  
 Where are you?  
 I go about searching.

Then I see you,  
 Standing under a spire of pale blue larkspur,  
 With a basket of roses on your arm.  
 You are cool, like silver,  
 And you smile.  
 I think the Canterbury bells are playing little tunes.

You tell me that the peonies need spraying,  
 That the columbines have overrun all bounds,  
 That the *pyrus japonica* should be cut back and  
 rounded.  
 You tell me these things.

But I look at you, heart of silver,  
White heart-flame of polished silver,  
Burning beneath the blue steeples of the larkspur.  
And I long to kneel instantly at your feet,  
While all about us peal the loud, sweet,  
*Te Deums* of the Canterbury bells.

Within the radius of these bells, gone, quite, are the empty melodies of the purpled Pretorian guards. Here the aspect of our verse is no longer mildewed: fresh and colorful images rise, nobly limned. Again and again Miss Lowell is mistress of chiselled traceries of words breath-quicken in their appropriate beauty. Judged by canons old or new, few lyrics will show fairer than this lovely **VENUS TRANSIENS**.

Tell me,  
Was Venus more beautiful  
Than you are,  
When she topped  
The crinkled waves,  
Drifting shoreward  
On her plaited shell?  
Was Botticelli's vision  
Fairer than mine;  
And were the painted rosebuds  
He tossed his lady,  
Of better worth  
Than the words I blow about you  
To cover your too great loveliness  
As with a gauze  
Of misted silver?  
  
For me,  
You stand poised  
In the blue and buoyant air,  
Cinctured by night winds,  
Treading the sunlight.  
And the waves which precede you  
Ripple and stir  
The sands at my feet.

How much of Miss Lowell's achievement comes from remarkable adaptive power and how much from sound poetic divination, only the omniscient may tell. Trails of the sedulous ape lie plain in the vintage pressed for her wine-cup, but her cup is a fructifying one and that is the main matter. Present appraisement finds in her work eccentricities and childishness, confusing, belittling, and somewhat too much of decoration, and of the dehumanized ejaculation of the virtuoso. But, these "mincing matters" (for which the Critic may well be "damned with a good, round, agreeable oath," such as the Poet counsels Keats to give!)—these mincing matters aside, present appraisement is happily conscious of many a full-bodied beauty, many an inevitable line,—of richness and challenge, of freshness and verity. Work so radiant, veritable, exquisite, may yet achieve the weight and momentum of supreme integration.

## PERSONALITY: THE SOCIAL FACTOR

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To those interested in the problems of personality the studies connected with the name of Morton Prince will constitute a permanent landmark in the history of our knowledge of the mind.

If one were asked to state which of all the facts uncovered by recent psychological research was the most important for our dealings with personality, both for the theoretical task of understanding its nature and for the practical task of catering for its needs, one would be safe in pointing to the facts of dissociation; or rather, in pointing to the simple discovery that such a thing as dissociation was possible, that this working and functioning unity which we call personality was capable, under pathological conditions, of having a part segregated from the rest and set working by itself as a wholly or partially independent center of activity.

The main facts are nowadays quite familiar. We fail to recall a friend's name, work at it as we will; and later, when we are busy about something else, lo! it springs full-fledged, and in all its irrelevance, into consciousness. To go to a different field, a young man lives two lives, one when he is at home with his parents, and another when he is in lodgings in town; and only by accident, when he carries some trace of the other life with him inadvertently into his parents' presence, do the two ever come together in all their tragic irrelevance. To go at once to the extreme instance, a man disappears from the

countryside, walks to a distant town, sets up a business, carries on a regular and orderly life there for some months under another name, returns at length to his own countryside to take up his old life where he left it off, a little puzzled indeed to find some changes in the interval, but not really knowing that there has been an interval or that he has ever been away. The two phases of his life in this instance never come together at all.

Such facts as these are what we are here naming, in a designedly wide sense of the term, the facts of dissociation. The insight that these facts belong to a common field, that they should be studied together, that they possibly cover the working of a single principle, mark the real stage in our dealing with personality. It is this which has made possible the great advances both in the understanding of the normal person and the therapeutic treatment of the abnormal, which the last two decades have seen.

The occasion of this paper, however, is not to give any account of these theoretical and practical advances; but to point to a possible narrowing of our interpretation of these facts, which has in it both the seeds of theoretical error and practical misfortune. The risk to which we refer lies in the seductive temptation to those who study these dissociations to refer them all to "repression," without considering duly what is covered by the term.

We have in mind such reasoning as the following. Why do I fail to recall my familiar acquaintance's name? Because I have "repressed" it. Why do the two halves of the young man's life not come together? Because he keeps them apart; he "repesses" the one while he is indulging the other. Why does the individual, in one extreme instance, not recall that he has been away leading quite another life in another part of the country for the last six months? Because he has thrust this episode out

of his consciousness; he has "repressed" it.

Our contention is not, of course, that this term could not be used. It probably must be used. But the above sample of thought, may represent an unintelligent use of it, in which there is real risk.

The currency of the term is due, of course, to the psychological theory known as psycho-analysis; and to the ascendancy which it has gained, and rightly gained, at the present time. The effect of a great deal of this theory has been to widen the role of repression in the mental life enormously. Freud and Jury and their followers have almost written the word repression right round our spiritual horizon. And if there is error mixed in with their truth—for that they have struck some truth is patent to every unprejudiced mind from their practical success—the error has crept in along with their term, and is traceable to the enormous emphasis which they have been led to put upon "inhibition" and "repressions"—repressions necessitated, of course, by the need for living a civilized life; mostly, according to Freud, a repression of sexual tendencies; a repression not merely of sexual tendencies but equally of many others according to Jury.

Apropos of this theory, an acute American thinker has put the pertinent question; "but what exactly is repressed?" This question is urged by W. E. Hocking in his book on *Human Nature*, in the few places where he touches on the subject. This question, however, can be evaded. What really needs to be asked is another one. In order to bring things to a head and segregate truth from error in this important matter, the question which needs to be put is, as it seems to us, not What is repressed? but is repression the evil?

We are all under the necessity of living a civilized life, which involves that a great number of our crude natural tendencies require to be kept under or repressed. But is

repression the evil? If it is, then to seem to repress will be enough. Healing will consist in that. And that this is the first insidious suggestion which comes to people's minds when they begin to be acquainted with psycho-analysis, is a fact of which there can, we think, be little doubt. Now to cease to repress is not of itself enough to heal. And it seems to us a matter of more than merely theoretical importance, to grasp the distinction between the mere ceasing to repress, and the actual process which does heal.

When, in a person's mind or personality, a part becomes split off and thus "alienated" from the rest, in what consists the evil in the case? Not, in itself, in the "repression" which the person is doing. We have all to repress. Conversely during the process of healing, the removal of the repressing force (to speak metaphorically) is not the whole operation.

Take our case of the man just returned to his native place from some months of absence which he knows nothing about. By methods now fairly well established, a good physician may heal that man, through removing the repressing force that keeps the forgotten episode out of consciousness. But it is a great mistake to think that the whole operation consists in letting the repressed elements up, unmodified, to occupy consciousness again. If this were all, the repressed element would simply repossess the field of consciousness.

The man would go clean over into his other personality, and instead of being at home in his native haunts with a normal memory of his immediate past, would wonder what he was doing here so far from home, when all his worldly connections were in a distant town. There is no healing in merely bringing up the old personality again. The two personalities must be brought together, and the individual must be enabled permanently to hold them together.

Stated thus our contention is almost a truism. Yet the perception of it it seems to us, is socially very important. Healing of the self-alienated personality is a rebinding of the scattered elements of the personality. Healing therefore does not come from bidding man merely cease to practice repression, and begin and commit himself those indulgences which social requirements forbid. It is no real healing to do this. It is no real healing to a man with murderous proclivities simply to let him murder—to put an extreme but quite possible case. That would only be to bid him drop out of the ranks of civilization into another personality. There is real healing, only in the modification of those tendencies; that is, in his letting out his hatred upon really hateful things. The true healing is not simply that a man should burst away the repressing forces which normally keep him from outrage. It is something much subtler and harder to describe. It is that he should, in a manner of speaking, go back in consciousness, into the mood of repressed desire to outrage, and rise straight out of that to the attack upon the things which socially deserve to be attacked. The unsocial in man has not only to be let act, it has to be socialized. Otherwise there is of course, no safety for society. But that is not our exact point. Our point is, that in that case there is no healed personality either.

The distinction subtle as it is could be illustrated from innumerable examples. One final one may not be superfluous.

A man is walking with his wife along a crowded railway platform, where many of their fashionable acquaintances are, like themselves, issuing from the train. The lady suddenly stops to tie her shoe. It is a trifling incident, but full of significance to the man who has the penetration to see. He possibly knows very well that ten, fifteen, twenty years before, it would have been impossible

for the then prim dame to have done such a thing—quite unthinkable indeed. In those far-off days she would have let him tie her shoe. And that, not out of affectation, by any means. Quite the reverse. It would have been a matter of necessity, even tragic necessity, necessity arising, it might be, out of a deep, haunting, pursuing fear of being less than sufficient in her every act and motion to the society she conceives she is living amongst.

This, then, is the simple elementary situation. We must notice, now, a distinction which comes in. The man as he witnesses the act and notes the enormous change which has enabled this hitherto imprisoned person to arrive at the freedom of a simple peasant woman, will yet witness it with different sentiments according as he has or has not risen from the individual point of view to the social point of view which we have been advocating. From the individual standpoint the act will record a complete triumph. From the other it will be a triumph, indeed, but as yet an incomplete one.

From the first standpoint all that is wanted is for the individual to be rid of a repression. From this point it will be all satisfactory that the long tragic years of late adolescence and spinsterhood, with their agony of insufficiency, are in that act proved to be now successfully elided, cut out, and the freedom of early adolescence or childhood restored again. But this is not the final point of view. That distracting section of life must not be simply cut off. It must not be lost. It too had its value. What is really needed is not merely that the distant mood of childhood should be restored unmodified; and the lady be free to tie her shoe as a peasant woman is free, but that she should realize the freedom she has, as a peasant woman does not. She should realize in other words who is doing this thing; namely the identical prim dame of twenty years ago, the identical member of this present

fashionable society. By the miracle of consciousness she should sink back momentarily into that old personality, sink back for an instant behind those old barriers and feel their confining touch again, and rise straight through them to her present act, and burst them as she passes. She has fashionable society around her to help her do it. It is a fine thing to do the act freely and to be oblivious to the fashionable company. But there was a finer thing still—namely to do it and not be oblivious. This is more than being free. It is being free *in* being social. Whereas the “unconscious” method was a freeing of herself. The conscious,—so far as one little act comes—was a freeing of herself to the salvation of the body politic.

The question whether the scientific therapeutic movement is socially dangerous or not is the vital one. And of course, if it is, then that of itself condemns it. It is tantamount to the statement that it must be practiced simply so far as it is socially safe, and beyond that be treated as Plato treated objectionable art. But it may be possible as we have argued here, to take higher ground in its defence, and to discover that like many other fine things, it is socially unsafe only when half understood; and to discover that, in accordance with a long philosophic tradition, it ceases generally to help the individual just where it begins to sin against the social order.

## IS CIVILIZATION SECURE?

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Civilization at present is like a person who has been brought low by a grave and uncertain malady. The case is serious. And it is uncertain. The patient may live, or he may die. But the final direction of the malady is uncertain. The outcome depends upon forces over which no one seems to have an confident control. In the long run the issue will depend upon what reserve energies the patient may possess and upon the possibility of these being adequately stimulated and brought to their proper functioning in the healing process. But it is not known what latent resources the patient possesses. Neither is it known what means will be successful in stimulating those impulses which are essential in making available any resources that may exist. The problem is twofold. Do any such resources actually exist, or have they been exhausted? Secondly, supposing such resources to exist how are they to be made available for the preservation and for the re-shaping of civilization? Ultimate failure to meet the second phase of the problem is just as fatal as the complete absence of any reserve energy would be.

Modern life, it seems to me, has not found a secure foundation. In spite of wonderful mechanical and material achievements it cannot be said that we have really found the way to live happily and beautifully. There is not the harmony between the inner and the outer man that is necessary for a life of peace and happiness. The achievements of modern science have given us the basis,

so far as material and physical conditions are concerned, of a very superior form of life. These achievements of science and the perfecting of the tools of practical life, however, have overshadowed other and more valuable elements of life. We are withal spiritually poor, and our life has a certain shallowness, a certain artificial brightness and superficiality. Modern civilization has never attained a proper perspective of the values of life as a whole. Thus it is that those values and those ideas that are fundamental in the building of humanity are subordinated and other values of a materialistic type have become supreme. The impulses which produced modern science itself as well as modern culture have not retained their purity but have become mixed with impulses of a less spiritual nature. Thus the impulse to know tends to be degraded to the impulse to know this or that thing because of its utilitarian character. The impulse to create tends to be replaced by the impulse to possess. The thing that is desired is material good and civilization is commercialized.

This form which civilization has taken has given the character to modern intelligence. We have plenty of intelligence of a sort but it is for the most part an intelligence that is directed along the channels of the egoistic impulses and the demands and opportunities of practical life. Hence our world is for the most part a world of mere things rather than a world of values. In order to get command of the tools of practical life we are trained to view the world as a world of mere things, instruments shaped to our hand. We see things only in their specific function as instruments for practical life, and not in their significance as elements in a world. And for many this is the whole of the world and life is molded upon this conception. Education, which ought above all things, to teach us how to estimate, to value things, is largely confined to teaching us how to use things. The youth may

leave college without having seen a *world* at all, but only a great many *things*.

Moreover, science gives us a view of the world as a world of matters-of-fact. Nothing is real, nothing is worth while unless or until it is reduced to a matter-of-fact. Thus the world comes to be regarded as a world of matter-of-fact and the matters-of-significance are excluded. It is not the world as a whole but the world under certain aspects. Not that this world of mere things and of matters-of-fact is not itself a valuable world but when this is made the exclusive view serious consequences to the individual and to society are inevitable. However important and desirable for practical purposes the materialization of life may be the result on the whole must be a genuine spiritualization of life processes if civilization is to endure. Modern life has failed in this respect. Hence we have lost in spiritual depth, in insight, in richness, in harmony, and in happiness and well being. For these depend upon living life in its wholeness. To see life as a material civilization is not to see it whole. To order the processes of life with the proper perspective of values as a standard would mean the spiritualization of those processes.

The values which are fundamental to civilization are the so-called mother virtues such as kindness, sympathy, love, courage, fortitude, and loyalty. The first achievement of humanity was the control of impulse by ideas and sentiments. In the best sense that is human which is dominated by intelligence effective through the higher sentiments. In this way the race has won for itself not alone physical and material security but a spiritual home, a community of the spirit. This seems to me the real achievement of the race. Man comes to interpret life, to value things, and this constitutes the criterion. The particular values are seen as a totality. To envisage the

world thus as a meaningful whole is to recognize its spiritual character. This has become the basis of man's very existence so that in his philosophies and in his religions man comes to hold that this spiritual world is after all not only the most important but that it is also the real world. That which arose seemingly as the superstructure has become the foundation. This at least seems to be the insight of the race, its faith, its hope, and its salvation.

That this is really the insight of the modern world also—however it may have been ignored or obscured on occasion—was shown in the Great War. For when the western nations were faced with defeat what they saw in civilization was humanity—the old and universal virtues and values. The world of mere things, of egoistic impulses, of private fortune took a more modest place in the estimation of men. It was because the peoples were recovering something of the basic impulses of human life, because the spirit of wholeness had replaced the distracting tendencies of a superficial life. This, it is contended, is the function of the spiritual impulse, to give harmony, peace, unity, wholeness. It is the true view of life as the race in its best insight has determined.

This is not, to be sure, the whole concept of civilization. But it is, I believe, the very essence of it and it is the distinctively human element in the world. Moreover, this is the source and the basis of civilization in the broader sense, and without it civilization in its material, intellectual, and æsthetic elements would perish. Instance Rheims Cathedral. The spiritual values have at least this validity that they are the fundamental conditions of any true civilization or worthy life. It has often been the case, for whatever cause, that the spiritual impulse has failed to function adequately. The result has always been fatal.

Modern civilization has failed to achieve security chiefly

for two reasons. In the first place, we have not acquired intellectual mastery of the forces of modern life. The knowledge and the technical skill have been inadequate. The changed conditions brought about by the industrial revolution are such as the mind of man has never been called upon to deal with. In complexity, in vastness, and in delicacy our social and economic structure presents an incomparably more difficult problem than that of any other age. He is perhaps not quite fitted for it. For his intelligence, his type reactions, his instincts and impulses were shaped in a different and far simpler environment. We are now beyond nature. We cannot trust instinct as we once could. But under our form of social and economic life our impulses and instincts may wreck civilization unless they are brought under adequate control and guidance. The achievements of science in the knowledge and control of the forces of physical nature have been remarkable. But we reckon ill when we leave human nature out. And modern civilization has not acquired the knowledge of human nature, and in particular of human nature in the mass, that is necessary for a secure and stable order.

This failure in intellectual mastery, while equally important, is perhaps not as fundamental as the failure in the appreciation of values, or the capacity to estimate. Whatever it may mean to value, to estimate, there can be no doubt as to its vital importance for life. Almost if not quite the whole of education begins and ends in giving this power. It is not necessary to claim for this function of intelligence any special seat or faculty. It is rather to be regarded as an essential element in all intelligent action. In any field, therefore, where values enter, this function of intelligence becomes fundamental.

The intellectual failure has been due largely to this spiritual failure. For we develop intelligence in the direction

of our interests, and interests are objectifications of impulses. The interests of modern life are largely practical, commercial, and scientific. The dominant tendencies have been naturalistic and intelligence has been shaped along the line of these tendencies.

Much has been written about the decline in the influence of philosophy in recent years. The fact of the decline is perhaps unquestionable; the reason may be seen and it is important. Philosophy has lost ground because it is essentially foreign to the dominant naturalistic tendencies of today. It has succumbed to the doctrine of success, the pragmatic test, pragmatism being to no little extent a commentary upon the decline of philosophy. The natural sciences discovered a method that was successful. The results have been real, far reaching, and above all practical in value. The prestige gained by actual results chiefly for practical life has enabled science to impose its dogmas much as the church at one time did. When it has been said, therefore, that the methods of the natural sciences can give all that man can hope to attain of truth, that the scientific view of the world is the only true view, and in particular that it is the only respectable view, the statement has carried conviction by the power of recognized authority. But the scientific view is valuable, true, and successful, just because of its self-limitation because of what it omits or ignores. And what it ignores is precisely what philosophy finds important, and true, and successful, namely, the view of life and the world as a whole. Philosophy seeks meanings, science seeks matters-of-fact. For philosophy fact serves meaning, for science fact is its own excuse for being. Philosophy estimates, interprets, evaluates; and it sees all things, all matters-of-fact, under the form of eternity.

This relation of philosophy and science is but another reading of modern life. Philosophy is having rough sail-

ing, so is modern life. The two are based upon the same conditions, namely, a failure to make the spiritual view of the world prevail, to make the impulses and the values of a spiritual nature dominate the distracting and materialistic tendencies of the times.

The task of meeting the problem of modern life, therefore, falls not a little upon the bearers of philosophical tradition. Philosophy cannot afford to become "scientific," since this means to adopt the methods and viewpoint of science. Whatever may be said against philosophy as personal insight, what, it may be asked, does the world need quite as much as insight? The only pity is that there is not adequate insight, or that the insight of philosophy could not have made its influence more effective in the world. There may be methods of bringing about this result but the way out is not for philosophy to forsake its own method and viewpoint and adopt that of science, attempting to gain its end by piece-meal work. The problem for philosophy is the problem of life, and life is totality. This is really the problem of making the insight of the race prevail. And philosophers have been notable contributors to this result.

We seek, then, a secure basis for the values of life, for human life itself, in fact. The present crisis in civilization, in which the highest values are placed in jeopardy, raises the question of the actual existence of a permanent basis of life. Have the spiritual resources of our time been exhausted? The question is purely speculative for we cannot know. We only know that the race has passed through periods when the values were apparently lost only to reappear in a new environment. The spiritual vitality of the race itself seems to be inexhaustible. As we survey the present world we cannot believe, despite the evidences of moral defeat and incapacity, that our own civilization is doomed. But we cannot rationally hope to save the

best in our life unless adequate methods are found by which the spiritual impulse of the peoples may be brought to function. Perhaps the only adequate stimulus is a cause, the cause of humanity itself, of our spiritual heritage. For this cause the peoples, if they could only see it, would make further sacrifices. Unfortunately the necessary moral leadership seems lacking though it may yet appear.

The source of human values is the spiritual impulse, their existence the result of the functioning of this impulse in the human environment. It may be that this impulse, and life itself, are incapable of definition. But this at least seems clear: life not only is but possesses, as it appears in human beings, a bias of a specific quality, which, by reason of its fruits, we call spiritual. These fruits are the values and they have been judged to be, on the basis of the best insight of the race, the most inclusively significant character of the real. Being the most significant character of reality value possesses objectivity. These values have been won by the race. Did the race also create them? Perhaps the distinction is unreal. For if it is said that the values have been produced by the creative activity of human beings it can be answered that the creative activity itself is a form of the spiritual impulse. And the human quality of life is also a result of the functioning of this impulse. Thus to say that the values are human, or that they are the product of human activity may not affect their objective character. And if the race could answer we should find that that which is the most significant in the values is that they are not merely human, but that they belong to the very character of the world as a spiritual reality. This faith in the objective character of the values of life is, in addition, an important factor in their achievement and preservation. It is still an important factor, for if the peoples lose their faith in the

reality of the ideal serious consequences will follow. This belief is not, however, sufficient merely as a faith. The philosopher must give to this ancient and honored conviction a rational basis. This is after all the traditional task of philosophy.

## Book Reviews

### THE RELIGIOUS TEACHING OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

By ALBERT C. KNUDSON, Professor in Boston University School of Theology. The Abingdon Press, New York, 1920. Pp. 416. Price \$2.50 net.

A necessary element in a well-rounded consideration of the religious teaching of the Old Testament is a philosophical mind and preparation. These are evident in a marked degree in this book.

There is no slavish following of some theory of criticism such as has often been exhibited in this field. Yet there is toleration and a fair presentation of the leading theories.

One is made to feel that after all the important thing is not the pursuit of a theory, but the grasping of the living element in the inspired message. The importance of judging by life is made clear by the author in the very beginning when he grounds authority in experience. He says:

"In the religious realm the final test of truth is not to be found in any absolute objective authority, whether church or Bible, but in experience. If the Bible finds us at greater depths of our being than any other book, if it enriches our lives and inspires us to heroic service, if it makes God real to us, we have in that fact a sufficient evidence of its inspiration." We need no doctrine of infallibility to assure us of its truth." (p. 22.)

Dr. Knudson shows the muddled condition of criticism that grows out of the determination to make biblical development conform to a theory of strict evolution. Such a standpoint shows a wholesome reaction from recent tendencies to overlook the facts of life in the pursuit of the evolutionary dream. The unique survival of Israel's religion over national disaster is held to be due to the highly ethical and universal content given it by the prophets. Personality in God is considered fundamental to religion as it is likewise to the highest category of our own existence. If this be anthropomorphism he is willing to accept the challenge, for by personality he means Bowne's definition, "self-hood, self-consciousness, self-control and the power to know."

The thought of the unity of Yaweh enabled Israel to keep out many of the immoral practices of the heathen. It prepared the way for the internationalism of the Eighth century prophets by providing a conception of God sufficiently universal to be applied to existing political conditions. The resulting monotheism grew out of the life needs of the people.

"The imperious heart of the Hebrew could tolerate no fundamental dualism or pluralism in his view of the universe. Its demand for an ultimate unity was as insistent as was the Greek intellect. But while the latter gave us a unity that aimed simply to satisfy the mind's demand for an ultimate explanation of the world, the former gave us a unity that met the demands of life as a whole, a unity to which heart, conscience and intellect might adoringly turn and say, 'Thy kingdom come and thy will be done.' It is then no surprise that the monotheistic faith of the Hebrews rather than the monistic philosophy of the Greeks finally conquered the civilized world" (92).

Of the biblical doctrine of sin he says:

"Sin is a positive act or state of hostility to God. It is not an 'unreality or illusion,' as Spinoza would have us believe; nor is it as Hegel teaches, 'An essential moment in the progressive or eternally realized life of God; nor is it, as some evolutionists tell us, simply a relic of the animal nature which we have inherited. Not even Kant's conception of evil as 'the perversion of the right relation between reason and sense, the false subordination of the rational to the sensuous,' fills out the biblical idea of sin" (255-6).

In the chapter on the Messianic hope, the author calls attention to the over-strenuous criticism which would give all eschatological passages a late date. There is a large measure of justice in his criticism. It should not, however, be overlooked that early traces of the eschatological spirit are not inconsistent with the appearance of a larger body of eschatological writing in times of special storm and stress. Eschatology becomes a dominating motif as we say in music when hope is forced to turn to dreams of revolution when real revolution becomes at the same time more desirable and more impossible. There seems to be a historical connection, which probably Dr. Knudson would not deny, between the eschatological temper and political change just as the late war gave a popular impetus to the doctrines of millennialism. The eschatological temper is essentially that of present spiritual futility.

The work has a tolerance, a naturalness, a freshness and vigor of treatment which fully justify its appearance and make it of special value not only to the critical scholar but also to the untechnical student who desires to trace the growth of Old Testament ideas.

**HUMANISM IN NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY.** By GEORGE A. GORDON, D.D., Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1920.

This is a stimulating and bracing treatment of a crucial question today, how to retain all that was dignified and uplifting in the old theology, and yet meet the issues that modern life and thought have injected into the problem of life. The author, considered the ablest thinker in our American pulpit—he is pastor of the Old South Church in Boston—uses the term “humanism” in a wide way, reminding one of David Hume’s pungent utterance: “What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain, which we call thought, that we must make it the model of the universe?” A man is not less a man, but more a man, more “human,” when he strives to establish his relationship with the Divine Ruler of the world.

A stanch Trinitarian, constructive in his final attitude toward religious faith, Dr. Gordon recognizes that the orthodox theology of fifty years ago is gone for good; although the reaction against its rigid and artificial postulates carried with it much that was regrettable. “Nothing could be more shocking to the majestic moral sense of the Puritan,” he asserts, “than popular Universalism’s easy ideas about sin, its shallowness upon every question of conscience, its conversion of the most worthy Judge Eternal into an infinite, indiscriminating sentimentalist.” And yet “the main contention of Universalism—the love of God for every soul that he has made and his everlasting purpose to pursue with his redeeming grace all souls in all worlds” was a necessary complement of the system it attacked, able to furnish it with “new range, reality, life and worth.”

The world is not happy today; it is “groaning and travailing” as in St. Paul’s time. “Into this tragic world of man,” pertinently remarks the author, “ancient thinkers looked with profound vision; that vision must be renewed by the thinkers of this modern time who would know what man is and what he needs in order that he may become what it is in him to be.”

The booklet is eminently helpful for this purpose.

JAMES MAIN DIXON.

SOME RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF PRAGMATISM. By JOSEPH Roy GEIGER, one of the series of philosophical studies issued under the direction of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1919. Pp. 54.

THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE. By Angus Stewart Woodburne. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1920. Pp. 103.

The futility of trying to make science answer the questions of metaphysics on the empirical plane has been evidenced in the history of philosophy, times without number, and yet the attempt is oft repeated. Joseph Roy Geiger in "Some Religious Implications of Pragmatism," dismisses all such things as general truths, of universal applicability, in order to provide in pragmatism a basis for religious thought. Of course, there must be the deepest sympathy with the effort to bring religious experience to the test of practice. But it will not do to be too pragmatic at this point. When he confines religious experience to the individual does he mean to confine it to individual attainment only or does he mean to include religious ideals as well. If so, there must be something over against man or separate from man which in creating creates a common moral need. If religion is to be at all commanding it must be something more than a private experience. Otherwise all its value judgments become solipsistic. An individual human ethics is not enough. If religion is to be a thing of power I must be reasonably sure that the power behind the universe is ethical. This confidence cannot be gained by solipsistic experience. Thus individual ethics becomes a hand to mouth, utilitarianism. There are a considerable number of smug historical generalizations which a thorough-going pragmatism would seem to rule out. Among these is the time-worn but "scientific practice of making one's point by assuming an evolutionary origin of religion, rather than by reference to the ever active spiritual nature of man." So we are measurably prepared for loose statements implying that only recently has religion become ethical, that philanthropy is a plant of recent growth, and that "theology arose because of a disintegration of human values."

Quite similar in treatment and outlook is the work of Angus Stewart Woodburne in "The Relation Between Religion and Science." When he declares in his closing pages that "religion has

at least the *argumentum ad hominem* that science too has its metaphysics in the æons, electrons, atoms, and molecules of the scientist," he displays an insight which should have saved him from some of his earlier conclusions.

He proposes to show that religion and science move from the same basis being only differentiable attitudes toward the extra-human environment. He spends a considerable effort in proving the historic separation of the two in philosophy a fallacy. Having united them in supposedly undying wedlock, however, he straight-way discusses their necessary separation.

The real aim of the discussion seems to be the overthrow of the old dogmatic view of revelation which neglected the test of life and depended for its proof upon external and literal authorities. The author ought to know, however, that this type of theology has not been prevalent in protestant seminary circles at least for many years.

His definition of instinct is a gem. "Instinct is a congenital co-ordination of reflexes, neurally integrated and effecting an organic response characteristic of and serviceable to the species and in some manner capable of subsequent modification." We suppose the author must consider this the "scientific" way of saying that instinct is the simple functioning of organisms for the uses of life. To put it thus simply would not appear nearly so profound and the emptiness of the definition becomes too apparent.

What he fails to discover is that religious instinct cannot appear in the same biological plane with plant and animal instinct for the reason that it springs, not as he thinks, from the simple processes of life, but from the unique possession by man of conscious self-consciousness. This consciousness of consciousness brings in its train the whole world of reflection and moral sense. The discussion is all along overawed by the assumption that primitive man was an animal. While popular and supposedly 'scientific,' this conclusion is one of those dogmatisms of science against which the author has warned us.

THE RIVAL PHILOSOPHIES OF JESUS AND PAUL; being an explanation of the failures of organized Christianity and a vindication of the teachings of Jesus, which are shown to contain a religion for all men and for all times. By IGNATIUS SINGER. The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1919. Pp. 347.

This book must surely give pause to many of our light and thoughtless assumptions regarding the meaning of the gospel, for it is written with an evident sincerity which runs from beginning to end. It starts with the declaration that it is not the church that has failed, but it is Christianity that has failed. Believing that there was a real Jesus, the author asserts that Christ is but a myth. Many of the arguments are ingenuous rather than scientific. It might be called a sincere effort to make the facts fit a theory, and we have already been surfeited with this type of exegesis. It seems to us sadly deficient in all knowledge of biblical criticism, and claiming excellence for its very defects. The argument progresses by that hoariest of all fallacies, the ignoring of contradictory cases. This is the method that fills the patent medicine almanac and is the resort of every species of fraud. Thus he presumes to make out that Paul was the greatest enemy that the Gospel has ever known. As a sample of loose and unsustained statement we quote the following: "It is as plainly established, therefore, as any fact in history can be established, that it was Paul who conceived the idea of the "Christ," and that this must have happened many years after the death of Jesus." Throughout the book there seems a peculiar lack of any insight into the meaning of life, a blindness that would demand that all life be free from inconsistency or paradox.

A ST. ANDREW'S TREASURY OF VERSE. By MRS. ALEXANDER LAWSON and PROFESSOR LAWSON. London: A. C. Black. New York: Macmillan. Pp. 280. (\$3.00.)

This anthology will be welcomed by lovers of Scottish lyrics, of whom there are so many in our country. The selection is the work of the Professor of English Literature and his wife at the ancient university on the estuary of the Tay, and the frontispiece is an artistic limning of the fine old college of St. Salvator's, where George Buchanan once taught. St. Andrew's has always kept up its liter-

ary productiveness throughout the centuries. Robert Fergusson, who did so much to inspire Burns, Thomas Chalmers, and in our own days Andrew Lang, were all St. Andrew's bred. Its poet-laureate is Robert Fuller Murray, who died young, along before the war. Charles Murray, also a student in its time-worn halls, who this year received an honorary degree from Aberdeen University, will always be remembered by his inimitable *THE WHISTLE* of the wee herd laddie:

"He played a march to battle; it cam' dirlin' 'through the mist,  
Till half the halfin' squared his shou'ders an' made up his mind to  
'list;  
He tried a spring for wooers, though he wistna what it meant,  
But the kitchen-lass was lauchin' 'an' he thocht she maybe kent;  
He got ream and buttered bannocks for the lovin' lilt he played.  
Wasna that a cheery whistle that the wee herd made?"

There are several poems from the pen of the gifted son of the well-known Principal of Aberdeen University, George Buchanan Smith, whose bones lie somewhere in Flanders. J. M. D.

## Books Received

**Pantheistic Dilemmas and Other Essays in Philosophy and Religion**, by Henry C. Sheldon, Professor in Boston University. Methodist Book Concern, New York, 1920. Pp. 358. Price \$2.50.

**Immortality, a Study of Belief and Other Addresses**, by William Newton Clarke. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1920. Pp. XIII and 132.

**Problems of Conduct**, an introductory survey of Ethics by Durant Drake, A. M., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Ethics and Philosophy of Religion at Wesleyan University. Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston.

**An Introduction to Social Ethics; the Social Conscience in a Democracy**, by John M. Mecklin, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy. University of Pittsburgh. Harcourt, Brace and Howe, New York, 1920. Pp. IX and 446.

**Psycho-analysis, a Brief Account of the Freudian Theory**, by Barbara Low. Introduction by Ernest Jones, M. D. Harcourt, Brace and Howe, New York, 1920. Pp. IX and 199.

**The Lebanon in Turmoil, Syria and the Powers in 1860**, by Iskander Ibn Yaqub Abkarius, translated and annotated and provided with an introduction by J. F. Scheltema, M. A., Ph.D., Yale University Press, New Haven. 1920. Pp. 203.

**The Field of Philosophy, an Introduction to the Study of Philosophy**, by Joseph Alexander Leighton, Professor of Philosophy in Ohio State University. 2nd Revised and Enlarged Edition. R. G. Adams & Co., Columbus, O. 1919. Pp. XII and 485.

**A Critic in Pall Mall, Reviews and Miscellanies**, by Oscar Wilde. Ravenna Edition of Oscar Wilde's works. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

**The Orient in Bible Times**, by Elihu Grant, Professor of Biblical Literature in Haverford College. J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia. 1920. Pp. VIII and 336.

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The more important of these books will be reviewed in future numbers of **THE PERSONALIST**.

## Current Thought

### THE EINSTEIN THEORY

To a certain type of scientist it has come as a shock to learn that time and space which he has been considering as the fundamental physical realities are nothing more nor less than relativities. What makes the matter worse this which has heretofore been considered the raving of inconsequential philosophy has to be taken account of in actual experiment. The theories of Einstein are set forth by C. D. Broad in the *Hibbert Journal* for April under the title, Euclid, Newton and Einstein. His purpose is thus stated at the beginning of the article: "I propose to try in the present paper to put into simple terms, which shall neither make a layman feel dizzy nor a mathematician feel sick, the main points of Einstein's principle of relativity." This result he seems to accomplish in a more extended way than most of the other magazines and reviews, and in absence of a knowledge of the original sources, with a greater exactness.

### THE LETTERS OF WILLIAM JAMES

No one interested in philosophy will feel that he can afford to miss the delightful series of personal letters of William James begun in the July *Atlantic*. The letters have been edited by his son and give an intimate picture of his attitude toward life, his philosophy, and his estimate of his contemporaries. Of special interest to personalists is his attitude toward the French personalist, Charles Renouvier, author of *Le Personalisme*. To Renouvier he writes: "I do what lies in my feeble power to assist the propagation of your works here; but *students of philosophy* are rare here as everywhere. It astonishes me nevertheless that you have had to wait so long for general recognition. Only a few months ago I had the pleasure of introducing to your *Essais* two *professors* of philosophy, able and learned men, who hardly knew your name!! But I am perfectly convinced that it is a mere affair of time, and that you will take your place in the general History of Speculation as the classical and finished representative of the tendency which was begun by Hume,

and to which writers before you had made only fragmentary contributions, whilst you have fused the whole matter into a solid, elegant, and definitive system, perfectly consistent and capable, by reason of its moral vitality, of becoming popular, so far as that is permitted to philosophic systems." Yet who now knows Renouvier? We venture the guess that his name is quite unknown to the average American student of philosophy. Recognition will, however, come in that day when the theories of personalism come into their own. Some day the justice of James' estimate will we believe be recognized.

### DEMOCRACY AT THE CROSS-ROADS

Such is the title of a clear and analytical essay by Harold J. Laski in the *Yale Review* for July. It will be of special interest to all who feel themselves profoundly disturbed by the political unrest of the time. He closes with these words: "What is needed in the political philosophy of the present generation is admission of the novelty of our problems. The simple *a priori* premises of Hobbes or Locke, the intriguing mysticism of Rousseau's general will, eloquence about the initiative of men and its translation into terms of private property, are no longer suited to a world that has seen its foundations in flames because to its good intentions an adequate knowledge was not joined. What we need, as a no previous time, is the sober and scientific study of the conditions of social organization. That does not mean, as in the books it so often means, some crude remarks on consciousness of kind, or arid summary of the evolution from the family to the state. It means a realization that the basis of our society is intellectual co-operation and that a study of the procedure by which it works has hardly been begun. It means a careful analysis of the motives by which men live together with rejection of that dangerous simplicity which made Tarde find in initiation or Maine in habit the final technique of government. It involves inquiries into the conditions of happiness, the substance of men's thoughts, the impulses we must satisfy if our state is to endure. Above all it involves a skepticism about all systems which assume to themselves finality. The path of history is crowded with shrunken ghosts of systems which once were taken as the sum of truth. An admission of vast complexity is the beginning of wisdom in political philosophy. That and the willingness to pursue the investigation wherever it may lead must be our first demands."

## CHANGING WAR MOODS

Under the title British War Poetry, Professor Chauncey B. Tinker (*Yale Review*) discusses with rare insight into the minds of the men who took part in the conflict the change from the intensity of personal faith expressed in such a poem as Everard's poem on Harrow, to a later feeling of bitterness:

There is a hill in England,  
Green fields and a school I know,  
Where the bal's fly fast in summer,  
And the whispering elm-trees grow,  
    A little hill, a dear hill,  
    And the playing fields below.

There is a hill in Flanders,  
Heaped with a thousand slain,  
Where the shells fly night and noontide  
And the ghosts that died in vain,—  
    A little hill, a hard hill  
    To the souls that died in pain.

There is a hill in Jewry,  
Three crosses pierce the sky,  
On the midmost he is dying  
To save all those who die,  
    A little hill, a kind hill  
    To those in jeopardy.

From this idealism he turns to that other mood which characterized the spring of 1918, in which Siegfried Sassoon turns bitterly upon the people at home:

Does it matter?—losing your legs?  
For people will always be kind,  
And you need not show that you mind  
When the others come in after hunting  
To gobble their muffins and eggs. . . .

Do they matter?—these dreams from the pit?  
You can drink and forget and be glad,  
And people won't say that you're mad;  
For they'll know that you fought for your country,  
And no one will worry a bit.

And will we ever return to the mood of high idealism that once characterized us? Let us hope that the high tides only served to mark the place where the returning tides must surely come.

## A PLEA FOR THE NEGLECTED INTELLECT

Dr. Ralph Barton Perry writes interestingly in *The Harvard Theological Review* on The Integrity of the Intellect. He feels that the pragmatists and instrumentalists have brought intellect so low, that "it is dressed in livery and sent to live in the servants' quarters." This indignity moves him to raise a protest in defence. His only hope for the restoration of intellect appears strangely enough to be the removal of metaphysics from all religious influences. If intellect is to stand in its own right philosophy must cease to provide aid and comfort to the theists and like the inhabitants of York, "just set and think."

Dr. Perry fails to tell us, however, how intellect can think about the nature of reality and the world-ground without being badgered by the ghost of theistic suggestion or assumption. Perhaps in that case like the aforesaid inhabitants it should "just set." It may be that this miserable diversion of philosophy toward theism is not entirely due to indoctrinated prejudices, but that the suggestion arises from the nature of the universe and of life itself.

## THE NEW RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSY

*The Expository Times* of June suggests that the fires of coming religious controversy are to rage around the question of the deity of Jesus. The editor writes: "The controversy that is upon us has to do with the New Testament, but not with its dates or its documents. The first great controversy of all was over the Person of Christ. It must have been a thrilling time to live in. It takes no prophet to say that the next great controversy will be over the Person of Christ also, and that the rising generation will pass through an experience no less exciting. What are the signs of its coming? They are many. But this is one sign of more significance than all the rest. It is that men of undeniable interest in Christ, men of theological training and church loyalty, are seeking 'a way out of the trinitarian difficulty.' They have various ways of seeking it. Some of them simply ignore the deity and write with a captivating beauty of language on the humanity of our Lord. Some are bolder and believe that they can discover a middle way."

## Notes and Discussions

### IN MEMORIAM: HINCKLEY GILBERT MITCHELL

Most of the men trained under Dr. Bowne had the privilege of association with one who in another field commanded a like reverence.

The passing of Hinckley Gilbert Mitchell will be to all such like the turning of one more page and the ending of one more chapter in the book of their lives.

Dr. Mitchell was great as an Old Testament scholar, and to him came the satisfaction of general recognition. He was greater as a Christian, however, which was better. When the fires of controversy raged about him, he, of all, friend or foe, remained alone undisturbed, kindly, unsuspicuous, and unresentful. He had unscrupulous enemies and false friends, but he refused to the end to impute malice, or to think of anyone except in the kindest terms.

His last years were filled with uncomplaining and joyous ministrations to invalidism in his own home, just as the earlier years had been spent in spreading the gospel in the byways and hedges of the north-end tenements of Boston. The world possesses but few such Christians, and their going leaves a sad void. Never was funeral hymn more appropriately sung than when in old Kings Chapel they sang for him, "For all the saints who from their labors rest, Alleluia! Alleluia!"

### THE FORGET-ME-NOTS OF GOD

In a far corner of what was once No-man's Land in the sector near Rheims stands a rude cross made from broken branches of shell-shattered trees. Its significance to the eye lay in its isolation. Here some son of France paid his last great tribute of devotion. The field was still strewn with the desolation and broken enginery of war. The grave was nameless and unmarked save for the extemporized cross, but through the days of heat and storm and in

the long night-watches invisible hands had been at work. The lonely grave, when I saw it, was a burst of blue, a blanket of wild forget-me-nots.

Thus there are on every hand evidences of an unforgetting Intelligence that softens our human miseries and points us to the day when all shadows shall flee away forever.

I cannot go into our southern mountains without witnessing the ameliorating care of this divinity. The unsightly and overheated rocks are carpeted with the royal purple of the phlox. Canterbury bells and lilies nod to me in the breeze. The monkey-flower spreads its masses of delicate gold, and, though the wonder of the mountain lilac be passed away my eye is constantly assailed and my interest aroused by the panoply of color.

Over every rugged trail, and around every steep place of sorrow I find spread forth, the forget-me-nots of God. My heart takes comfort from experience. The lonely soldier has not died in vain in spite of all appearances in these turbulent and forgetful times. As surely as the tides of spring send up their life to carpet the grave of neglect, as surely as the tides of the sea kiss again the sands from which they retreated, so surely must the tides of human feeling and accomplishment rise to the level of this lonely sacrifice. This grave is one of God's outposts in the forward march of humanity. You have but to wait, brave lad, until the race shall catch up with your advanced bivouac! What God forgets not cannot eventually be forgotten.

### THE NIGHT WATCHES

That hour of cold, of sleeplessness and darkness when the first draught of precious sleep is quaffed. How shall one lay the spectres of the mind that haunt it? The cares of yesterday, the fears for tomorrow seen through the mists of troubled rest assume colossal proportions. Let us not join in execrating this ebb-tide moment of the night, for out of the fleeting hours of consciousness it is the one entirely free for introspection, meditation, and prayer.

What matter if it force me to acknowledge my insufficiency if only I end by falling back on the Infinite goodness and mercy and help. "His reins instruct me in the night seasons." My heart is thronged with the music of songs in the night. I rest my soul as well as my body. And 'ere the dawn comes singing over the hills

or the linnet pipes beneath my window I fall asleep again in the arms of God. It may be in some such way after I have bravely faced the spectres of time and the ravishing years that He shall lay his hand of peace upon me, He who "giveth his beloved sleep."

### KEYNES, BRITISH APOSTLE OF GERMANISM

No book in these last few months has been more widely read than John Maynard Keynes' *The Economic Aspects of the Peace Treaty*. He was on the British staff as an expert, and his picture portraits of the President, Lloyd George and Clemenceau are very well drawn. He considers that Clemenceau got about all he wanted; and that the opportunist Lloyd George and the theorist Woodrow Wilson were as wax in his hands. One thing is disappointing in his outlook; his differentiation between "theological" and "intellectualism," as if the keenest intellect were not all the keener for having a religious outlook; and his aloofness to national aspirations. Just retribution—moral or theological term—comes in the way of a quick healing up of economical troubles; therefore it must be ignored. This is only one aspect of his dangerous line of argument, which works wonderfully into the German way of viewing things today; exactly suiting them.

We are in hearty accord with the *Yale Review* which says: "It is at least unfortunate that Mr. Keynes, with the chance to do great good by dealing honestly with his subject and its setting, has chosen to blur the truth. He has himself explained this in a later statement to the effect that it was necessary to catch the attention of the British public. . . . Mr. Keynes's book, however, is pernicious, for it spreads the impression that the entire work of the Conference was rotten to the core, and it excites complete mistrust of the Treaty; if the Treaty, faulty as it may be, is scrapped, Europe faces chaos."

### THE MEANING OF NATIONALITY

The July number of the *International Review of Missions* is a particularly attractive one. Following a thoughtful article on "Foreign Missions and the League of Nations," by George Freedland Barbour of Edinburgh, is a sane and suggestive discussion of

"Nationality and Missions," by Bishop J. H. Oldham. He begins by making a distinction between the terms nation and nationality, although they are from the same root; and expresses a doubt whether nationality and the state must always coincide. In any case nationality is different from the state, which is political, and from race, which is physical: "For the Christian, nationality," he rightly declares, "is not the ultimate loyalty; his highest allegiance is to the Christian fellowship. . . . The reconciliation of the narrower and the wider loyalty is found in the truth that nationality can attain its highest and fullest expression only in the service of an ideal higher than itself." This is well said. And his closing sentences are equally weighty: "Like the individual, the nation can find its highest and noblest expression and self-realization in devotion to an ideal and the unselfish service of mankind. In the measure that we submit ourselves to this law, national loyalty and loyalty to the universal kingdom of God become one."

## The Philosopher's Shears

### SOME BOWNE EPIGRAMS FROM A COLLEGE NOTE-BOOK\*

Personality is the key to all philosophy.

What we want is not eyesight but insight.

Russia—despotism tempered with assassination.

Somebody has to pay your way if you are to go.

Nothing ought to be discovered at the cost of baseness.

The ideal is always ahead of the real, but not always perfect.

The person who mentions our obligations thereby cancels them.

One can always give a good reason for the things he is bent on doing.

Work is a good thing to keep temptations away. We can outflank sin.

Some persons are so small they have no soul. They have only a gizzard.

Everything worth while has had to fight its way; the printing press in Germany and railroads in China.

Scrupulosity is to be avoided. I have no respect for that man who writes a letter on Sunday and dates it on Monday.

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\*The above are from the note-book of Reverend J. Frank Chase, of Boston. Many others could be added by other Bowne students. Won't you help the cause by sending in those of special interest?













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The Personalist

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